The Revitalization of Political Philosophy: Towards a Marcuse-Jung Synthesis*

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A growing number of political theorists are finding the study of psychology or psychoanalysis a rewarding key for an understanding of politics. Within the Marxian school of thought the apparent incompatibility of the presuppositions of Marx and Freud have been the source of serious theoretical problems and have eventually precipitated deep cleavages. Some theorists, in particular members of the Frankfurt school, have tried to reconcile the seeming contradictions. In the present essay Professor Steuernagel examines Herbert Marcuse's effort to harmonize Marx and Freud and finds that his attempted synthesis is unconvincing. She shows that he could have been more successful if, instead of relying on Freud, he had relied on Jung, whom he dismisses out of hand. Through her analysis she contributes to the continual search for the aims of political philosophy and buttresses the case for the use of psychology in the study of political phenomena.

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The central thesis of this essay is that Marcuse's rejection of Jung was premature,1 and that a Marcuse-Jung synthesis can revitalize the thera-

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peutic function of political philosophy. Since this topic enters into relatively unexplored territory, it will be necessary, at times, to engage in a rather tedious exposition of the basis for the synthesis. This is less an apology than a caution: any creative conclusions or implications for political philosophy can be only suggested. The real work will be done by political philosophers who find some validity in what is suggested here.

Why Jung? Is not Freud “our” theorist? Students of politics, at least those who attribute any validity to psychoanalytic theory, are more likely to deal exclusively with Freud’s concepts and ideas. This is somewhat ironical since Freud conceives of the external dimension, the public arena which is the concern of politics, as little more than a projection of an internal reality. Jung in no way reverses this relationship; he too would contend that the primary reality is internal. It is the very nature of this Jungian internality, however, which is of interest to political philosophers. Jung contends that in the depths of our psyche, in our collective unconscious, we share something. The public dimension, which is to regulate relationships between nature and the species and within individuals, is affected by conscious and unconscious collective factors. Politics has traditionally been concerned with common affairs, and Jung can help us to understand that this commonality goes beyond considerations of conscious “agreement” and “covenant.” Jung is a political theorist, although his primary concern is not with the external world of public affairs but rather with the nature of our inner commonality.

Jung can help Marcuse more than Freud. The major problem which would appear to impede an attempted Marcuse-Jung synthesis—the autonomy of psychic factors, that is, the conception of an internal dimension which interacts with, but is not totally a reflection of, an external dimension—is illusory. Marcuse is a “materialist,” but he has always been concerned with the internal dimension and has suggested that this internality has some kind of autonomy. As he notes:

For there is such a thing as the Self, the Person—it does not yet exist but it must be attained, fought for against all those who are preventing its emergence and who substitute for it an illusory self, namely, the subject of voluntary servitude in production and consumption, the subject of free enterprise and free election of masters.²

Obviously, this is not conclusive proof that Marcuse posits any kind of autonomy for psychic factors. But then, even if this is not so, Marcuse still needs Jung. Marcuse has argued that consciousness is not simply a

reflection of material forces. He has always insisted that a change in consciousness, a New Sensibility, must precede any extensive social and political change. Even if a conclusive evaluation cannot be made in respect to Marcuse’s conception of the relative autonomy of psychic factors (and this is not unusual given a thinker of Marcuse’s breadth and complexity), it is still possible to argue that Jung can help Marcuse more than Freud. Marcuse needed Freud to help to understand, in effect to map, the psyche of a person in capitalist society. As this essay will attempt to demonstrate, Marcuse’s interpretation actually distorts Freud. As strange as this may seem, there is no need for a Marcuse-Jung synthesis: Marcuse’s conception of the psyche is already Jungian.

Then why does Marcuse reject Jung? It is only possible to speculate. One clue might be found in Odajnyk’s lucid and important book on Jung’s social and political ideas. Odajnyk suggests, after an examination of Jung’s alleged Nazi sympathies, that “there may be some basis for allegations that, at least to begin with, Jung was not unsympathetic to National Socialism.” Odajnyk also forces the reader to consider Jung’s initial “fascination” with the Nazis in light of Jung’s own ideas. Jung believed it possible for a healing symbol to emerge from the collective unconscious. He recognized that something was happening in the German case but did not want to evaluate it prematurely. This whole question of Jung’s relationship to the Nazi movement is intriguing (and indeed might be the only question that is important for Marcuse), but it is not the focus of this essay. Odajnyk refers the reader, for a more complete treatment of this problem, to Jaffe’s piece “C. G. Jung and National Socialism” in her book From the Life and Work of C. G. Jung; the interested reader may want to consult that source for further information.

I. Marcuse on Jung Re-examined

Why does Marcuse say he rejects Jung? He attacks what he interprets as Jung’s lack of awareness of the effects of a repressive external reality. He denounces Jung as a right-wing psychoanalyst who holds the belief that a person can be healthy and creative even in a repressive reality. It is difficult to accept this criticism in light of the development of Marcuse’s own thought. Indeed, some critics have leveled this charge against Marcuse himself. Marcuse has had to battle those who argue that he believes change can come about by a pure act of will or by a willed

change of consciousness. He does contend that the Great Refusal can occur within the old society and that the New Sensibility can be formed as a precondition for revolution. This assertion complements, rather than attacks, Jung’s claim that individuation can precede direct external institutional change. This, however, is not Marcuse’s strongest indictment of Jung.

More fundamentally, Marcuse contends that Jung reduces the role of the instinctual dynamic in the life of the psyche. What does Marcuse mean by “reduces?” He apparently suggests that Jung “softens” the raw force of instinctual energy. He seems to argue that Jung, in effect, “spiritualizes” Freud’s discovery of the biological nature of the instincts, that is, he transforms a biological reality into a weakened spiritual impulse. As Marcuse notes, “Thus purified, the psyche can again be redeemed by idealistic ethics and religion; and the psychoanalytic theory of the mental apparatus can be written as a philosophy of the soul.” 5 Again, Marcuse’s charge is ironical in light of his own view of the nature of instinctual energy. He is forced to “do something” with Freud’s death instinct because it represents a challenge to his vision of a nonrepressive reality. His solution of this dilemma actually brings him closer to Jung’s conception of psychic energy as libido—a general, nondifferentiated energy.

Marcuse clings to Freud’s brief flirtation with the notion of an original, undifferentiated psychic energy even though Freud dismissed this notion and concluded with a dualistic theory of instinctual energy which is incompatible with Marcuse’s needs. Marcuse does not have to search for a conception of psychic energy that is compatible with his vision of a nonrepressive reality: he needs only to recognize and accept Jung’s concept of libido. Marcuse dismisses Jung after a few comments by referring the reader to Glover’s *Freud or Jung?,* a piece highly critical of Jung. Glover argues that Jung’s psychology, which employs a conception of libido as psychic energy, is one-dimensional, that is, it “flattens out” the more specific meaning found in Freud. 6 Again, it is only possible to speculate why Marcuse accepts Glover’s criticism of Jung. There is one possibility that perhaps is unfair to Marcuse but needs to be raised. Is Marcuse’s rejection of Jung a serious theoretical difference or simply an *ad hominem* rejection of a Nazi sympathizer? Marcuse has never drawn any connections between Jung’s theories of the psyche and their possible support for fascist doctrines, but it is unfair to indict him for not doing

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5. Ibid.

so. Anything Marcuse might produce on this subject would be fascinating; but to indict him for not doing so can be likened to condemning a person for not saying anything about pineapples in an essay on brooms. This might seem like a facile dismissal of the problem for some readers; but again it is necessary to assert the intent of this essay: political philosophers have something to learn about the nature of the psyche from Jung, and Jung’s thought raises some important questions for social and political theory. This essay, in its attempt to synthesize Marcuse and Jung, suggests how Jung’s thought can give support to Marcuse’s vision of a nonrepressive reality. Marcuse turned to Freud to give a psychological dimension to Marx, but many of the weaknesses in Marcuse can be eliminated by substituting a Jungian conception of the psyche.

II. Marcuse, Jung, and the Therapeutic Function of Political Philosophy

Marcuse envisages a therapeutic function for political philosophy. He is interested in demonstrating how the individual and society can progress from a diseased state to a healthy one. His “therapeutic vision” of health does not accept the present reality as natural but rather as a diseased version, a perverted distortion, of a healthy, natural condition. A therapeutic orientation is an optimistic orientation; disease is seen not as given or natural but as something which can be healed or removed.

Marcuse has a vision of a nonrepressive reality which has its root in aesthetics. He makes an interesting connection between the unconscious and the aesthetic dimension. For him, the forms involved in the development of a New Sensibility are the same forms found in the aesthetic dimension. That is to say, Marcuse’s conception of a nonrepressed unconscious parallels his conception of the aesthetic dimension: the non-repressed unconscious and the aesthetic dimension share the characteristics of beauty, receptivity, and harmony. In this sense, Marcuse’s aesthetic vision can be thought of as a therapeutic vision: health will come about through the revitalization, the recapture, of an original, non-repressed unconscious whose forms can be understood in terms of the qualities of the aesthetic dimension. Marcuse argues that in the past the potential for a nonrepressive reality has been excluded from the mainstream of political philosophy and consigned to what has been called utopian speculation. Marcuse argues we can be free after culture has done its work in providing us with a model for a nonrepressive reality. He does not accept the consignment of this nonrepressive potential to utopian speculation but argues that domination has never been complete, that fantasy has remained a truth incompatible with reason.

Marcuse, in his role of political philosopher as therapist, functions in
what Jung calls the “visionary mode” of artistic creation. Jung discusses two modes of artistic creation, the visionary and the psychological. It is the second mode which parallels Freud’s description of artistic creation, and it is clear that Marcuse misunderstands (or refuses to understand) Freud’s conception of artistic creation. Marcuse believes that it is possible for the political philosopher through the use of fantasy to tap the aesthetic-unconscious dimension. The political philosopher as therapist can then elaborate symbols which can serve as models for a non-repressive reality. When Marcuse describes fantasy and symbols, however, he is much closer to Jung than Freud. If his vision of a non-repressive reality is to be validated through a description of the psyche, then it must be Jung’s description rather than Freud’s.

Creative inspiration for Freud involves the artist’s ability to tap the lost images and feelings of his or her childhood.\(^7\) For Freud, the artist has powerful instinctual demands which he or she cannot satisfy and which must be expressed in a fantasy world, “on the borderline of neurosis.”\(^8\) Freud locates much of this creative function in consciousness and in the ego. Marcuse must revise Freud if fantasy is to be a liberating force: for Freud fantasy is a process located in consciousness, and this is the arena Marcuse sees as the most perverted, distorted, and repressed. For Marcuse, the aesthetic dimension is the domain of certain non-perverted forms which can serve as a model for the needed syntheses to heal mutilated sense experience and lead to a new rationality and a New Sensibility. Marcuse cannot, without substantial distortion, argue that Freud’s aesthetic dimension is grounded in a realm free from the dominant reality principle. Spector, in a discussion of Freudian aesthetics, emphasizes this point:

> When we try to locate art within this scheme, we conclude that the seat of aesthetic activity must be in the ego, judging from Freud’s remark that although the ego draws its energies from the id, what distinguishes the ego from the id is a “disposition for synthesizing its contents, for concentrating and unifying the emotions, completely missing in the id.”\(^9\)

Culture, for Jung, is not simply a substitute for instinctual gratification. Jung did write of a “psychological” mode of artistic creation, and artists functioning in this mode deal with material from the realm of conscious-

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9. Ibid., p. 112.
ness. But, as has been noted, Jung also outlined a second, qualitatively different mode of artistic creation. Artists in this "visionary" mode tap a nonperverted dimension, a dimension which has not been repressed and distorted. Jung has noted that works in the visionary mode function as symbols to compensate for what Philipson, in a discussion of Jungian aesthetics, calls "socio-historical onsidness." 10

Philipson, in this same analysis, contends that the critical interpretation of art is for a culture what an analyst's interpretation of symbols is for a patient.11 With the right interpretation, a symbol can become a "living experience,"12 possessed of "potential reconciling and transcending power."13 Marcuse, the political philosopher as therapist, functions in this visionary mode. His vision is an attempt to elaborate symbols present in the aesthetic dimension and rooted in the unconscious. Marcuse is arguing that we have the potential, within our own psyche, to shatter the repression of one-dimensional society. One of the symptoms of our disease, one-dimensionality, is the loss of contact with the mental process, fantasy, which can once again put us in contact with the models, symbols, for a nonrepressive reality.

Marcuse argues that Freud restores imagination to its rights: "As a fundamental, independent mental process, fantasy has a truth value of its own, which corresponds to an experience of its own—namely, the surmounting of antagonistic reality."14 He implies that Freud's concepts of fantasy and symbol in some way give evidence that there resides, within the mind, something that has remained "untouched" by one-dimensional society. Marcuse prefers Freud's concepts of fantasy and symbol, yet here too (as in his conception of the nature of psychic energy), he must revise Freud; and with his revision he moves still closer to Jung.

Marcuse wants to argue that all along, within our material beings, we have had the tools to go beyond or transcend the supposed unity of thought, perception, and behavior present in one-dimensional society. This ability to transcend the given resides, as Marcuse reads Freud, in the unconscious; and our ability to tap this liberating potentiality is linked to our ability to engage in fantasy, a process which connects the conscious mind to the unconscious. Marcuse argues that Freud attempted to show the "genesis of this mode of thought (fantasy) and its essential connec-

11. Ibid., p. 177.
12. Ibid., p. 183.
13. Ibid., p. 128.
tion with the pleasure principle.” 15 Fantasy, unlike the pleasure principle, operates in the “developed consciousness” and still maintains autonomy in relation to the reality principle. Fantasy, Marcuse concludes, “preserves the archetypes of the genus, the perpetual but repressed ideas of the collective and individual memory, the tabooed images of freedom.” 16 Marcuse sounds more and more like Jung as he continues to argue that fantasy, since it retains the structures of the original, undifferentiated psyche, preserves the memory of the subhistorical past, “the image of the immediate unity between the universal and the particular under the role of the pleasure principle.” 17 He argues that the ego in contemporary advanced industrial society is guided only by consciousness; it is a distorted ego, a remnant of an ego, an ego that is “left over” after the mutilation of the psyche by the reality principle. 18 This is why fantasy, as a nondistorted mode of thinking, becomes so important for Marcuse. Fantasy and the symbols which it gives access to are a vital part of his therapeutic vision, and he attempts to document their existence with Freud’s evidence. And this is where Marcuse makes his mistake. There is no evidence in Freud to support these conceptions of fantasy and symbol. Does that mean then that Marcuse’s theory must stand without support from psychoanalytic theory? Not if Freud is replaced with Jung.

Marcuse realizes that the function he desires for fantasy is not directly found in Freud. Freud does not believe in the possibility of a non-repressive reality, and Marcuse recognizes that he must revise Freud. It seems the important question here is: where does revision end and distortion begin? Freud argued that the possibility of a nonrepressive reality principle was a matter of retrogression. Marcuse chooses to ignore this, in fact he charges Jung with being “retrogressive,” and instead argues that there is a basis in Freud’s own theory to revise the latter’s belief in the inevitability of the link between civilization and repression.

Marcuse bases his revision on Freud’s notion of narcissism:

If this is the case, then all sublimation would begin with the reactivation of narcissistic libido, which somehow overflows and extends to objects. The hypothesis all but revolutionizes the idea of sublimation: it hints at a non-repressive mode of sublimation which results from an extension rather than a constraining deflection of the libido. 19

15. Ibid., p. 128.
16. Ibid.
17. Ibid., p. 129.
18. Ibid.
Marcuse argues that narcissism, usually connected with egoistic withdrawal from reality, is actually connected with oneness, "a fundamental relatedness to reality which may generate a comprehensive existential order."  

20 It is this concept of narcissism, Marcuse states, which could contain the "germ" for a new reality principle: "The libidinal cathexis of the ego (one's own body) may become the source and reservoir for a new libidinal cathexis of the objective world—transforming this world into a new mode of being."  

Marcuse's images of Orpheus and Narcissus are images of the Great Refusal, a refusal to "accept separation from the libidinous object (or subject)." 21 He wants to rescue fantasy and reconnect it with Eros and argues that Freud's dichotomy between the sexual instincts and fantasy was surpassed in his later reformulation of the instinct theory. 22 Marcuse refuses the idea, which would have been raised by Freud, that his vision is regressive, that is, that it is based on the description of an original, undifferentiated psyche which cannot function in civilization. Marcuse argues, somewhat facilely, that his vision is not regressive in the sense that Jung's was regressive. He contends that his vision of a non-repressive reality would be "in the light of a mature consciousness and guided by a new rationality." 23  

Marcuse argues that Jung's conception of fantasy is purely regressive, that is, that it reaches only to the subhistorical past and lacks any future orientation.  

Glover also criticizes Jung's conception of symbol. He compares Jung's and Freud's definitions and concludes that a symbol for Jung is more than just a substitute or, as Jung would say, a sign. For Jung, "A symbol purposely seeks a clear and definite goal with the help of a certain line for the future psychic development." 24 Ernest Jones, a Freudian, concurs with Glover. He charges Jung with making the concept of symbol meaningless, of using the term symbol as meaning "any mental process that is substituted for another." 25 Jones argues that Jung's work on the anagogic signification of symbols becomes lost in a maze of mysticism and occultism. Jung, Jones contends, abandons science in favor of obscurantism. 26 James' charges of mysticism and occultism refer to what

22. Ibid.  
23. Ibid., p. 128.  
24. Ibid., p. 181.  
27. Ibid., p. 136.
Marcuse has called Jung's abuse of the truth value of imagination. Marcuse asserts that Jung has eliminated the critical insights of Freud's theory with the emphasis on the "retrospective" qualities of imagination. He prefers Freud's conceptions of fantasy and symbol, yet here too (as in the case of a conception of psychic energy) he must revise Freud. While Marcuse appears to cling to Freud, he actually moves closer to Jung.

Marcuse argues that Freud restores imagination to its rights: "As a fundamental, independent mental process, fantasy has a truth value of its own, which corresponds to an experience of its own—namely, the surmounting of antagonistic reality." Marcuse implies that Freud's conceptions of fantasy and symbol in some way give evidence that there resides, within the mind, something that has remained "untouched" by one-dimensional society. Why is this important to Marcuse? Marcuse does not want to advocate the return to a primordial time; the dialectical nature of his thought would not permit this. He wants to describe a time after the new rationality and the New Sensibility have prepared the way for a different and nonrepressive reality principle for modern industrial society. He argues that Jung's conception of fantasy is limited to a regression to a primitive state of mind and being, but this misrepresents Jung. Jung, in fact, accuses Freud of reducing the concepts of symbol and fantasy to purely causal terms.

Jung argues that every psychological fact is always becoming and creative:

The psychological moment is Janus-faced—it looks both backwards and forwards. Because it is becoming, it also prepares for the future event.

Fantasy, he states, has to be understood purposively as well as causally. To speak solely in causal terms is for Jung to speak not of symbols but of symptoms, since symbols have a future orientation and symptoms do not. According to Jung, Freud's symbols are actually symptoms or signs that lack any future orientation. More directly, Jung recognizes that symbols must have a future direction. What is ironic is that Freud, whom Marcuse turns to, denies this, although Marcuse's therapeutic vision requires that symbols have a backward and forward direction—back to a nonrepressive past and forward as a model for a nonrepressive future.

29. Ibid., p. 130.
31. Ibid., p. 580.
Fantasy, for Jung, combines feeling, thought, intuition, and sensation—all the functions of the psyche. He believes that both Adler and Freud reject imagination since they reduce fantasies to semiotic expressions. For Jung, what Freud calls symbols are actually signs for elementary instinctive processes. Marcuse seems unable to accept the conclusion that it is Jung, rather than Freud, who has the more powerful, the more transcendent, conceptions of symbol and fantasy.

For Jung, symbols and fantasy have a creative and unifying function. Fantasy is "the creative soil for everything that has ever brought development to humanity." Jung's own description of his hermeneutic conception of symbols perhaps best indicates the importance he attaches to them:

For the significance of a symbol is not that it is a disguised indication of something that is generally known, but that it is an endeavor to elucidate by analogy what is as yet completely unknown and only in process of formation. The fantasy represents to us that which is just developing under the form of a more or less apposite analogy. By analytical reduction to something universally known, we destroy the actual value of the symbol; it is appropriate to its value and meaning to give it an hermeneutical interpretation.

A synthesis of Marcuse and Jung can revitalize the therapeutic function of political philosophy. For Marcuse, the political philosopher as therapist attempts to elaborate symbols in the aesthetic dimension which can serve as models for a nonrepressive reality. These symbols, which come from the unconscious and are approached through fantasy, can penetrate the total administration of one-dimensional society. When Marcuse turned to Freud, however, he found a description of fantasy as a process rooted in consciousness and a definition of a symbol as a single-dimension substitute. Does Marcuse have to abandon his vision? Not if he turns to Jung where he can find evidence to support his therapeutic vision.

For both Marcuse and Jung, therapy involves the reintegration of the unconscious as a curative for atrophied consciousness. For Marcuse, scarcity is no longer a valid reason for repression; and for Jung the need to develop autonomy is no longer a valid reason for the repression of the unconscious. Jung argues that the unconscious can have a positive, therapeutic value and is dangerous only if ignored. The unconscious, accord-

33. Ibid.
ing to Jung, is not a "demonical monster" but a "neutral" natural entity.\textsuperscript{34} The danger coming from the unconscious, he posits, is a function of the degree to which the unconscious has been ignored or repressed. Jung argues that the ego-conscious personality is not the whole person. He contends that modern man is split off from the collective man and is even, at times, in opposition to him.\textsuperscript{35} Although he concedes that some degree of resistance to the unconscious is necessary both for the development of species and individual autonomy, Jung argues that this quest for autonomy has become too one-sided.\textsuperscript{36} He, like Marcuse, is not without hope. He believes it is possible for the unconscious to compensate for over-intellectualized and rationalized modern consciousness. And again, like Marcuse, Jung has a therapeutic vision which involves the reintegration of the unconscious:

But since everything living strives for wholeness, the inevitable one-sidedness of our conscious life is continually being corrected and compensated by the universal human being in us, whose goal is the ultimate integration of conscious and unconscious, or better, the assimilation of the ego to a wider personality.\textsuperscript{37}

Jung contends that modern man uses dogma to replace the realities of the processes of the collective unconscious.\textsuperscript{38} In turn, the modern condition is best characterized by an "impoverishment of symbols," \textsuperscript{39} in which our symbols have lost meaning because we are ignorant of their relation to our psychic processes. In other words, as modern men we receive symbols and do not realize that they come from within ourselves. Jung reasons that we accept this dogmatic condition because of a fear of "egocentric subjectivity," that is, if we "descend" into the unconscious, we will be overwhelmed by our own inadequacy and become drowned in a sea of subjectivity without signposts or guides. Jung counters this fear with the assertion he so often makes, that the collective unconscious is "sheer objectivity" \textsuperscript{40} and that it is dangerous only if ignored. Although we cannot know the collective unconscious directly, we can be aware of its presences and its meaning for our existence.


\textsuperscript{35} Ibid., p. 78.

\textsuperscript{36} Ibid., p. 124.

\textsuperscript{37} Ibid., p. 78.

\textsuperscript{38} Ibid., p. 12.

\textsuperscript{39} Ibid., p. 14.

\textsuperscript{40} Ibid., p. 22.
What appears in the vision of the person (the political philosopher as therapist) who functions in the visionary mode of artistic creation is the collective unconscious. The political philosopher cannot "create" a symbol, for symbols must come to the individual from the psyche; but he can attempt to tap the healing power of these symbols. This is what Marcuse attempts to do with his vision of a nonrepressive reality;¹¹ and if we turn to Jung, we see that there is some psychoanalytic evidence to support this vision.

III. Conclusion

Other similarities between Marcuse and Jung are apparent. Marcuse's "innate ideas" can be said to correspond to Jung's "archetypes" in proposed structure and function. Marcuse's innate ideas, like Jung's archetypes, are without substance themselves; they only serve to provide the form of the synthesis of the sense experience. Jungian archetypes are not the product of repressed individual or personal experience but are universal collectivities which have an objective existence. Likewise, Marcusean innate ideas cannot "possibly be given in the immediate experience under which the immediate given norms of things appear as 'negative,' as denial of their inherent possibilities, their truth." ⁴²

What is intolerable for Marcuse is the unity of opposites, the elimination of dialectical tension.⁴³ Jung concurs and argues that progress in life can come only through the tension of opposites.⁴⁴ It is this Jungian emphasis on tension which can "charge" Marcuse's symbols. Marcuse, by positing only a personal unconscious, restricts his symbols to contents which have passed through the repressive society. The symbols themselves, then, become mere reflections of individual repressive experiences. Jung's archetypes, which are the contents of the collective unconscious, are the psychological equivalent of Marcuse's innate ideas; and Jung's symbols, as external manifestations of the archetypes, can revitalize Marcuse's vision.

Jung argues that a doctor must deal with the unconscious and the conscious aspects of a patient's personality.⁴⁵ If the therapeutic function of

42. Ibid.
43. Ibid., p. 129.
political philosophy is to be revitalized, political philosophers must recognize the power of unconscious realities. Political philosophy cannot continue to conceive of man as "simplex" rather than "duplex." 46 It is imperative that human knowledge continually evolve to meet the changing demands of a changing reality. We must not stop the flow of instinctual energy into our existence. This is what is happening in one-dimensional society: this tension of opposites and the accompanying energy have been stifled. Political philosophy can become powerful if it taps this archetypal energy and takes into account the conscious and unconscious aspects of human existence.

46. Ibid., p. 96.