HEGEL AND CRITICAL SOCIAL THEORY: New Perspectives from the Marcuse Archives


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Recently published archival material suggests the need to reexamine Herbert Marcuse’s interpretation of Hegel’s thought. Social theory generally will benefit from reflections upon Marcuse’s historical attempts to understand contemporary societal domination, including its abstract forms, and his original social “translations” of Hegel’s Subjective Logic. Following sections on Being and Essence, the latter often favored by Marxists, the final part of Hegel’s Science of Logic was undervalued in the development of critical social theory before Marcuse’s close readings in the years 1932–1941. Marcuse took the lead among Critical Theorists in explicating Hegel’s texts. Just as significant, Marcuse was among the first to point out the sociological relevance of key categories in the most abstract final sections of Hegel’s most abstract work. The newly published materials document Marcuse’s unique attempts to conceive Hegelian dialectic proper as itself a practical force of social transformations. Most important, these articles concern the relationship between theory and social practice that Marcuse investigated in Hegel’s dialectic of the idea of the true and the idea of the good—the absolute idea.

Herbert Marcuse produced important works during World War II and its aftermath. These were intended to focus attention on the social relevance of Critical Theory for which Marcuse forcefully argued in his 1941 Reason and Revolution: Hegel and the Rise of Social Theory (1999). Reexaminations of Marcuse’s appreciation of the power of Hegel’s categories to orient thinking about the core problems of contemporary society are invaluable at a time when many sociologists have turned away from the idea that theory development can contribute to positive social change. Articles in the first of two recent volumes include publicly unknown 1940s writings from the Marcuse archives (Marcuse 1998). These writings suggest a dearth of direct immanent investigations of Marcuse’s Hegelian-Marxian critical social theory (Kellner 1998).

In reviewing a couple of these archival pieces I will argue that Marcuse’s assessments of the untapped potential of Hegel’s dialectic for critical social theory changed significantly in the period (1932–1941). During this period he published his two major books on Hegel, and carved out a role for himself as the principal philosopher at the Institute for Social Research (ISR), the original institutional basis of the well-known Frankfurt School. Comparisons of the two works suggest that, though subtle, the tendency of these
alterations was to render Marcuse’s social theory ultimately more compatible with the pessimistic “one-dimensional” thesis first fully developed by Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno (Horkheimer 1987; Horkheimer and Adorno 1988), also around the World War II period. This thesis held that the postliberal social totality had become non-contradictory and hence was not internally susceptible to radical social transformations. In view of this, the post-Reason and Revolution writings represent a difficult and ambiguous theoretical moment, as Marcuse attempted to reestablish an adequate relationship of dialectical philosophy to critical social theory. I will take into account Marcuse’s two major close readings of Hegel’s Science of Logic in which he linked the closing chapters of the work with current aspirations for radical social transformations. Development of critical social theory informed by Marcuse’s encounters with Hegel’s categories and by a deeper appreciation of the Logic’s final categories themselves may enhance the ability to diagnose contemporary society, including its current direction—and how it might be influenced.

Recent developments from within the Critical Theory tradition also suggest the need to reexamine Marcuse’s original research on Hegelian dialectic. Jürgen Habermas’s influential efforts in the 1960s and later to overcome what he believed was the exhaustion of the Hegelian-Marxian approach to understanding and changing society singled out for criticism Hegel’s absolutes in particular, and may have diverted new research away from Marcuse’s analyses of these aspects of Hegel’s work altogether. The U.S.-based Critical Theorist Moishe Postone’s (1993) “reinterpretation of Marx’s mature critical theory” sharply criticized Habermas’s ensuing social theory. It included as well novel perspectives on Marx’s “social explanation” of Hegelian philosophy. This work further negated the potential of research into the social relevance of Hegel’s own categories in the last sections of the Logic.

A reexamination of Marcuse’s analysis of Hegel’s concepts by comparison of his two books on Hegel can provide both a sociological basis for appreciating the significance of the recently published Marcuse archival materials and the means for gaining a clearer understanding of issues involved in recent attempts, such as those of Habermas and Postone, to reestablish the social relevance of Critical Theory as a viable alternative among the many competing contemporary approaches.

First I will briefly background and survey two of Marcuse’s just published post-Reason and Revolution writings. Following this I will critically reexamine Marcuse’s reading of Hegel’s Science of Logic, particularly that of the final parts.

“Theories of Social Change”

In his introduction to the first volume of Marcuse’s archival writings, Douglas Kellner suggests that new research indicates that there was something of an incipient post-Reason and Revolution Marcusean “social” tendency. Kellner suggests that perhaps this tendency was even vying for supremacy in the ISR (Kellner 1998, p. 12). as Horkheimer and Adorno moved away from social theory and focused more on cultural critique. An article on “Theories of social change” (Marcuse 1998) was one of a series of documents co-authored with Franz Neumann. In this article, written around the time of Reason and Revolution, Marcuse and Neumann survey the tradition of Western philosophy in terms of its critical social-theoretical potential. Hegel’s philosophy in particular is understood
as the basis for determining the role of revolutionary thought in social transformation. Marcuse and Neumann write:

The dialectical conception of change was first elaborated in Hegel’s philosophy. It reversed the traditional logical setting of the problem by taking change as the very form of existence, and by taking existence as a totality of objective contradictions. Every particular form of existence contradicts its content, which can develop only through breaking this form and creating a new one in which the content appears in a liberated and more adequate form. Full liberation and adequacy is only reached in the totality of all forms, when this totality is comprehended and made the realization of reason. Such realization is, according to Hegel, the result and good of the historical process, and is identical with the achievement of free and rational forms of state and society . . . Hegel himself used the dialectical conception in the field of social philosophy by analyzing Civil Society as developing through the antagonism between self- and common interest, accumulating wealth and increasing poverty, growing productivity and expansionist war. (Marcuse 1998, p. 131)

“33 Theses”

Written in 1947, a half-dozen years after the completion of Reason and Revolution, “33 theses” (Marcuse 1998) provides important evidence for the different theoretical and political perspectives that were developing in the late 1940s between Marcuse on the one hand and Horkheimer and Adorno on the other. A central feature of the manuscript’s importance lies in the context formed by Marcuse’s efforts—which failed completely—to actually secure the repeatedly promised collaboration of other ISR members in establishing a theoretical nucleus aimed at social change in the postwar years (Kellner 1998). In the case of “33 theses” Marcuse essentially proposed that a statement of distinctly Hegelian Marxism form the basis for resumption of publication of Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung, the ISR’s journal, after the defeat of German fascism. With obvious yet sometimes intriguing ambiguities, “33 theses” argues that the post-World War II world was dividing into Soviet and neofascist camps, a situation demanding that revolutionary theory, “ruthlessly and openly criticize” both camps (Marcuse 1998, p. 217). The thesis was never publicly tested, even though Marcuse held that the rationale for such critique was that the,

working class and political praxis of the working class, and changing class relations (at the national and international level) continue to determine the conceptual development of theory, as they in turn are determined by it—not by the theory without praxis, but by the one which “seizes the masses.” (Marcuse 1998, p. 218)

MARCUSE’S CHANGED INTERPRETATION OF THE IDEAS OF THE TRUE AND THE GOOD

Marcuse’s assessment of Hegel’s Science of Logic is the central chapter of Reason and Revolution, even though the work also contained other important features such as the first analysis of Marx’s 1844 economic-philosophic manuscripts to appear in English (Anderson 1995). “The Subjective Logic, or The Doctrine of the Notion,” the part least written about by Marxists (Dunayevskaya 2002, p. 67), is divided into three sections—
“Subjectivity,” “Objectivity,” and “The Idea.” Each section contains three chapters that are further divided into subsections. In the treatment of the Logic in both Hegel books Marcuse focuses attention on section three. “The Idea.” Hence I will outline this section in the following paragraph.

The three chapters of “The Idea” are titled, respectively, “Life,” “The Idea of Cognition,” and “The Absolute Idea.” “Life” is very prominently featured in Hegel’s Ontology, owing to the work’s basic topic, but receives significantly less attention in Reason and Revolution. The “Idea of Cognition” (subdivided into sections on the Idea of the True and the Idea of the Good) receives careful and varied assessments in Marcuse’s two Hegel books. “The Absolute Idea” is the subject of an entire chapter in Hegel’s Ontology. The attention it receives in Reason and Revolution is abbreviated, though there Marcuse’s analysis of it is nonetheless pivotal to his theoretical conclusions on the current social relevance of Hegel’s dialectic.

Hegel (after Kant) analyzes the theoretical and practical ideas, terms denoting the differentiation between the spheres of reason. (Among Kant’s principal works were The Critique of Pure Reason, and Critique of Practical Reason.) Hegel uses the terms Idea of the True and Idea of the Good interchangeably with the terms theoretical Idea and practical Idea, respectively. Hegel writes,

In the theoretical Idea the subjective notion, as the universal that lacks any determination of its own, stands opposed to the objective world from which it takes to itself a determinate content and filling. But in the practical Idea it is as actual that it confronts the actual. (Hegel 1969, p. 818)

Hegel’s Ontology provides the philosophical background for the meaning of Hegel’s concepts Idea of the True and the Idea of the Good. Marcuse writes,

...An explicit reference that the “good” must be understood as an objective-ontological determination is given in Hegel’s introduction to this concept in his Lectures on the History of Philosophy and in his discussion of Socratic philosophy. With the concept of the “good,” Socrates is said to aim at a determination of “essence” or “substance,” “qua that which is in- and for-itself, qua what preserves itself, substance has been defined as purpose (telos) and more precisely as the true. the good...” Thus the “good” is understood as the “universal, which has determined itself in itself...” the philosophers of nature had sought to define it as one or more self-sufficient substance. Hegel views it as Socratic “one-sidedness” that he applied this concept of the good to the moral sphere alone, whereby “subsequently all followers of moral idle talk and popular philosophy declared him their patron saint...” But “the good that is purpose in-and for-itself... is also a principle of the philosophy of nature...” (Marcuse 1987, p. 170; emphasis added)

The passage makes the central point that a prior unity of the ideas of the true and the good existed in Socratic philosophy. In the Logic Hegel analyzed the modern separation of the two. Finally, there is an intention at the core of Hegelian philosophy to reconceptualize their dialectical unity, or “identity,” at a higher level and more concretely than that which is found even in Socrates. Hegel critically noted that Socrates applied the idea of the good to the moral sphere alone. Yet, for Hegel more important than this limitation was the historical context in which individual self-determination intrinsic to the
universal was represented in the personality of Socrates (Hegel 1995, p. 408). (Later I will indicate the importance Hegel attributed to “personality,” even at the level of the transition from the idea of the good to the absolute idea.)

Much more than criticism of Socratic philosophy per se, Hegel’s insistence that the idea of the good apply to nature as well as to the moral sphere reflects historical developments from ancient Greece to modern society. For example, in line with Hegel’s original concept of alienation and its transcendence as underlying historical developments, and Marx’s detailed depiction of the quasi-objective, naturelike structures that function “behind the backs” of social actors, the theoretical attitude adduced by the concept of the true, split off from the concept of the good, emerges within the context of the social totality as well. For awareness, even scientifically determined, of abstract forms of social domination not only does not result in their abolition (Marx 1976, p. 167). Such awareness may provide the bases for more deeply imbedding social domination, in that it may contribute to either the expansion or the increasing fragmentation of specialized knowledge and, with it, the proliferation of expert cultures split off from each other and from everyday life. The true is true only in its dialectical relationship with the idea of the good.

Likewise, although forces of social domination that are not cognized by social actors may be analyzed historically as alienation, they may also actually shape the idea of the good (or the good life) as well, a possibility that should shake any certainty concerning the actual separation of one concept (the “true”) from the other (the “good”). Hence the “good” is really good only in a dialectical relationship with the idea of the true. For example, in contemporary society the freedom and variety of lifestyle choices may appear to be expressions of either the value attributed to the individual or the respect for the social diversity of groups. Yet, generalized “nonconformity” may itself be coercive, an abstract form of social domination. Here “abstract” means, in part, that no particular individual or group intends or wills this domination. In this sense many of Marx’s analyses of modern capitalist society involved fully developing the implications of individuals freed from relationships of direct personal domination but wholly subject to labor-mediated social relations, terming this situation “individual personal freedom in the framework of ‘objective dependence’” (Marx 1973, p. 158).

After an account of prior sections of the Subjective Logic Marcuse states in Reason and Revolution that he will attempt “a rough interpretation of the closing paragraphs of the Logic” (Marcuse 1999, pp. 161–162), which should situate his analysis in the Logic’s final chapter, “The Absolute Idea.” Marcuse nonetheless proceeds to discuss more generally “the concluding sections of the Logic” (Marcuse 1999, p. 162). The difference between the stated initial intention and the amended actual approach is significant. The real basis of Marcuse’s critique of Hegel’s absolute idea is already formulated through his assessment of the Idea of the True and the Idea of the Good. There Marcuse critically notes, “the final transformation of history into ontology” (Marcuse 1999, p. 163), in place of development of their dialectic relationship, which had been an abiding theme in the Logic up to this point.

According to the account in Reason and Revolution, Hegel succeeded in maintaining a proper tension in the relationship between the social or historical and philosophical cognition in the first two sections of the Logic, “Being” and “Essence.” But, Marcuse critically notes, within the Subjective Logic philosophy transcends history. According to Marcuse this development was clearly retrogressive from the standpoint of contemporary
critical social theory. In order to see why, it is helpful to recall here that Marx’s critique of Hegel, long before Marcuse’s, involved Marx’s explication of the plausibility of Hegelian notions such as abstract being transcending objectivity in terms of the social relations that constitute a specifically capitalist society. In an example derived from Marx, which Marcuse provides in a later chapter, abstraction is the most powerful social force within capitalist society in particular:

[A]bstraction is capitalism’s own work...the Marxian method only follows this process...the capitalist economy is built upon and perpetuated by the constant reduction of concrete to abstract labor...individual work counts merely in so far as it represents socially necessary labor time...relations among men appear as relations of things (commodities). (Marcuse 1998, p. 313)

Still, Marcuse is looking for something in Hegelian dialectic that might warrant a less definitive conclusion, which he is nonetheless prepared to issue, about the relationship of philosophy to history in the Logic. In a statement that seems to anticipate some postmodern criticisms of Hegelian dialectic. Marcuse first dismissed the idea—that it is the tendency of a multitude of notions (most generally Being and Essence) to converge in a single notion (specifically the absolute idea in the Notion)—that ultimately excludes an historical interpretation of Hegel’s Logic. According to Marcuse, Hegel’s absolute idea could be regarded simply as meaning,

[r]ealization of the notion...universal mastery, exercised by men having a rational social organization, over nature—a world that might indeed be imagined as the realization of the notion of all things. (Marcuse 1999, p. 161)

But nonetheless Marcuse quickly issues a clear statement rejecting the prospect that further detailed examination of Hegel’s dialectic proper might still make independent contributions to the establishment of a critical social theory. Marcuse remarks,

Hegel tends to dissolve the element of historical practice and replace it with the independent reality of thought. (Marcuse 1999, p. 161)

Marcuse attempted to demonstrate this conclusion, but not before affirming Hegel’s initial approach to the absolute idea through the theoretical and practical ideas in the concluding sections of the Logic. Marcuse writes,

[T]he adequate form of the idea is termed the unity of cognition and action, or (in Hegel’s words), “the identity of the Theoretical and Practical Idea.” (Marcuse 1999, p. 162)

Note that Hegel’s phrase on the identity of the theoretical and practical ideas Marcuse reproduced actually appears within the first paragraph of the Absolute Idea chapter, the concluding chapter of the Logic. Nonetheless, without noting this Marcuse seamlessly directed attention back to an observation Hegel offered in the prior chapter (in the subsection on the Idea of the Good). Marcuse writes,

Hegel expressly declares that the practical idea, the realization of the “Good” that alters external reality, is higher than the Idea of Cognition...for it has not only the dignity of the universal but also of the simply actual. (Marcuse 1999, pp. 162–163)
Thus Marcuse’s reading created an inaccurate impression that the “higher” status of the practical idea may consist in its concreteness, even when compared with the absolute idea.

In connection with this, it is also important to note that the above passage quoted from *Reason and Revolution* contains a significant theoretical error. The ellipsis in Marcuse’s quotation replaces Hegel’s words, “already considered.” The idea of cognition Hegel had “already considered” was the Idea of the True. Thus, according to Hegel’s actual text the practical idea not only is *not* “higher than the Idea of Cognition,” but also can not possibly be so. The *dialectic* of the idea of the true and the good *constitute* the Idea of Cognition chapter, which concludes with a paragraph in which Hegel (on the only occasion in the entire *Logic*) actually defines the absolute idea. As the unity of the theoretical and practical ideas, this definition radically alters the type of critique applied to each when considered alone. I will reproduce this definitional passage in the next section.

First Marcuse presents the textual appearances of two of Hegel’s key statements in reverse order, a reversal which mistakenly suggests that the practical idea predominates over the theoretical idea. Then, Marcuse altogether removes the practical idea from its dialectical relationship to the Idea of the True, a relationship that constitutes “The Idea of Cognition.” In doing so Marcuse’s analysis implies that a contemporary critical approach to Hegelian philosophy would rightly interpret Hegel’s initial apparent elevation of and preference for the practical idea as the highpoint of the *Logic*. In this context, however preliminarily, the special nature of the *identity* of the theoretical and practical ideas (to which Marcuse refers) should be noted as well. Hegel writes that the absolute idea (identity of the theoretical and practical ideas) still nonetheless:

contains within itself the highest degree of opposition . . . possesses personality . . .
but which, none the less is not exclusive individuality, but explicitly *universality* and
cognition . . . (Hegel 1969, p. 824)

This passage clearly evokes Hegel’s analyses in the *History of Philosophy*, cited earlier, his historical description of the type of individuality that characterized the life of Socrates—a dialectical unity (or identity) of personality and universality. However, now Hegel’s suggestion seems to be that whereas in ancient Greece there was one such personality (Socrates), contemporary historical conditions hold the potential to realize such “personality” generally.

When continuing to trace Marcuse’s argument, more important than his reversal of Hegel’s categorical presentations or his questionable interpretation of the practical idea, Marcuse does *not* explicitly note Hegel’s key intermediary observation, which also appears in “Idea of the Good.” In fact, it *sets off* Hegel’s apparently higher evaluation of the practical Idea from his reference to the “identity” of the two. Hegel writes,

But what is still lacking in the practical Idea is the moment of consciousness proper itself; namely that the moment of actuality in the notion should have attained on its own account the determination of external being. Another way of regarding this defect is that the practical Idea still lacks the moment of the theoretical Idea. (Hegel 1969, p. 821)

The practical idea contains an *intrinsic* defect. The practical idea in its immediacy (volition, will, action) is by virtue of what it *opposes*. The limitations, or particularities, of its
own activities are disclosed in an outer actuality that has held out against this aspect of the idea. Hegel will thus describe in detail a second negation that the practical idea undergoes.

On the bases of the textual evidence Marcuse presents in *Reason and Revolution*, the question of the "idealistic" unity of the theoretical and practical ideas is adequately resolved in the practical Idea as *initially* presented by Hegel. In *Reason and Revolution* Marcuse does not directly comment on Hegel's *further* attention to the practical Idea. Instead Marcuse criticizes the "manner" in which Hegel attempts to demonstrate the unity of the theoretical and practical ideas.

According to Marcuse the manner is Hegel's absolute idea, which reflects a "knowing subject" that must comprehend all objects "so that their independent objectivity is overcome" (Marcuse 1999, p. 163). Hence Hegel's absolute idea is essentially a "mark of resignation" (Marcuse 1999, p. 164) in respect to the *social* realization of freedom. In Hegel's pursuit of "perfect freedom," the idea was the only element of modern society that could measure up. For now, at least, it must be preserved as such. From the beginning, the concepts of idealism, though admittedly less so in Hegel than in his philosophical predecessors, "reflected a social separation of the intellectual sphere from the sphere of material production" (Marcuse 1999, pp. 163–164). Marcuse says that, whereas he "spoke for the actual power of reason and the concrete materialization of freedom," Hegel was "convinced that modern society was a system of irreconcilable antagonisms." In the aftermath of the French Revolution he was "frightened by the social forces that had undertaken the concrete realization of freedom" (Marcuse 1999, p. 164). According to Marcuse this is traceable to Hegel's belief that the type of labor in modern society would never allow for "perfect freedom" (Marcuse 1999, p. 164).

In contrast to Marcuse's analysis in *Reason and Revolution*, Hegel's *Ontology* gives a fuller presentation of key passages in the Subjective Logic and considers Hegel's arguments as they are further developed in the subsection on the Idea of the Good. In *Hegel's Ontology*, following a description of "pure cognition" or the idea of the true, Marcuse *at first* describes the practical idea in as unreservedly positive terms as those he later employs in *Reason and Revolution*:

Is there a higher truth of life which does not suffer from the deficiency of cognition? Is there a mode of being which lets the world emerge, and which "lets go forth" its object such that this object no longer has the "appearance" of in-itselfness, of a self-sufficient objectivity which stands over and against one? ... Indeed this is the "practical idea" of action, the Idea of the "good." (Marcuse 1987, p. 169)

But, despite his observation that the idea of the good "does not suffer from the deficiency of cognition," Marcuse continues in clear awareness of the persistent limitations of the practical idea:

So long as the "good" to be realized through the practical Idea is considered a "subjective purpose" alone which is not implicitly contained in objective actuality but which first must be embedded in it, then action is just as deficient as knowledge, but in the opposite sense. (Marcuse 1987, p. 169)

Finally, Marcuse sums up Hegel's overall assessment of the idea of the true and the idea of the good thus far:
Pure cognition [Idea of the True] views its world as the other which is implicitly true, thereby misunderstanding the subjectivity of objectivity, whereas action [Idea of the Good] treats the world as empty receptacle for the actualization of its subjective purposes, thereby misunderstanding the objectivity of subjectivity. (Marcuse 1987, p. 169)

Marcuse next quotes from the following passage, which contains the heart of Hegel’s argument, that

external reality for the will does not receive the form of a true being; the Idea of the good can therefore find its integration only in the Idea of the true. (Hegel 1969, p. 821)

As I just discussed, Marcuse did not incorporate this development into his presentation of the Idea of the Good in Reason and Revolution. More significantly, Marcuse does not note in either Reason and Revolution or Hegel’s Ontology the next sentence in Hegel’s text:

But it [the practical idea] makes this transition [to an identity of the true and the good] through itself. (Hegel 1969, p. 821)

With this sentence Hegel initiates the final two paragraphs of the Idea of the Good subsection. I will more closely reanalyze these two paragraphs after completing this overview of Marcuse’s interpretations of these passages.

Marcuse himself characterized the dialectic relationship constituting the absolute idea through the idea of the true and the good as, “an action that knows and a knowledge that acts” (Marcuse 1987, p. 170). But Marcuse’s conclusion is more obscure when he writes that:

this transition to the “absolute idea” is made possible by the fact that the “good” no longer appears as mere subjective purpose but as an ontological determination of beings themselves. (Marcuse 1987, p. 170)

This conclusion, based on the final paragraph of “The Idea of the Good” (though Marcuse does not note this) is at best far too general. This criticism is supported by the fact that Marcuse returns to subject the passage to closer scrutiny after his analysis of the Logic has progressed most of the way through “The Absolute Idea” (the next and concluding chapter).

In remarks on Hegel’s Absolute Idea chapter itself Marcuse clearly indicates for the first time that the idea of the good (by itself) as much as of the true (by itself) constitutes the idea of cognition. Marcuse writes,

Cognition by itself, however, cannot reach its truth, for it presupposes a “prefound world,” upon which it is essentially “dependent” . . . [it] exists in its own world as by another, by a negativity it has not yet grasped to be its own. To this extent the movement of cognition is not the highest form. (Marcuse 1987, p. 182)

Marcuse’s clarification of the concepts Hegel develops in “The Idea of Cognition” within his analysis of Hegel’s chapter on the Absolute Idea contains a single reference to
a fragment of a sentence in the paragraph wherein Hegel defines the absolute idea. Marcuse writes:

The “Absolute Idea” of Being is first concrete as a subjectivity which grasps objectivity to be subjectivity and which knows it, “as an objective world, whose inner ground and actual permanence is the concept itself.” (Marcuse 1987, p. 182)

The quoted fragment is from the final sentence of the concluding paragraph of “The Idea of Cognition” (from the chapter’s final subsection, “The Idea of the Good”). Marcuse explains this final paragraph (which is the Logic’s only real definition of the absolute idea) with references to Hegel’s works earlier than the Logic. In doing so Marcuse repeats a procedure he had used to end his analysis of the Idea of Cognition chapter itself. As I suggested above, I will quote and assess this paragraph in the context of the conclusion of “The Idea of the Good,” wherein Hegel reanalyzes the practical idea. I have already demonstrated, on the one hand, that Marcuse did not directly analyze these passages in Reason and Revolution and, on the other, that a careful reading of Hegel’s Ontology is necessary in order to get a clear view of Marcuse’s rich interpretations of these passages of the Idea of the Good subsection as a whole.

In Hegel’s Ontology, proceeding from his characterization of the transition from “The Idea of the Good” to “The Absolute Idea,” Marcuse critically notes that Hegel’s absolute idea represents, “thought thinking itself” (Marcuse 1987, p. 182). Thus, he rejects Hegel’s conclusion to the Logic, which he interprets as a certain type of ontology, perhaps even rooted as far back as Aristotle (Marcuse 1987, p. 182). Marcuse nonetheless continues to defend Hegel to some extent, arguing that Hegel did not “postulate thought thinking itself” from the beginning (of the Logic), which would then dominate the ontological investigations. In addition, Hegel may not have understood the deeper implications of his own philosophy. Marcuse writes:

[A] purely formal interpretation of his determination [“thought thinking itself”] on the basis of the concept of movement which Hegel considers basic would be insufficient. The concrete determination of the Absolute Idea as the unity of theoretical and practical Idea or as the unity of Life and cognition would speak against this. (Marcuse 1987, p. 183)

Hence, Marcuse suggests that a current understanding of Hegel’s dialectic may be superior to Hegel’s self-understanding. Marcuse suggests that his own reading indicates that Hegel’s actual philosophy, the “concept of movement” connected to social practice and life that uniquely characterized it, does not really permit thought thinking itself as the “end,” or what today is often understood as an idea of an “end to history.”

The decade-later Reason and Revolution represents more conclusive negative evaluations of the potential social-theoretical implications of the absolute idea. Nonetheless, Marcuse’s discussion of “The Absolute Idea” in Hegel’s Ontology, in which references to the crucial final passages in “The Idea of Cognition” appear, suggests that in key respects Hegel’s Ontology as the earlier work containing severe doubts in respect to Hegelian dialectic, served as the fundamental basis for the interpretation of Hegel’s Logic in Reason and Revolution. However, I have pointed out some important differences, mainly associated with Marcuse’s greater (though still insufficient) attention to the details of
Hegel's argument in *Hegel's Ontology* than in *Reason and Revolution*, particularly with respect to the crucial subsection, “The Idea of the Good.”

In Marcuse’s *Reason and Revolution* interpretation, the absolute idea becomes the core of Hegel’s metaphysical solutions to what he nonetheless knew were actually social problems. Once Hegel opted for these solutions, he affirmed philosophy’s most characteristic limitation, its own basis in the split between mental and manual production. Thus the method (or manner) of the absolute idea, supposed to be the dialectical transcendence of objectivity, formed the bases of the “famous” transitions from Logic to Nature to Mind, in other words, of Hegel’s *Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences* itself. Its completion in 1817 coincided with Hegel’s late, conservative period, when he became the official philosopher of the Prussian state and, in Marcuse’s words, “the philosophical dictator of Germany” (Marcuse 1998, p. 169). Many critics of Hegel’s idealism, Marxists prominent among them, have considered this transcendence of objectivity to be the weak point in Hegel’s philosophical system. Hegel’s dialectic of pure abstraction, which Marcuse traced as an ontology, and in which spirit unfolds through overcoming moments of objectivity, has often been regarded as simply inadequate to the social.

**REREADING HEGEL ON THE THRESHOLD OF THE ABSOLUTE IDEA**

According to Marcuse, deep-seated class barriers intrinsic to philosophy barred Hegel’s thought from full access to the significance of the existence of proletarian labor as the unique, socially relevant negation of bourgeois society and culture (Marcuse 1999, pp. 163–164, 261). This is reflected in the negligible social relevance Marcuse attributed to the philosophical categories Hegel developed in the final parts of the *Logic*. The following discussion, which questions Marcuse’s conclusions, is based on a close reading of specifically Hegel’s *second* approach to the practical Idea (Hegel 1969, pp. 821–823).

In *Hegel’s Ontology* Marcuse’s assessment of Hegel’s *Logic* clearly includes direct considerations of many of the important details of Hegel’s arguments in the Idea of the Good subsection, as well as on the Absolute Idea chapter. However, I will argue that Marcuse’s references to the final paragraph of “The Idea of the Good,” in which Hegel defines the absolute idea, do not fully convey the social content or implications of Hegel’s argument. I identified Marcuse’s references in the previous section: The first appears in Marcuse’s concluding remarks on Hegel’s “The Idea of the Good.” Marcuse interprets Hegel’s transition to the absolute idea as possible only when the “good” no longer appears as a subjective purpose, but as an ontological determination of beings themselves. The second reference appears most of the way through Marcuse’s analysis of Hegel’s “The Absolute Idea.” Here Marcuse, quoting from the concluding sentence of “The Idea of the Good,” indicates that Hegel’s absolute idea might be interpreted such that it amounts to no more than “thought thinking itself.”

In *Reason and Revolution* Marcuse clearly stresses Hegel’s first approach to the practical idea, focusing on Hegel’s characterization of it as “higher than” the theoretical idea. The background to Hegel’s argument at that juncture is the epochal appearance of the individual—a result of historical processes, which implies Hegel’s opposition to traditional views of history as the work of individuals. But following from the “defect” Hegel noted in this first negation of the universal by the individual (that in the begin-
ning the practical idea lacks the moment of the theoretical idea). Hegel returns to the practical idea in the same Idea of the Good subsection.

As I previously argued, Marcuse’s direct and implied criticisms of the paragraphs that return to the practical idea intensify from Hegel’s Ontology to Reason and Revolution. Yet, contrary to Marcuse’s interpretations that Hegel decided to subordinate the practical idea to the absolute idea in the interest of preserving at least the idea of freedom, I will argue that Hegel’s return to the practical idea prior to the Absolute Idea chapter, represents a movement toward dialectical social theory. Hegel indicates the origins of the social individual in, first, a negation of the individual’s unity with the universal, that is, with the social that has lost its unquestioned moral authority. The logic of this historical process implies the social mediation of the individual. This mediation is itself overcome in the movement from social conflict of the individual and the universal, or social determination of the individual by abstract forms of domination (such as religious or state powers), to determination of the social by material, individual freedom.

Hegel evokes a sense of total social upheaval (as in the French Revolution) in his initial descriptions of the idea of the good. Hence the individual is a self-developing subject with, “a certainty of its own actuality and the non-actuality of the world” and “comes upon the scene with the worth of being absolute.” The individual’s “immanent determinateness” is the objective, while the “formerly objective world” is “now only something posited” by it. (Hegel 1969, p. 818) It is here Hegel writes (as Marcuse quotes in Reason and Revolution) that the idea of the good is “higher than” the idea of cognition already considered (the idea of the true). The practical idea is “the urge to realize itself, the end that wills by means of itself to give itself objectivity and to realize itself in the objective world” (Hegel 1969, p. 818). Hegel is literally describing the historical birth of the individual as a social universal.

Hegel affirms that this urge for self-determination of the individual is the good and the true. Yet, Hegel writes, a “further difference” comes in with the “realization of the good” (Hegel, 1969, p. 820). The “good” is good by virtue of its subjective end, the idea of self-determination, and is as such the true. But in its realization the good achieves an external existence, an actuality that, however, it had already determined as worthless (even “nonactual”). Thus, Hegel notes that the good is destructible by external contingency, evil, and the collision and conflict of the good itself. Hegel writes:

> From the side of the objective world presupposed for it, in the presupposition of which the subjectivity and finitude of the good consists, and which as a different world goes its own way, the very realization of the good is exposed to obstacles, obstacles which may indeed even be insurmountable. . . . There are still two worlds in opposition, one a realm of subjectivity in the pure regions of transparent thought, the other a realm of objectivity in the element of an externally manifold actuality that is an undisclosed realm of darkness. (Hegel 1969, p. 820)

Right here Hegel writes that the practical idea (though earlier rated higher than the theoretical idea) is nonetheless defective because “it lacks the moment of the theoretical idea” (Hegel 1969, p. 821). The theoretical idea is the determination of universality, the identity of the notion (unity of subjective and objective) with itself. Actuality for the theoretical idea is the world outside it (objectivity) self-determined independently of the theoretical idea’s subjective positing. Exactly opposite to this, the practical idea confronts
actuality both as an “insuperable limitation” (of itself) and as something intrinsically worthless, because such actuality receives its sole worth through the ends of the good.

Hegel identifies the core contradiction that continuously reproduces both an antagonistic actuality and a permanent but impotent opposition to it. The individual will, constitutive of the idea of the good in the quest to realize itself, separates itself from cognition. In its first or immediate sense the idea of the good indeed may be higher than the idea of the true, and in its idea prior to its realization is, “already on its own account the true” (Hegel 1969, p. 819). On the one hand, as the will, the mode of which is action, it sustains and reproduces itself by realizing itself against the background of an otherwise “worthless actuality.” On the other hand, the idea of the true that does not regard itself as a force in external actuality (regarded as everything, a datum independent of subjective positing), exists side by side with the idea of the good. Nonetheless, Hegel presents a detailed theory not only of how these opposing forms of reason are mutually perpetuating but also of how the contradiction they define is overcome.

Hegel indicates that the immediacy of the will is behind what he describes as the disintegration of the good, its separation from the true, the universal. The will stands in the way of the attainment of its own goal (the good itself). This is because external reality, as an “insuperable limitation” for the will, does not receive the form of a true being. However, the practical idea reintegrates through its own mediation of outer actuality. Outer actuality is infected with the true in the realization of the idea of the good. With this, Hegel writes, the will needs to turn not again against outer actuality but rather against itself (Hegel 169, p. 822).

Hegel describes in detail the transition to the unity of the practical and theoretical ideas (the absolute idea) where the good, through itself, finds its integration in the idea of the true. First, Hegel’s description indicates that when cognition (as the idea of the good) has achieved the stage of awareness of the limitations of the universal opposed to the individual, and the external reality as the universal is yet amendable to the action of the individual will, a new social stage has been reached. Second, Hegel details a “syllogism of action,” the two premises of which are (1) the immediate relation of the good end to actuality and (2) the utilization of this end as means against the actuality (Hegel 1969, p. 821).

The first premise presupposes the external actuality in which, “its worth doesn’t reside within it” (Hegel 1969, p. 821), but good can be realized in it. The second premise sublates (overcomes, but in the sense of incorporating into itself) the first premise. The idea of the good mediates external actuality, includes its own relationship to it in cognizing it. In the Logic the latter represents a first negation. External actuality is radically changed. In contrast to the initial realization of the good, when external actuality was thought to be intrinsically worthless (compared to the self-determining individual), it is now known to be radically divided—the realized good “in the face of another actuality confronting it . . .” (Hegel 1969, p. 822).

In a second negation (Hegel 1969, p. 822) the submergence of the idea of the good in the external actuality (the good as simply the other of the externality) is overcome. In the utilization of the end (of the good) as a means against itself—its own “exclusive” individuality—the second negation represents the actualization of the good that begins with what it is for. This is the freedom and knowledge of each individual, or the individual as such, the social individual. The practical idea is no longer determined by what it
opposes. In the final paragraph of the “Idea of the Good,” not completely analyzed in either of Marcuse’s Hegel books, Hegel writes:

When external actuality is altered by the activity of the objective notion [idea of the good] and its determination therewith sublated, by that very fact the merely phenomenal reality, the external determinability and worthlessness, are removed from that actuality. . . . In this process the general presupposition is sublated, namely the determination of the good as a merely subjective end limited in respect of content, the necessity of realizing it by subjective activity, and this activity itself. In the result the mediation sublates itself; the result is an immediacy that is not the restoration of the presupposition, but rather its accomplished sublation. With this the Idea of the Notion that is determined in and for itself is posited as being no longer merely in the active subject but as equally an immediate actuality; and conversely this actuality is posited, as it is in cognition, as an objectivity possessing a true being. The individuality of the subject with which the subject was burdened by its presupposition, has vanished along with the presupposition. . . . Accordingly, in this result cognition is restored and united with the practical idea; the actuality found as given is at the same time determined as the realized absolute end; but whereas in questing cognition this actuality appeared merely as an objective world without the subjectivity of the notion, here it appears as an objective world whose inner ground and actual subsistence is the notion. This is the absolute idea. (Hegel 1969, p. 823; emphasis added)

Hegel equally emphasizes the “active subject” and as a result, a new, immediate actuality (the social determined by the knowledge and freedom of social individuals). Thus, this passage is clearly inconsistent with Marcuse’s conclusion in *Reason and Revolution*. There Marcuse concluded that Hegel’s ontological concept of subject implied that the independence of the social movement internal to the practical idea was undermined with the idea of a “knowing subject” alone. To the contrary, Hegel indicates that that form of activity (the exclusive individuality of the subject) is overcome by the restoration of cognition to the practical idea and thereby its reintegration with the universal. With the term “questing cognition” it is clear that Hegel is summarizing his initial descriptions of the relationship between the theoretical and the practical ideas defining existing society. Yet in the concluding final points Hegel depicts the emergence of a different society in which the good and the true are identical.

**MARCUSE’S HEGEL INTERPRETATIONS AND RECENT RESEARCH IN CRITICAL SOCIAL THEORY**

Jürgen Habermas is the best-known and most theoretically productive of the Critical Theorists to follow Marcuse and others of his generation. Much of Habermas’s work aimed to correct the deficiencies that he believed resulted from the inability of the founders of the Critical Theory tradition to produce a social theory in the wake of its critiques of positivism on the basis of Hegelian logic. “Technology and Society as ‘Ideology’” (Habermas 1970), Habermas’s statement of his differences with Marcuse’s supposed neglect of the social sphere, is well known. Its criticisms are directed at the 1960’s *One-Dimensional Man* and an essay by Marcuse on Freud written in the 1950s. But the underlying implication was that the social-theoretical impasse these works represented suggested the need for a model substantially removed from the Hegelian-Marxian framework.
Habermas’s fuller if more implicit critique of Marcuse’s approach to social theory can be found in Knowledge and Human Interests (Habermas, 1972). Habermas’s most important and original work. It is clear from the introduction forward that among Habermas’s principal aims is extricating the development of a critical social theory from much further concern with either the mature Hegel’s dialectic or the question of whether the transformation it underwent in Marx’s theory was ultimately significant. Knowledge and Human Interests reflects Habermas’s intention to appropriate Marcuse’s approach to philosophy and the history of social theory Marcuse pioneered in Reason and Revolution, to reassess Hegel’s philosophy in terms of current social relevance, and to set the stage for an actual, detailed social theory. Hence, Habermas’s critique of Marcuse implies that the latter never actually developed a social theory.

Moreover, Habermas on several occasions applied this same criticism to both Hegel and Marx, suggesting that Hegelian-Marxian dialectic had long since constituted a barrier to such a theory. In Knowledge and Human Interests Habermas argued that Marx collapsed social interaction into labor. Moreover, he writes of the Hegel-Marx relationship:

The interpretive scheme set forth by Marx for the Phenomenology of Mind contains the program for an instrumentalist translation of Hegel’s philosophy of absolute reflection... [Marx’s] materialist science only confirms what [Hegel’s] absolute idealism had already accomplished: the elimination of epistemology in favor of unchained universal “scientific knowledge”—but this time of scientific materialism instead of absolute knowledge. (Habermas 1973, pp. 43, 63)

In The Theory of Communicative Action, his most definitive work on social theory, Habermas writes that his own social theory overcomes the Hegelian legacy in the Critical Theory tradition by appropriating aspects of Marx’s social research disencumbered from its (Hegelian) “philosophic ballast” (Habermas 1987, p. 383). He describes social and cultural differentiation processes constitutive of the modern behind which it is not possible to regress. According to Habermas these underlying processes have long been reflected in dichotomous concepts like labor and interaction, theory and practice, structure and agency, etc., which are found in a range of otherwise very different social theories. Within the Critical Theory tradition Habermas opposes the one-dimensionality thesis of Adorno and Horkheimer to the concepts “lifeworld” and “system.” He develops a bilevel social theory in which the rationalization of the lifeworld (social interaction) is based upon speech oriented to reaching understanding. Habermas attempts to retain the critical thrust of social theory through analyses of the medias of power and money. These constitute subsystems of instrumental reason (state and economy), which threaten to “colonize” the lifeworld and with that endanger the ongoing production of social meaning.

Postone, while sympathetic to Habermas’s attempts to overcome the sociological pessimism of the one-dimensionality thesis, rejected Habermas’s “ontological separation” of labor and interaction (Postone 1994, p. 253). Postone like Habermas attempts to place social relations at the center of analysis. This is instead of labor as a relationship between people and nature, which also determines social practices, a position often taken in traditional Marxist approaches. But whereas Habermas’s social theory suggests the separation of labor and interaction in an immediate sense (in contemporary society), Postone argues that such a separation is only a postcapitalist possibility. I argue that
Postone’s criticism of Marcuse’s concept of dialectic is related to the former’s rejection of Habermas’s separation of labor and interaction as well.

Postone refers to Marcuse’s “Some Social Implications of Modern Technology” (Postone 1994, p. 118), an article first published the Zeitschrift in 1941, the same year as Reason and Revolution. Though the article has been available for many years it is also included in the recently published volume of Marcuse’s 1940s writings. An opening passage reads:

In this article, technology is taken as a social process in which technics proper (that is, the technical apparatus of industry, transportation, communication) is but a partial factor. We do not ask for the influence or effect of technology on the human individuals. For they are themselves an integral part and factor of technology, not only as the men who invent or attend to machinery but also to the social groups which direct its application and utilization. (Marcuse 1998, p. 41)

Postone’s assessment of this article is brief but significant. He writes that Marcuse,

describes the negative, dehumanizing effects of modern technology. He maintains that this technology is social rather than technical and continues to discuss its possible emancipatory effects. Marcuse, also, however, does not determine this purportedly social character more closely; he does not ground the possible emancipatory moment of modern technology in an intrinsic contradiction but in the possible positive effects of precisely such negative developments as standardization, dequalification, and so on. The notion that a situation of total alienation can give rise to its opposite is one that Marcuse then pursued further in Eros and Civilization. (Postone 1994, p. 118)

Postone derives Marcuse’s retreat from a social critique of capitalism from the latter’s analysis of technology. However, what I have presented so far suggests that Marcuse’s analysis of technology illuminates his interpretation of Hegel’s philosophy detailed in Hegel’s Ontology and Reason and Revolution from which it necessarily derives. I have argued that in those works Marcuse’s analyses progressively retreated from developing the social implications of the intrinsic contradiction constitutive of the absolute idea, instead finally interpreting the latter as the transcendence of the social by the nonsocial (ontology).

Many of Postone’s arguments taken as strictly social theory, or indeed as the idea of the true, are often successful not only in terms of “intrinsic contradiction” against Marcuse’s dialectic, but also in respect to Habermas’s attempted separation of the instrumental and the social dimensions of capitalist society. For example, Marx’s basic concepts—such as the dual (abstract and concrete) character of labor—define an intrinsic contradiction underlying the capitalist social formation. Postone interprets these concepts found in Marx’s Capital, especially the early chapters, as reflecting Marx’s discovery (and elaboration of) a new form of social interdependence, defined by indirect, nonoverlaid social relations. In Postone’s interpretations, Marx developed the intrinsic contradiction of labor in capitalism as a social mediation.

The “objectifications of one’s labor” is the basis for the quantification of socially necessary labor time for the production of any commodity, which in turn is the basis for the specifically capitalist form of wealth—value. Marx calls abstract labor the labor time that determines the magnitude of this value. Historically, as capitalism develops, abstract
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labor increasingly shapes concrete labor, even “subsumes” it. While in technologically advanced capitalist production labor time remains the basis of the value form of wealth, material wealth becomes increasingly independent of the expenditure of direct, or concrete, labor. Hence, although the capitalist (value) form of wealth is dependent on direct labor such labor becomes increasingly superfluous in the production of material wealth.

However, Postone emphasizes the point that this “intrinsic contradiction” is not primarily economic. He contrasts capitalist society with prior social formations. In the latter custom, traditional social ties and power relations, or manifest social relations, determine the social distribution of labor and its products. In capitalism the role of these overt social relations is replaced by labor—“labor itself constitutes a social mediation in lieu of overt social relations” (Postone 1994, p. 150). Another way of conceiving this “capitalist difference” is that in noncapitalist societies social relations mediate labor, whereas in capitalism labor mediates social relations. Labor-mediated social relations define value-determined (capitalist) society while constituting an abstract form of social domination. However, since such labor becomes increasingly superfluous, the viability of the society based upon it is clearly problematic as well.

However, in terms of conceiving the actual abolition of capitalism the argument I have developed suggests the serious limitations of that aspect of Postone’s interpretation of Marx’s theory which attempts to explain socially Hegel’s absolute in terms of Marx’s concept of capital. According to Postone, Marx’s conception of capital is an unfolding, self-moving force that both generates and subsumes opposition—it is actually the “knowing subject” Hegel represented as Geist or spirit. As such, according to Postone, Marx intended that a category like capital also explain socially Hegel’s idealistic concept of the absolute. From this perspective Postone’s interpretation seems to follow from and draw out the implications of Marcuse’s analyses of the Logic in Reason and Revolution. It follows that Postone’s position is not compatible with the one I have developed in this paper—that the importance of a reinterpretation of Hegel’s philosophy is that it might permit identification of internal forces that potentially undermine contemporary capitalism, such as those identified in the ideas of the true and the good.

Postone’s development of the intrinsic contradiction of the capitalist social formation reflects Hegel’s concept of the theoretical idea exclusively. But Hegel’s absolute idea developed because the dialectic of the ideas of the true and good may act as a constitutive social force alongside the variety of new social movements that have continued to emerge in opposition to social domination of various types. Potentially, Hegel’s absolute idea is a force for emancipatory social change, not its actual negation, as Postone’s interpretations depicting it as “capital” suggest.

CONCLUSION

Marcuse was among the first to see how Hegel’s arguments in the most abstract (final) sections of the Science of Logic were so clearly and even directly relevant to the development of a contemporary critical social theory. Certainly his analyses of these texts were most comprehensive and original. Marcuse’s view of the primacy of the practical idea in Hegel’s Logic reflects an ontological notion of the “existence” of the proletariat—the living (and unique in terms of social relevance) negation of the false universalism of bourgeois culture and society. However, the overriding social-theoretical significance Marcuse attributed to this link (the proletariat’s negation of the bourgeois social order)
constituted a real barrier to deepening critical social theory. Marcuse’s repeated suggestions in _Reason and Revolution_ that the mere existence of the proletariat represented not only the negation of existing society but of Hegel’s absolute implied a too passive role for critical thought; likewise with the idea that this same proletariat labor’s alleged integration (practical nonexistence) constituted the totally administered, one-dimensional society (Marcuse 1965). Hence in order to deepen critical social theory today it is necessary to continue to probe how Hegel developed the _interrelationships_ of theory and social practice.

Marcuse’s immediate post- _Reason and Revolution_ writings themselves point to the need to reassess the potential social relevance of the Critical Theory tradition. The key question is whether Marcuse’s studies of Hegel may still be developed in the interest of transforming contemporary society. In this context it must be concluded that Marcuse’s 1940s writings certainly do not in themselves resolve issues important for Critical Theory. To the contrary, they produce an even more contradictory field. This contradictory situation is twofold: One the one hand, as Postone suggests, “Some Social Implications,” in removing dialectic from an _internal_ position in the determination of the social, _anticipated_ the “one-dimensionality” thesis soon fully developed by Horkheimer and Adorno. On the other hand, the theoretical content of Marcuse’s archival writings (coupled with the evidence suggesting that Marcuse, along with Franz Neumann, deliberately set about establishing the organizational bases for a theoretical tendency with a socially practical intent during the peak of world crises, including global war and totalitarianism) is difficult to square with theses in “Some Social Implications.” At Marcuse’s most radical theoretical pole, he did consider the question of whether dialectic proper, as understood in Hegel’s concepts of the true, the good and the absolute idea, was potentially accessible to large numbers of people. Certainly, on the threshold of Hegel’s absolute idea, it may be just this possibility that motivated Hegel’s _own_ transition between the Idea of the Good and the Absolute Idea—a transition made from social practice “through itself.”

Hegel’s dialectic developed in “The Idea of the Good” in the final paragraph’s defining of the absolute idea, in which the individual’s freedom and knowledge is the “subsistence” of the social, remains very relevant today. During World War II and its aftermath Marcuse seemed to have conceived this as an unfinished historical task and even to have made a new beginning in the work of carrying it out. However, Marcuse’s apparent inability to convey the newness or urgency of his findings on Hegelian dialectic to even his closest colleagues contributed to his eventually seeking an absolute opposite to capitalism outside the social, rather than from _within_ it.

**REFERENCES**


