blem of scepticism is not reducible to the particular forms of it that Hume and Russell considered. If one is going to limit oneself to those authors, it would be interesting to investigate just how significant are the differences between their acceptance of induction as part of a 'way of life' and the view proposed by Dilman. There is a difference of attitude here, and attitudes can be important.

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This is a selection of Marcuse's essays in social philosophy, extending from 1932 to 1969 and, in the case of some, available in English for the first time. As specific and detailed studies of such topics as alienation, authority, freedom and historical laws, they document to some extent Marcuse's development and illuminate the major assumptions underlying his more recent work.

The first essay, 'The Foundations of Historical Materialism' of 1932, is a review of the first German edition of Marx's Paris Manuscripts. It expounds the thesis that it is inadequate to think that Marx developed from providing a philosophical to providing an economic basis for his theory' (p. 3). According to Marcuse, Marxism includes a crucial philosophical element in all its stages: 'What must be seen and understood is that economics and politics have become the economic-political basis of the theory of revolution through a quite particular, philosophical interpretation of human existence and its historical realization . . . the revolutionary critique of political economy itself has a philosophical foundation . . . ' (p. 4). Moreover, he argues that Marx's typical critique arose out of his confrontation with Hegel's treatment of labour, objectification, alienation, supercession, property. Marcuse is, of course, helped by Marx himself: 'But are alienation and estrangement "economic facts" . . .?" (quoted p. 6). Thus at the bottom of Marx's social criticism there is, in Marcuse's view, 'an idea about the essence of man and its realization' (p. 8), which makes economic facts appear as the perversion of the human essence and the loss of human reality, and at the same time supplies the real basis for a radical social revolution. It is interesting that, in spite of criticisms, Marcuse has not since retreated from the interpretation of Marx given in this early essay: in a Hegelian manner Marx held that there are both the various historical shapes of man and an essence of man an sich, i.e. as the sum of potentialities to be developed as history progresses. Marx's critical stimulus can be treated as 'philosophical' in so far as it is a theoretical understanding of the discrepancy between essence and fact, but it can also be regarded as 'ethical' in so far as it is a dissatisfaction with this discrepancy. One hopes that the republication of this essay will curb those interpretations of Karl Marx which tend to look at him in terms of twentieth-century philosophy and are ignorant of his immediate Hegelian heritage.

The second, lengthy and many-sided essay, 'A Study on Authority', first appeared in 1936 as a contribution to a co-operative volume published in German in Paris. Marcuse here traces the historical development of what he calls the 'bourgeois' concepts of authority and freedom, and finds their consequent source in Luther's division between the 'inner' sphere of the person which is always 'free', and the 'outer' person which may be subjugated in real life. Kant's moral theory only secularizes this tendency. A break comes with Hegel's laborious analysis of sociality in his concepts of Ethical Life and the State.
and Marx's less abstract Classless Society, but these insights are neglected by bourgeois theorists generally. However, this essay is conspicuously uneven; not only does it fail to tackle adequately the question of authority in the family (another of its self-appointed tasks) but also breaks off abruptly on a staccato note of doubtful value. It may be significant that this break should have occurred during a discussion of Sorel and Pareto, for it may show that Marcuse became aware here of a serious inadequacy in his evaluation of Hegel and Marx. The difficulty is this. Whilst Marx at least implicitly argued that the abolition of class distinctions would lead to the disappearance of 'negative' (i.e. irrational, selfish, exploitative) authority, and thus to the disappearance of the problem of authority (for the classless society would be rational), the Neo-Machiavellians like Pareto, Michels, Mosca drew attention to the psychological causes of 'negative' authority. In view of this new argument, a Marxist who wished to hold with Marx that in the classless society the problem of authority would not exist, would have to show now that the psychological causes of power-seeking are also ultimately bound up with class distinctions, i.e. that the abolition of class distinctions would preclude the appearance of authoritarian power-seeking. This, however, demanded a separate enquiry which had not yet been carried out. In the light of the new dimension, it is certain that on the problems of authority Marcuse's essay remains, as it were, in the pre-psychological stage and therefore unjustifiably optimistic. Can Marcuse's subsequent Eros and Civilization be seen as an attempt to improve?

One of the conclusions of Marcuse's essay on authority is that bourgeois thinking about what constitutes freedom has never been able to get completely away from Luther's insistence that man's 'inner' freedom is more important than his 'outer'. Consequently, actual social and economic inequality was neglected, and this meant that even if everyone was guaranteed equal political freedom, this sort of freedom remained very 'abstract'. The same line of argument Marcuse carries on in the next essay entitled 'Sartre and Existentialism', the upshot being that Sartre's paradoxical theory of freedom—'everyone is essentially free'—is a 'modern reformulation of the perennial ideology, the transcendental stabilization of human freedom in the face of its actual enslavement' (p. 162). Marcuse's critique of Sartre's theory of freedom is devastating for good reasons, but after this it is not so clear that Sartre is also supposed to promise a 'revolutionary theory which implies the negation of this entire ideology' (p. 162). On the contrary, it is not impossible to treat such symptoms as a mere inconsistency. Indeed, it is curious that when in a postscript Marcuse calls Sartre 'an institution in which conscience and truth have taken refuge' (p. 190), he does so because Sartre had condemned colonial wars. Is such evaluation philosophy or a political move?

The least solid is the fourth essay, 'Karl Popper and the Problem of Historical Laws', in which Marcuse appears to have crossed quite a few wires. He discusses sociological laws or tendencies when Popper criticises allegedly historical laws, and affirms in detail very specific claims which Popper does not at all deny (e.g. that violence can be caused by plain social facts and not only by sophisticated beliefs in inevitable historical laws). Thus, Marcuse's contention that Popper's criticism of historicism is 'in the last analysis a struggle against history' (p. 207) does not produce the intended punch. Indeed, in his last essay, 'Freedom and the Historical Imperative', Marcuse unwittingly goes back upon his earlier criticism in so far as he now admits, on the question of whether it is possible to break the progressively all-engulfing web of capitalism depicted in One-Dimensional Man, that 'there is no historical “law of progress” which could enforce such a break; it remains the ultimate imperative... of man as his own lawgiver' (p. 223). This admission, not at
all un-Popperian, is expanded even in other directions: 'since there is no scientific logic according to which this imperative [sc. the revolutionary imperative] can be validated, it is indeed a moral imperative' (p. 216). Here, of course, new issues arise, but at least on the old problem of determinism versus voluntarism in history Marcuse has not thrown any new light.

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Apart from a paper by the editor, 'Thought and Action in Spinoza', written for this volume, this is a collection of previously published papers and, in two cases, extracts from books by fourteen authors, all writing in English. An extract from Samuel Alexander's Spinoza and Time (1921) is the earliest piece. Abraham Wolf's 'Spinoza's Conception of the Attributes of Substance', P.A.S. (1926-7), dates from the twenties. All the other pieces have been published between 1933 (not 1937, as stated in the Introduction, p. xiii) and 1969. Apart from the contributors already mentioned, those represented are T. M. Forsyth, Francis Haserot, Ruth Saw, H. Barker, H. F. Hallett, A. E. Taylor, G. H. R. Parkinson, David Savan, Guttorm Flågstad, Raphael Demos, and Stuart Hampshire. It is a very useful collection for anyone interested in Spinoza.

The history of commentary on Spinoza is a history of extraordinarily diverse, and of partial, interpretation. The commentator, as Hampshire puts it in 'Spinoza and the Idea of Freedom', 'unconsciously faithful to his own age and to his own philosophical culture' seizes upon some one element in Spinoza's thought and then develops 'the whole of the philosophy from this single centre' (p. 310). Commentators have also tended to fall into the two groups of those who aim to show in detail the incoherences and inconsistencies of the doctrine, and those who offer sympathetic defences. Among the latter, great enthusiasm for Spinoza is not uncommon. Hampshire, for example, who says that one can return to the philosophy 'again and again without ever being sure that one has penetrated to the centre of his intentions', confesses, '. . . I have the persisting feeling—I cannot yet properly call it a belief—that in the philosophy of mind he is nearer to the truth at certain points than any other philosopher has ever been' (p. 310). Again, Wolf writes, '. . . unless I am very much mistaken, the philosophy of Spinoza is more in harmony with present day scientific thought, to say nothing of social and political thought, than any other philosophy since his time' (p. 27). The largest claim is made by the editor who says in the Introduction (p. xiii) that Spinoza's 'thought was centuries ahead in his own time and still is ahead in our own. The more one understands him the more one marvels at his genius in having conceived of a philosophical system capable of giving a surprisingly coherent account of a number of philosophical issues in such fields as philosophy of mind and philosophy of action, which have only recently begun to receive the attention they deserve. For this reason, Spinoza's thought today assumes a greater philosophical relevance than any other philosopher in history apart from Aristotle'. Something of the diversity of interpretation comes out in the pieces here, but I doubt whether anyone would be convinced that 'a surprisingly coherent account' of any major philosophical issue can be given within his system from them. The difficulties in saying precisely what the system is and the problems of the terminology, which Spinoza uses so confidently, are emphasised fairly consistently. I am, however, a cautious