The third volume of this annual, like the earlier two, brings together a valuable collection of psychoanalytic essays which are broad in scope, informative, and generally of very high scholarly quality. There are four theoretical studies, six clinical studies, a paper on the problem of the training analysis, three articles on psychoanalytic history, a tribute to Heinz Kohut, three papers on psychoanalysis as a science, and three essays in applied psychoanalysis. All these contributions deserve commentary, but space permits me to touch briefly on only a few.

Three of the theoretical studies (by Basch, Hyman, and Thomä and Kächele) are pointedly germane to the re-evaluations and critiques of classical metapsychology that have recently become the subject of lively controversy within Freudian circles. Among the clinical studies, I found Krystal’s paper on affect tolerance and Terman’s article on aggression and narcissistic rage to be especially illuminating and directly helpful in clinical practice. I particularly enjoyed Gedo’s tribute to Kohut and Kohut’s own two essays on psychoanalysis as a science, in which he brings to focus the central healing and humanizing role of “scientific empathy” in the psychoanalytic enterprise.

While a number of the papers in this volume were specifically written in honor of Richard Sterba, the influence of Kohut’s contributions on many of the authors is readily apparent. Taken as a whole, the book demonstrates that the Chicago group continues to flourish as an important center of creative and innovative psychoanalytic scholarship.

Volume 3 confirms my impression that the Annual of Psychoanalysis is a superior periodical that well merits the attention of anyone who wishes to keep abreast of current developments in psychoanalytic thought.

ROBERT D. STOLOROW


To undertake an incisive critical interpretation of Herbert Marcuse’s thought, Sidney Lipshires inquires into the consistency of Marcuse’s proposals with the thinking of Marx and Freud. For the most part the author, a historian, focuses on the chronological development of Marcuse’s revolutionary utopianism and its relation to Freud’s realism. In the course of Lipshires’ analysis of this development he argues that Marcuse’s extrapolation of Freud’s theory is unsuccessful because it rejects Freudian constructs without a careful consideration of their meaning.

Marcuse came to Marxian theory from the perspective of a well-founded understanding of Kant and Hegel; thus it was natural that
Marcuse would join the Frankfurt school of social thinkers led by Max Horkheimer. As a member of this group Marcuse was willing to revise Marxist teachings where the course of events did not sustain their apparent implications. Accordingly, Marcuse came to doubt that the proletariat was the vehicle of revolutionary transformation. In Freud's instinct theory he sought a ground for revolutionary hope, a principle on which to envision the negation of what in civilized social existence is responsible for human alienation and oppression. Marcuse attempted to reinterpret Freud from the viewpoint of Eros as the instinctual essence of human nature. In advancing this vision, Marcuse believed that he was completing Freud's insights where the master had succumbed to the tradition of Western philosophy wherein reason or Logos must subdue instincts. As an organizing principle Eros contains within itself the functions of reason in relation to reality. This means that Marcuse resists to biological grounds for his belief in a mature, nonrepressive culture, that the particular relation of conflict between individual and society—with the necessity of repression and domination—is a historical development which can be undone in favor of a different organization of human energy. Thus Marcuse envisions a mature culture that will obviate the need for most repressions. He has in mind a return to pregenital eroticization of the whole personality and the work situation.

Lipshires' criticisms undercut virtually every move in Marcuse's construction of the free individual and the mature society insofar as it claims to build on Freud's thinking. The author details how Marcuse revises or rejects elements of Freud's theory without a serious confrontation with basic concepts such as repression, genitality, regression, and narcissism. Furthermore, argues Lipshires, Marcuse's thesis that there is a biological desire for liberation refers to the biological in an ambiguous and idiosyncratic manner. Finally, Marcuse's vision lacks specificity and his ideas are not supported by any empirical evidence. The author takes Marcuse to task for neglecting the ethological confirmations of Freud's thinking (e.g., Weston LaBarre, George Devereux, and Derek Freeman). The unempirical character of Marcuse's speculations separates him not only from Freud, but even from the spirit of the appropriation of Marx by the Frankfurt school.

Lipshires' interpretation is helpful because he frames Marcuse's ideas in historical settings and compares them to Freud's work. The arguments are cogent and concisely stated. To my mind the issue of repression is the key to the fundamental difference between Marcuse and Freud. By a consideration of the development of various facets of Marcuse's and Freud's ideas, Lipshires shows the cumulative significance of this issue.

The analysis of Marcuse is based to a considerable extent on a simplified and very orthodox reading of Freud. Because Freud is the standard for judgment and the question concerns only Marcuse's consistency in terms of Freudian theory, Lipshires himself does not enter into a seri-
ous discussion of the empirical evidence for and against psychoanalytic constructs, a discussion which a wider orientation in psychology and related disciplines would permit. Despite this limitation, *Herbert Marcuse: From Marx to Freud and Beyond* is worth the attention of all who recognize the impact of Marcuse on contemporary culture. It will also contribute to the understanding of psychoanalysts who are sensitive to the cultural setting in which they practice and who seek to assess the implications of Freud's ideas for a comprehensive interpretation of human nature and society. The book is well organized and has a good bibliography, but no index.

RALPH UNDERWOOD


William Sahakian begins his historical review with a brief sketch of the precursors of modern psychology from the ancient Greeks to modern philosophical psychology. He next sketches the development of British psychology. With the third chapter, using the "university approach," he outlines the development of psychology at the major universities in England, Germany, America, Austria, and France, and then, even more briefly, at Soviet, Oriental, and Latin American universities.

Sahakian feels that the book's "distinctiveness lies in its (1) university or school approach; (2) quotations where deemed necessary from original sources; (3) summary overview followed by an analysis in depth; and (4) extended scope."

As to his first point, the university approach, I cannot see that it gives more insight or understanding to the development of psychological systems of thought than the older type of organization according to schools of psychology. As to his second point, the quotations from original sources are fine, but there could be more of them. The "analysis in depth" is very uneven and at times disjointed. Of necessity, everything is brief because so much is covered. However, even with brevity one must be accurate. Not all things are of equal importance, and therefore they should not be given equal space. For example, the summary of Freud is good in spite of its brevity and clearly outlines Freud's main contributions, whereas that of Gestalt psychology is not accurate nor fair in its space allotment. For example, Abraham Maslow is incorrectly considered a member of the Gestalt school. Perls and his school of "Gestalt therapy" misuse the word "Gestalt" and really have nothing to do with Wertheimer's system of thought. In the discussion of field theory a number of Lewin's students who made no real contributions are given at least as much space as, for example, Tamara Dembo (given one sentence), who worked with Lewin extensively and published much important material, especially the "Frustration and Regression" and "Frustration and Aggression" experiments, which beauti-