destructive effects of tool efficiency have made man "the only mass murderer," an animal who "does not fit his own society," and who is "his own enemy." Somewhat gloomily he suggests that greater knowledge of human aggression may make it possible for us to sublimate or redirect it.

"Future Aspects of Human Genetics" by Helmut Baitsch is the last chapter in the book. It considers principally the factors that have led to a heavy genetic burden of undesirable mutations and the factors that are likely to increase genetic variability, concluding cautiously on a note of restrained optimism.

Many facets of the human animal are reflected in these pages. Many others are not. The tone of the book is reminiscent of the dialogue of optimism and pessimism in the ancient wisdom literature of Meso- potamia and Egypt. Perhaps it is intrinsic to the preoccupations of ethology to hope for environmental change rather than any alteration of the less mutable genetic structure we have derived from evolution. One misses nonetheless the disturbing but far more dynamic perspectives of modern microbiology. In the same sense, while most of these papers explicitly relate humanness to culture, and acknowledge the relatively flexible potentialities of cultural change, they don't express much understanding of or confidence in such possibilities. In the last analysis, the viewpoint expressed here seems to come down to the idea of culture and its movement forward, or back and forth, as a subjective expression of its optimistic regard for the future, or the past, of the whole of mankind or a part. An aspect of this is taken up by the author; it is the creed pertaining to the imminence of a desirable outcome of our history. But the question of whose history is being taken up has been posed: this imminent outcome is a feature of occidental mood, including some of the anthropologists. Though shared by many, yet it is subjective, for we carry to the matter under study something that is not inherent in it. It may per chance be discovered in the thought of non-Western peoples. That would be a critical advance in our theory of the subject, but our theorists have not acted critically in this regard, having thrown their reactions to their own cultural frame, together with reflections on the same, on to the screen of the human kind as a whole. We will return to this matter of the critical view in a moment.

Before the concept of culture was formed in the minds of anthropologists, philosophers, and historians, the ideas of progress, regress, and recurrence were being considered. At first the feature of speculative thought pertaining to Western civilization, the joint idea of culture and its movement forward, or back and forth, was then applied to Eastern, to primitive, or to global culture. The hidden premise was that cultures form wholes and move as wholes, which was implicit in the philosophical and historical writings of Europe from the Renaissance to the Enlightenment, being then made explicit by Hegel and Goethe. In the nineteenth century it was further premised that cultures are organisms and accordingly ameliorate and deteriorate. Of late these ideas have been advanced by Spengler, Sorokin, Toynbee, Schweitzer, Schubart, Northrop, and Kroeber. The national complex has its historians, Javary, Delvaille, Bury, Ginsberg, Pollard, and Wagar.

Astrophysicists in Western civilization have lately achieved awareness of what it is they are after: depending on whether you postulate a big bang or a steady state theory of the origin of the cosmos, you are proving or disproving the existence of god. They have taken the next step, and recognized


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Progress is a given that can be "read" in a culture in the way that its inner meaning can be discovered; progress is in this sense the determinate of the culture, its message. In reference to the book under review, progress is good tidings. But who originates the message, the ethnologist's culture or the ethnologized? Progress is not an objective category; it is determined by a mood predominant in a social class or group, being a subjective expression of its optimistic regard of the future, or the past, of the whole of mankind or a part. An aspect of this is taken up by the author; it is the creed pertaining to the imminence of a desirable outcome of our history. But the question of whose history is being taken up has been posed: this imminent outcome is a feature of occidental mood, including some of the anthropologists. Though shared by many, yet it is subjective, for we carry to the matter under study something that is not inherent in it. It may per chance be discovered in the thought of non-Western peoples. That would be a critical advance in our theory of the subject, but our theorists have not acted critically in this regard, having thrown their reactions to their own cultural frame, together with reflections on the same, on to the screen of the human kind as a whole. We will return to this matter of the critical view in a moment.
that it is in the European cosmological speculation that this question of the origin of All is raised. The proportion of Japanese or Chinese or Indic astronomers who raise this kind of question is much lower. Western cosmologists thereby recognize their cultural bondage, whereas anthropologists, the guardians of the sacred flame that wards off ethnocentrism, are less aware of their blinders. The bibliographies of Sorokin, Kroeber, et al. refer, in their theoretical parts, chiefly to each other, the critical awareness of the cosmologists has rarely been raised in the cultural sciences. Nor has there been any advance in the past generation over the former in our field. Further: a classicist recently traced the idea of progress back to antiquity, but it is the same sort of projection of his own frame of reference on to the screen of the past. E. R. Dodds brings gifts to the Greeks.

The idea of progress, being early connected to the idea of culture as an organic whole, was thereby related to the philosophy of the emergent by C. L. Morgan, S. A. Alexander, Smuts, Kroeber, Whitehead. Those who took up the notion of progress did so in relation to that of providence. To the Calvinist Defoe as to the Catholic Vico providence is the deity as active on earth. Vico had evidence of both activities, of divine providence and of human progress; Croce failed to see Vico's theory of progress, which is the same as that of Turgot, Concorct, Burdin, and Comte, being all in the mind or spirit. Croce also failed to see a concept of material progress by human works in Machiavelli and his ardent admirer, Bacon. Acton did not distinguish between progress and providence, whereas Bury did. But Bury recognized that providence is something external to mankind, and mystical; he did not see that progress is no less mystical. Moliere saw through the mysticism of the imminence long ago.

Wagar brings out that progress is a matter of belief, which cannot be objectively demonstrable. It is bound to hope. Failing this creed, Spengler falls outside the ranks of progressists. Ernst Bloch reacted against the Spenglerian pessimism and introduced a principle of hope that he subjectively discovered in Marxism. It is one thing to speak of the progress of technology from the Paleolithic times on; it is another to speak of the progress of morality, as Quetelet and Niceforo have done, and to seek for its numerical indices. Here the holistic concept broke down. Technology and morality are not bound together; technology is the relation between mankind and the surrounding nature, it is an objective relation. Morality is neither the one nor the other. Progress in relation to the social whole is a creed: here we combine the thoughts of Kroeber and Wagar. You premise that creed if your class or nation is winning.

There is a negative side of this: it is the critical awareness of the public today. You may not show that you despair; you must appear to be on the side of history. It is the cult or hypostasis of hope, which forbids that a Spengler can be the spokesman of the present. Bloch and Herbert Marcuse project the appropriate image wherewith to hide fear and pain. But in all these writings in the present generation, there is no sign of tears or sweat. It is not a matter of game theory, of play. But with Nietzsche it was otherwise.

The book under review deals with a number of these issues. Its author is halfway committed to its creed, halfway critical of its limitations. He conveys his fascination with the subject matter in a lively way. The book can be recommended for its learning.

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Dodds, E. R.


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This is a symposium volume and thus can be characterized by unevenness, tenuous continuity, and an inordinately high price. The papers vary from fifty or more pages of thoughtful work, to some after-thoughts for a free trip to Philadelphia. On the whole, though, the book is interesting, informative, and well worth reading.

The book is a collection of anthropological papers dealing with Ester Boserup's (1965) theory that, contrary to the generally