NOTES ON MARCUSE'S CRITIQUE OF INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY*

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Herbert Marcuse has, in the main, been ignored by economists. A major reason for this lack of interest is the highly eclectic nature of his work, drawing heavily on philosophy, linguistics, sociology and political science, but only peripherally on economics; so, many economists have not even read him. The festchrift in his honor, with twenty-six contributors, included no economist and no discussion of the relevance of his thought to our profession. [Wolff, 1967] Furthermore, his works have not even been reviewed in any of the major journals of our profession, although their political aspects have drawn comments in popular journals. But his work, in this writer's view, is relevant to economics, challenges several of its favorite tenets, and therefore deserves attention by economists.

His evaluation of industrial society is not lapidarian. W. H. Auden once remarked that the way to tell a major poet from a minor one is simple: just read two of his poems. If you can tell which was written first, he is a major poet. If such a touchstone can be used with thinkers in general, then Marcuse certainly comes out favorably, for he is constantly revising and expanding his critical theory of society. The Marcuse of Reason and Revolution is not the Marcuse of Eros and Civilization, or of One-Dimensional Man, or of "Repressive Tolerance," or of An Essay on Liberation, or of Counterrevolution and Revolt, to mention in chronological order his major critiques of Western society. This is not to imply that Marcuse is inconstant or protean, rather that his assessment of Western society, i.e. advanced industrial society, is undergoing constant clarification and expansion. Because his work may be unfamiliar to most economists, I will briefly summarize some of Marcuse's major positions. Afterwards, I will offer several reasons why, as economists, we should give his critique some thought.

I. Marcuse's Theory of Society

Marcuse draws his major inspirations from the works of Freud and

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Marx. Along with Freud, Marcuse conceives of man as in continuous pursuit of an ever-elusive goal of happiness. Man's neuroses derive from his resultant frustrations. To enable him to differentiate between neurotic and normal behavior, Freud developed a comprehensive metapsychology which he applied to art, politics and religion. Marcuse has, in large part, adopted this approach to understanding human behavior.

Freud was of interest to Marcuse because of Marx's apparent failure to provide an adequate explanation for the growth in political consciousness of the working class. Many of Marx's predictions about the progress of capitalism seem to have come true, for instance, those in reference to mechanization, the limits of domestic market expansion and the development of imperialism, the trend toward monopolization or cartelization, and, with the Great Depression, the apparent inability of the capitalistic system automatically to recover from slumps.

However, the events of the 1930's, which, according to Marxist thought, should have fostered world revolution, did no such thing. Instead, the working classes of Europe and, more especially, the United States, seemed docile and helpless. It was apparent to neo-Marxists that the domination and exploitation of the proletariat by capitalism was not merely external, as Marx had thought, but internal as well, that the workers did not view themselves as an alienated class in opposition to capitalistic domination with power to alter the social structure. When the objective events called for the climax of the Marxian world drama, the consciousness of the workers was not one which allowed them to seize this opportunity for radical change.

In turning to Freud for an explanation, Marcuse was not concerned merely with what did not happen. He was concerned with what has not yet happened. Man is still unfree, not fully human in Marcuse's estimation, and he finds an explanation for this state of affairs in Freud's metapsychology. Freud offered his theory of the development of human behavior not as history but as metaphor, and this is how Marcuse has accepted it. Just as Rousseau's Social Contract is metaphor, not history, so is Freud's explanation for the development of civilization designed as an explanation of how civilization works, not how civilization came to be. In order to avoid any possible confusion, we must make a distinction between an attempt at an historical explanation of the development of civilization and a paradigmatic explanation of the dynamics of civilization. Such a dis-
tinction appears to be a problem with several of Freud's and Marcuse's critics; these same critics might also reject Genesis 1 as worthless on the basis that there never was an Adam and an Eve in an Eden, despite the truths about human nature and motivations the myth explicates.

In Freud's analysis, the id, or the human instinctual drives (mainly the sexual urge), must be curbed and repressed, basically for two reasons. [Freud, 1961] First, repression is in the interest of the super-ego, or the internalized authority of the parental figures; that is, it is needed to maintain the social structure (law and order). Secondly, repression of the instincts is in the interest of the ego or the self, a self which seeks to preserve its integrity in the face of the conflicts of reality by serving as mediator between the rival claims of the id, the drive for sensual gratification, and the super-ego, the need to avoid anarchy. Additionally, Freud asserts that the ego serves as mediator between the rival claims of the instinctual drive for pleasure (including the avoidance of work) and the external reality of biological needs for food, clothing and shelter, which by requiring man to work, also force this drive to be disciplined and repressed. This renunciation of the pleasure instinct (mainly sexual release) makes psychic energy, or the libido, available in sublimated form for the tasks of creating higher culture, what we understand by the term "civilization."

In other words, the Freudian theory of society is based on the contrast between sexuality and civilization or, it might be put, between pleasure and freedom. In this view freedom is the conquest by man of his baser nature. True liberation, then, is the release from the hold that the instinctual desires of infancy and the fixations resulting from the encounter of those desires with the external world still have upon man. To achieve this release, liberation requires that the ego, which regulates and controls the pleasure instinct, or the pleasure principle, as Freud called it, replace the id, which is committed to the pleasure principle, as master of the individual. In Freudian thought, for civilization to exist, individuals must necessarily renounce the pleasure principle, in order to achieve their freedom from the natural order, become men.

Marcuse, however, does not accept such a stark dichotomy between freedom and happiness. On the contrary, he contends that there can be a close, compatible relationship between the two states; similarly, a compatible relationship can exist between sexuality and civilization.
Marcuse agrees with Freud that the works of culture have been achieved by sexual renunciation, a saving of libidinal energy for the creation of civilization; yet even so, he also contends that sexual and other social relationships need not be as different as Freud thought they were. Marcuse asserts that there is a close connection between sexuality and happiness on the one hand and his culture pervaded by freedom he wishes to see on the other.¹ For Freud, any social relationship larger than that between sexual partners is founded on a common, unrecognized renunciation of sexual life. Otherwise, social order would be destroyed. Marcuse, on the contrary, looks forward to a civilization in which human relationships can enjoy both a large measure of libidinal release and gratification.

Marcuse contends that the destruction caused by libidinal release foreseen in the Freudian analysis would not be the outcome of human nature as such, but rather the product of an anomalous historical situation — the forced continuance of a specific set of institutions which had outlived their usefulness. It is only those institutions which would be destroyed by libidinal release, not necessarily civilization as such. He justifies this position by incorporating into the Freudian paradigm two interrelated concepts of his own, surplus repression and the performance principle. As to the first, Marcuse divides the repression of the instinctual drives in man into two very different kinds. The first he labels basic repression, by which he means the set of restrictions upon the instincts which is necessary to found and maintain civilization. The other he calls surplus repression, the set of restrictions beyond basic repression which is necessary if some particular form of social domination is to be maintained.

Marcuse agrees with Freud that because of economic scarcity and the work necessary to overcome it, some basic repression is necessary, witness the fable of the grasshopper and the ants. This repression is phylogenic, common to all species. However, there exists in human society a repression which is sociological in origin, concerned with

¹ Marcuse speaks of happiness in a somewhat different sense from the traditional notion. He views happiness as “the fulfillment of all potentialities of the individual” [1968, p. 180], including sensual gratification. Marcuse maintains that if freedom were to pervade our culture, i.e., if, inter alia, culture were no longer subject to the bourgeois compulsion of internalization of its work ethic and the separation of the labor process from the process of consumption, then there would be no need to separate a definition of pleasure from that of happiness. Were we to eliminate guilt, poverty and injustice by freeing social development from its bourgeois constraints, then, he says, “even the most personal human relations can be open to happiness in a really guiltless knowledge, i.e., freedom” [1968, p. 198]
civilized individuals and their groups. This type of repression, which determines the particular form of the distribution and organization of work, say, that of a Roman latifundium, and the degree of repression necessary to maintain such institutions, eventually is greater than that which is necessary for civilization as such, because of social progress.

What is even more important, as technical and material progress remove the obstacles which scarcity placed in the path of civilized development, repression becomes more and more a matter simply of maintaining specific forms of social domination, rather than of maintaining civilization itself. In other words, outmoded institutions seek to perpetuate themselves. To understand the potential for human liberation, the principle of surplus repression, and society's ability to alter its institutions yet retain civilization, must be recognized. Marcuse writes, "the historical possibility of a gradual decontrolling of the instinctual development [i.e., libidinal release] must be taken seriously, perhaps even the historical necessity — if civilization is to progress to a higher stage of freedom." [Marcuse, 1955, p. 122]

Freud contended that the needs engendered by reality, labelled the reality principle, demands repression. Marcuse counters that the performance principle, his second expansion on Freud's paradigm, answers the reality principle. He asserts that society confuses reality itself with the demands which some particular form of social domination, some particular set of institutions, such as capitalism, seeks to impose in the name of reality. Reality does not demand that social tasks be performed in some particular order and hierarchy. For instance, we could live and work under a feudal/manorial system, but the level of our economic and social development is such that these medieval institutions are no longer necessary, and any attempt to establish and maintain them would involve much more repression than is required any longer to maintain civilization. The need to make a choice from among the options available to a society to perform the tasks necessary for civilization, Marcuse's performance principle, can now be seen as fundamentally different from simply the need to curb the instinctual drives in man in order to maintain some form of civilization, Freud's reality principle.

Marcuse, having made these emendations to the Freudian model of civilization, is now able to divide human history clearly into two parts, or two eras, based on the notions of surplus repression and the performance principle. The first is the pre-modern era, charac-
terized by the necessity for strong social domination in order to overcome scarcity and lay the technological foundation for abundance, while the second is the modern era, characterized by needless or surplus repression of the energies of the libido and their expression only in the permitted forms of work organization and distribution and the limited monogamic sexuality of the socially-required family, both of which, he contends, are dead hands of the past. Marcuse maintains that human liberation involves the relaxation of restraints on the pleasure principle, on sexuality in the fullest sense of the term. Human sexuality has been alienated from the social order in the past due to the dictates of a reality which may now be confronted with much less renunciation and asceticism. This process of liberation constitutes the flowering of a new society which can enable human beings at last to be subjects of their existence, instead of objects which merely react to the circumstances of their existence. For Marcuse, liberation will provide the opportunity for man to fulfill his potential as man.

II. Marcuse's Criticism of Modern Society

Such liberation, the development of a truly free individual, one who has the consciousness to develop his, and mankind's, potential- ities, was Marcuse's hope in Eros and Civilization. In One-Dimen- sional Man, hope gave way to despair. Marcuse had previously spoken of "a mental faculty which is in danger of being obliterated, the power of negative thinking." [Marcuse, 1960, p. xiv] Negative thinking, in Marcuse's view, is the sole source of creative social criticism, and he feared the obliteration of creativity in social life. In a rare fit of eloquence, the introduction to One-Dimensional Man, which is com- mended to the reader, Marcuse expresses this concern as the central theme of that work. He suggests that the threat of nuclear destruction and the need to devise a defense against it have caused modern Western society (and Soviet society, also) to develop an industrial/ defense alliance which has succeeded in convincing society that the alliance is the logical outcome of the nuclear threat and that the interests of the alliance are those of all society. "And yet," he notes, "this society is irrational as a whole."

Its productivity is destructive of the free development of human needs and faculties, its peace maintained by the constant threat of war, its growth dependent on the repression of the real possibilities for pacifying the struggle for existence
—individual, national, and international. This repression, so
different from that which characterized the preceding less
developed stages of our society, operates today not from a
position of natural and technical immaturity but rather from
the position of strength. The capabilities (intellectual and
material) of contemporary society are immeasurably greater
than ever before—which means that the scope of society’s
domination over the individual is immeasurably greater than
ever before. Our society distinguishes itself by conquering
the centrifugal social forces with Technology rather than
Terror, on the dual basis of an overwhelming efficiency and
an increasing standard of living. [Marcuse, 1964, p. x]

He continues that technological progress in advanced industrial
society, which he had contended in Eros and Civilization could enable
mankind, by freeing it from want, to develop its potential, now ren-
ders any critique of the society’s historical alternatives — social de-
velopment — of its foundation, because now technology, in the hands
of the industrial/defense alliance,

. . . creates forms of life (and of power) which appear to
reconcile the forces opposing the system and to defeat or re-
fute all protest in the name of the historical prospects of free-
dom from toil and domination. Contemporary society seems
to be capable of containing social change—qualitative change
which would establish essentially different institutions, a
new direction of the productive process, new modes of human
existence. This containment of social change is perhaps the
most singular achievement of advanced industrial society. . .
[Marcuse, 1964, p. xii]

In other words, the fundamental thesis of One-Dimensional Man is
that the technology of advanced industrial societies has enabled them
to eliminate social conflict, and therefore social development, by
assimilating all those classes which in earlier forms of social order
provided either voices or forces of dissent. Technology does this partly
by creating affluence. Both Marx and Marcuse take freedom from
material want as the foundation of other freedoms; but in the afflu-
ent society this first freedom has been perverted, been turned into an
agency for producing servitude. When men’s needs are satisfied many
of their reasons for dissent and protest are satisfied and they may
become mere passive pawns of the dominating system.

An example of Marcuse’s point is given in the prize-winning novel
by Reynolds Price, The Surface of Earth. A black man is speaking to
a white man.
... money scares people. Scared 'em terrible in 1919, I tell you—colored boys coming home from the U. S. Army, shovels in one hand and money in the other. Scared people to death; thought we'd buy up land, you see, and own the whole damn world. Two or three did, little poor piece of dirt; but you want to know the truth?"

"Yes."

"You want to know who saved the world from niggerboys?"

"Sure."

"Mr. Henry Ford."

"How?"

"Model T. Every nigger had to have one, poured his money down it, saved the land for white folks."

Although fictional, this conversation illustrates Marcuse's point that industrial society, by offering material goods to its disenfranchised and abused classes, diverts those classes from what should be their true aim, to seize the opportunity to alter the structure of that society to their and, therefore, mankind's benefit, to carry on the historical development of the social order, and in this example, to alter the relationship of black men to the land. How much more able than formerly, Marcuse asserts, is advanced industrial society to freeze the historical process of social development by the widespread provision of consumer goods and services to all classes.

He explains that the forms of consumption in our advanced society have two effects: 1) they satisfy the material needs which might otherwise lead to protest; and 2) they foster identification with the established order. He says:

If the worker and his boss enjoy the same television programs and visit the same resort places, if the typist is as attractively made up as the daughter of her employer, if the Negro owns a Cadillac, if they all read the same newspaper, then this assimilation indicates not the disappearance of classes, but the extent to which the needs and satisfactions that serve the preservation of the Establishment are shared by the underlying population. [Marcuse, 1964, p. 8]

According to Marcuse, those who are exploited by the system are also bribed into silence by that system and thus do not perform their historical role of subverting the established order and providing the driving force for its development.

What is more, he asserts that the conditions of work in modern society also tend to render the worker passive. The pattern of pro-
duction in a modern factory, the nature of skilled work, which involves the laborer’s introjection of his job, the structural shift in the labor force toward white-collar workers and their concomitant ideas of professionalism, the collaboration of top management and top labor, all help to destroy any consciousness of being in opposition to the work system. For that matter, so also do the institutions of the welfare state, which, by means of an administered standard of living, dominate the lives of the recipients of the state’s benefits.

In a later work he expands on this theme, holding that since all systems wish to perpetuate themselves, and since modern industrial society now has the power to do so, advanced industrial states organize technology, manipulate individuals, and mobilize all of society to the end of increasing industrial and technological strength. Furthermore, modern technology is dependent upon an acceptance of technical progress and the application of science to the social world without reference to humanitarian considerations. It encourages an authoritarianism in society and elicits an acceptance of its domination of society by permitting the pleasurable release of tension and painless satisfaction of basic needs. And, in so doing, modern technology has developed individual self-autonomy. [Marcuse, 1970, pp. 1-5] The result is a super-ego which is authoritarian, submissive to manipulation, apathetic to social concerns, and fixed in its development. It is “happy” both with the dominant social order and in its own unfreedom.

Does this seeming “happiness” with the industrial order, mass consumption, and the welfare state mean that it is no longer possible for men to be free, to be subjects of their existence, able to direct their lives in fulfillment of their potentials as human beings? Not quite yet, Marcuse claims, for although in One-Dimensional Man he does speak of people being “satisfied to the point of happiness with the goods and services handed down to them by the administration,” he contends that this happiness is not the true happiness of free individuals. For instance, take the growth of leisure: the leisure of modern society is not free, because “it is administered by business and politics;” [Marcuse, 1964, p. 49] it is merely recuperation from and preparation for work. The corporate state channels our leisure in the directions most beneficial to it and prevents it from moving along the lines leisure — liberation from work — should take, the cultivation of the potential in men to be free, rational individuals.

To a large extent, Marcuse desairs of our ability to overcome the persistent and pervading influence of technology on our lives. Nev-
ertheless, at the end of *One-Dimensional Man*, he sees a chance that
man can be truly liberated. He expands on this chance in *Five Lectures*,
saying that the technology that should allow man to see the
flowering of freedom through liberation from the reality principle is,
instead, chaining man to a self-justifying production process.

Today any form of the concrete world, of human life, any
transformation of the technological and natural environment
is a possibility, and the locus of this possibility is historical.
Today we have the capacity to turn the world into hell, and
we are well on the way to doing so. We also have the capacity
to turn it into the opposite of hell. [Marcuse, 1969b, p. 62]

It will be explained below what constitutes this chance, but if
economics is defined as the science of scarcity, then for Marcuse the
discipline has fulfilled its function. The problem is not now how to
reconcile man's supposedly unlimited wants to his limited resources.
To assume that he had unlimited material wants was a useful device
for mapping out a strategy of how best to satisfy more of those wants,
but the assumption is not true according to Marcuse. Accordingly,
if economics has a function left, it should be to discover how best to
distribute the goods we have in abundance while not stifling man's
liberation.

Material satisfaction is an important aspect of life, but only one,
and we have provided for that need in abundance. Marcuse says
that it is our failure as a society to realize that we have solved the
economic problem (the reality principle), and that we are living un-
der conditions of surplus repression, which has led us into our present
one-dimensional society. Liberation from surplus repression would
entail a reworking of our entire social, economic, and political struc-
ture, in accordance with the performance principle, in order to thaw
the historical process that technology — which led us to the threshold
of liberation — and its concomitant industrial system have frozen.

The only chance Marcuse sees for liberation comes from:

. . . the outcasts and outsiders, the exploited and persecuted
of other races and other colors, the unemployed and the un-
employable. They exist outside the democratic process; their
life is the most immediate and the most real need for ending
intolerable conditions and institutions. Thus their opposition
is revolutionary even if their consciousness is not. [Marcuse,
1964, p. 256]

The opposition of the poor, the disenfranchised and the discri-
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The economic and technical capabilities of the established societies are sufficiently vast to allow for adjustments and concessions to the underdog, and their armed forces sufficiently trained and equipped to take care of emergency situations.

[Marcuse, 1964, p. 257]

There is only a chance, he concludes, as opposed to an historical inevitability, that they might succeed in performing what has been the historical function of alienated groups.

Since 1964, when Marcuse wrote One-Dimensional Man, he has become more optimistic in his outlook. At least he has written more extensively of the society he would like to see and how we could get there. In An Essay on Liberation, he argues that a revolution is possible through the consciousness of the educated elite he praised in One-Dimensional Man, those individuals who have escaped the dehumanizing elements in our society either because they were excluded in the first place or have been able to throw off on their own the shackles to personal development our one-dimensional society attempts to place on men. [Marcuse, 1969a, p. 30] His hopes rest on their leadership as the only route through which mankind might be saved from a new Dark Age.

It is not my wish to devote more space to Marcuse's estimation of the prospects of revolution; these speculations are probably to some extent the reason he has been ignored by economists. The purpose of this paper is to provide a summary of his critique of the present state of modern society and then to suggest those areas in it which should attract the attention of economists. However, it would be helpful in completing this summary of the relevant aspects of Marcuse is thought to present his description of the personality of a liberated person after the revolution has occurred:

Let me first formulate it negatively because the negative contains the positive. It would be a psyche, a mind, an instinctual structure that could no longer tolerate aggressions, domination, exploitation, ugliness, hypocrisy or dehumaniz-
ing routine performance. Positively you can see it as the growth of the esthetic and the erotic components in the instinctual and mental structure. I see it manifested today in the protest against the commercial violation of nature, against plastic beauty and real ugliness, against pseudovirility and brutal heroism. [Keen and Raser, 1971]

III. Relevance to Economics

An analysis of our society which is as far reaching and has as much depth as Marcuse's, the extent of which can only be hinted at in this summary, seems to be deserving of our attention as economists, certainly more than it has been accorded so far. There have been some comments made concerning Marcuse by prominent economists in popular journals, mainly centering on Marcuse's predictions about revolution and prescriptions for the future, but, as I mentioned earlier, there has been no serious discussion of his critique of industrial society in any of the professional journals.

It is my belief that an evaluation of the worth of Marcuse's critique, or its relevance to economics, should not hinge on his prescriptions or predictions. In the case of prescriptions, we would be dealing with his judgments on how to get from where he says our society is in its development to where he thinks it should be, and by their nature, judgments are open to potentially never-ending, sterile disputes. In the case of predictions, most economists realize that an understanding of the nature of reality does not also necessarily involve the ability to predict the future and vice versa. Thus an attempt to evaluate the critique presented by Marcuse in terms of its predictive ability would launch us into the quagmire of methodological differences between empirical and historical sciences and, even, into the dispute currently occurring over Bayesian inference and subjective probability.

Rather, our approach, as economists, should be to evaluate Marcuse in terms of his analysis of the current state of our society, not where he would like us to go or how to get there, which are other matters. And in doing so, we should distinguish between his normative and his positive analysis, not because one is more important than the other, but because it is easy to confuse our criticism if we do not. Assessments of normative issues should be based on different criteria from

*For an enlightening attempt to clarify the issues involved in the conflict of the methodologies, see Tarascio, 1975.
assessments of empirical statements. A normative statement deals with value judgments of the observer, and value judgments are not empirically verifiable, nor are they deducible from empirical statements, and thus they cannot be proven either true or false. [Carnap, p. 77.] Consequently, what we must deal with is whether or not a normative statement is logically consistent, or correct or incorrect, in terms of the values the observer has in mind. For instance, the statement that a truly free individual is one who is able to develop his potentialities as a human being must be evaluated in terms of the goal of human liberation, which liberation Marcuse deems desirable. Are they logically connected? Does the normative statement conform to the goal? Is it logically consistent or inconsistent to say that liberation entails the development of potentialities? These are theoretical issues of the kind with which economists have long dealt, for instance, the concepts of Paretian optimality and efficiency, which are grounded in value judgements but then involve a whole series of logically derived empirical statements.

But why should economists be concerned with Marcuse's normative statements? What have they specifically to offer to economists with normative interests? Based on the presentation of Marcuse's critique given in this paper, it should now be obvious that there are normative positions in the critique which directly bear upon the subject matter of economics. For instance, there is Marcuse's contention that a society which has maximized the use of science and technology to minimize the need for human labor is preferable to one which has not, which we might label Marcusean optimality, to distinguish it from Paretian optimality. There is at least as much ethical justification for that position as there is for any of the major premises of traditional welfare economics.

Furthermore, such a position as Marcuse's cited above leads to the same kinds of testable empirical propositions as traditional welfare economics. Just as with all instances of inference, the tests we devise cannot do more than support or not support the propositions (as opposed to proving them or disproving them), [Blalock, pp. 9-10] but that has not stopped research in welfare economics. If the empirical propositions are not supported by the evidence, then the normative statements are called into question.

What kinds of empirical propositions could be developed and tested from Marcuse's analysis? For one, that the increase in productivity achieved by technological society has been at the price of regula-
tion, domination and control, and therefore society has not achieved Marcusean optimality. Do workers and consumers respond through free choice to a potential improvement in their lot, as is necessary even in Pareitian optimality, or has our society developed in them an authoritarian personality which causes them to respond not to their own interests but to those of the establishment, that is, causes them to respond so as to perpetuate the existing institutions?

One way to test this proposition would be to investigate whether or not there has developed an authoritarian personality in industrial societies. Is there evidence to support this notion? One of the first scholars to investigate this area was Carl Friedrich, in a 1937 study of Nazism. [Friedrich, pp. 50-61] He found that the electoral support of the Nazi movement was stronger in rural areas of Germany than in industrial areas. In Japan, researchers found that the population of the rural areas likewise was more authoritarian and less concerned with civil liberties than the population of urban areas. [Kito, 1954 and National Public Opinion Institute, 1951] Another study found American farmers and farm workers to have the lowest proportion of males who are tolerant with respect to civil liberties issues. [Lipset, 1963, p. 95] Finally, a study of Egypt found not only that the Middle Easterners scored higher on the F-scale than did Americans, controlling for education and religion, but that rural origin in both countries was consistently positively associated with authoritarianism. [Melikian, 1959]

These are only a few of the studies which have been made of this matter, and most conclude that there is a negative correlation between authoritarianism and industrialization. Thus, Marcuse's contention that industrial society instills an authoritarian mentality in its citizens and causes them to serve the interests of the establishment does not seem to be supported by the material surveyed. This does not mean that Marcuse has been disproved, for the issues involved in these studies were not derived from Marcuse's analysis and are therefore not necessarily the same ones addressed by Marcuse (except for, perhaps, the F-scale). What it does mean is that just this one contention can be the subject of much fruitful analysis. That there are many other similar issues, dealing with economics, should be evident.

Presumably, authoritarianism for Marcuse must mean that which is measured by the F-scale, since he was a member of the team at the Institute for Social Research which published Studien Über Autorität und Familie, the preparatory study to The Authoritarian Personality (which introduced the F-scale), edited by Adorno, 1950. Marcuse mentions it in Counterrevolution and Revolt, 1972, p. 28.
by now. These include the nature and ethics of social experimentation (e.g., welfare programs) in a political democracy, a reevaluation of the issue of Say's Law and consumer sovereignty (a la Galbraith) in view of the pervasive power structures in industrial society outlined by Marcuse, and indeed, the whole issue of economic power. A thorough investigation of such issues will expand our knowledge about our society, the goal of all social science.

Marcuse's critique is worthy of our concern and consideration as economists, I hope I have demonstrated, because it suggests a different and heuristically valuable way of viewing our society and its structure. It is based on value judgments, but as Joan Robinson points out, "it is not possible to describe a system without moral judgments creeping in." Further, by "taking a particular economic system as given, we can describe the technical features of its operation in an objective way." [Robinson, p. 14] We can evaluate Marcuse's system or model of our society both normatively and empirically. We can also test economic propositions derived from Marcuse's critique to see whether or not the data support or do not support them, and therefore whether or not we should be concerned about them. Marcuse's conceptions, whatever their ultimate validity or usefulness, are not Clapham's "empty economic boxes." They merit consideration and it appears incumbent upon the profession to take up their challenges.

4 See chapter VIII of Rieck and Boruch, for an introduction to this kind of analysis.

REFERENCES


