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MARCUSE'S FREUDIAN MARXISM

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THE OBJECTIVE CHARACTER OF SUBJECTIVITY

Marcuse's early essays in the 1930s on the emancipatory content of German idealism and bourgeois culture prepared the way for his search for a materialist concept of reason that could anchor emancipatory struggle, largely individuated at first, during advanced capitalism's "total mobilization". Indeed this was the *raison d'être* of critical theory as a whole, although Marcuse is distanced from Horkheimer and Adorno (and especially from Habermas, a second-generation member of the Frankfurt School) by his reading of Freud. Where Adorno viewed Freud entirely as a profound analyst of the social manipulation of our inner cores, Marcuse treated Freud both as a perceptive critic of bourgeois repression and also as a prophet of liberation [1]. This more than anything else has made enemies for Marcuse both on the right and the left. Either he is read as an uninformed Epicurean who endorses "total" liberation from bourgeois morality or as a misdirected instinct theorist who substitutes biology for economism. This reading is to some extent conditioned by the affiliation between Wilhelm Reich's writings on psychoanalysis and dialectical materialism and Marcuse's *Eros and Civilization* [2].

Marcuse's Freudian Marxism is the mature

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outcome of his earlier *Zeitschrift* speculations about a materialist synthesis of cognition and sensuality. In that work Marcuse wanted to overcome philosophical dualism and introduce a synthesis that would become the *telos* of an emancipatory political theory. The dualism of the realms of freedom and necessity is merely a reflection of "antagonistic" societies in which work and leisure are sundered. Marcuse suggests that without grounding emancipatory impulses in an autonomous interiority, motivated both by reason and instinct, left theory will simply repeat tired nineteenth century recipes and fail to reinvigorate the proletariat. This is especially troublesome in the present period of capitalism's total mobilization because, according to Marcuse, alienation is now internalized on such a deep level that the early bourgeois distinction between the first dimension of material production and the second dimension of cultural critique collapses. As a result, revolutionary ideology loses all reference to the present historical moment. Socialist possibility is banished as metaphysical nonsense by a culture in which positivism is both a metatheory of science and a mode of everyday knowledge (*Verstand*).

The utility of Freudian psychoanalysis is, on the one hand, to explain why domination has penetrated so deeply and so effectively into our inner beings; on the other hand, Marcuse reads Freud as a utopian who points beyond this mobilization. The psychoanalytic model

of personality explains why false consciousness and false needs persist and at the same time why their hold on interiority can never be total, thus holding open the prospect of eventual liberation. Marcuse's critical theory is thus inherently dialectical, moving between the polarities of domination and liberation. And this is why Marcuse never gave up revolutionary hope.

For Marcuse psychological categories have become political categories [3]. Freud is not purely a "biological" thinker, as neo-Freudians have argued in justifying their addition to psychoanalytic theory of "sociological" correctives; he is also a social thinker who imbeds sociological content in his very categories of mind. Freud is most interesting precisely where biological and sociological content merge; indeed it is the Frankfurt School's contention that "subjectivity" in advanced capitalism is laden with objective content, determined by both the political-economic and cultural requirements of total mobilization. Here Marcuse pursues themes broached in the early essays where he attempts to protect bourgeois interiority against all-encompassing socialization. The *objectification of subjectivity* is extended in Freud's psychoanalysis precisely where psychoanalytic categories have political and ideological content and where the process of "private" ego formation, repression and sublimation is overlaid by the objective requirements of the social system [4].

The objective character of subjectivity, its biological ground, is treated by Marcuse as a resource for social freedom, not as a hindrance to ideal(ist) freedom. It is in and through the joining of instinct and reason that we can fashion a new rationality which shatters the constricting dualisms, the domination of the present. Our biological bases are the vehicles of liberation; they open from the realm of necessity (instinct) onto the plateau of freedom (reason). So for Marcuse the Freudian foundation provides a better source of individuation

than the concept of reason by itself. The emancipatory impulse must, he contends, be grounded in individual need, in instinct. And this instinct must be channelled by a rationality that partakes both of the realms of necessity and freedom. Marcuse wants to expand the category of sexuality, in accord with late Freud's preferences, into the larger category of Eros, the life instincts. It is only in and through the life instinct, he suggests, that we can recreate labour as a gratifying as well as socially useful activity. Indeed in the remembrance of infantile desires Marcuse finds one of the greatest resources for adult liberation, as we shall see below.

Marcuse finds Freud's hidden objectivism, his critical theory of instincts, both suggestive and false. It is suggestive in that Freud recognized how subjectivity contains a dynamic instinctual core; it is false where Freud accepts at face value the equation of progress and repression, the loss of happiness as the cost of civilizational advancement. Marcuse wants to historicize the pregnant categories that Freud passed down. He does not want to give them superfluous sociological content from the outside but to historicize and render dialectical the content they already have. For Freud, Marcuse contends in his maturity, offers a vital analytical tool with which to understand the unique character of advanced capitalism, rejoining themes that he had begun to air in the early essays.

Most important among these early themes that Freud's psychoanalysis allows Marcuse to pursue is the concept of domination, the obliteration of bourgeois interiority under siege by the forces of total mobilization. Marcuse in the 1930s offered no adequate explanation of why the working class in the early twentieth century had failed to accept and actualize its historical mission explicated in Marxian theory. The early essays on bourgeois culture and hedonism grasped that this earlier bourgeois interiority, once preserved only as an ideal on the transcendental plane of high culture, had

succumbed to the further linkage of political economy and culture and the total mobilization of human experience required in the era of advanced capitalism. Marcuse's early work through his book on Hegel in 1941 dealt with the collapse of the idealist concept of reason [5]. But he as yet could find no adequate basis for developing a materialist concept of reason other than the early Hegelian concept of negative thinking; he could describe the fall of interiority but provide no suggestions about its possible restoration.

Deepened alienation, the Frankfurt thinkers discovered, could not be adequately opposed by appealing to idealist ontology; the forged identity of the real and the rational, however false it may have been, was simply impenetrable by negative reason. And Marcuse could not join rationality and sensuousness solely with the categories of Hegelian phenomenology. After all, Hegel's human being had itself become pure spirit, rising above the exigencies of the externalized world. So for Marcuse the analytic problem was how to understand this deepened alienation or domination in categories that went beyond the purely rationalistic and which could thus both penetrate to domination's *modus operandi* and point towards its self-abolition. He found Freud's theory of instincts made to order.

But before he could credibly use the Freudian apparatus he had to liberate Freud from all sorts of right and left misreadings. Psychoanalysis had come to be seen by the mid-twentieth century as a repressive tool of class society. At best, Freud was a biological determinist; at worst, he was a dangerous metaphysician who in later books like *Civilization and its Discontents* "justified" heightened repression in defense of capitalism. Indeed to read Freud as an instinctual determinist who possessed an apocalyptic view of the *telos* of western civilization is a nearly universal habit. Marcuse thus had first to show that "his" Freud was a dialectical theorist of instincts and not a simplistic and ultimately malevolent

reductionist.

Eros and Civilization announces itself as a philosophical reading of Freudian categories; indeed Marcuse wants to display the hidden sociological and philosophical content of what are usually taken to be purely biological categories. But Marcuse's Freud extrapolates from ontogenic biology to the social structural concerns of the species as a whole. And while there is no coherent theory of society in Freud, there are important hints about what he took to be the fated relationship of the life and death instincts and reality and pleasure principles. Freud is so important for Marcuse precisely because he treats the individual's instincts as at once subjective and objective forces; their subjectivity is rooted in our unique socialization experiences while their objectivity is in the deep imprinting of phylogenetic forces on the developing and developed individual. Thus we must all work through the clash of life and death instincts, and this is always mediated by society.

It is the postulate of the objective character of subjectivity that interests Marcuse most about Freud. There is a dialectical relationship between self and society and not strict barriers, as many sociologists suggest. Freud suggests that the objectivity of instinct is always shaped by its subjective expression, that is, by personality. Indeed he described the structure of personality in terms of an objective id or erotic inner core and a more subjective ego formed in the clash of id and social order. This structure of personality is such as to guarantee that there is never complete cooptation of the person by the social system for residues of libido always remain. And this for Marcuse is the emancipatory resource for which he had been searching in the 1930s. The structure of personality that Freud sketched related sensuousness and reason, the objective and subjective, as a universal requirement of human nature. At last, Marcuse found in the objective character of human subjectivity, our instinctual core, a barricade against total mobilization. But he also found a

new wellspring of deep domination. The plasticity of our biological structures allows us to be more deeply manipulated.

The layer of instinct thus constitutes an inner barrier against the eradication of bourgeois interiority, a type of inner second dimension that replaces bourgeois culture with the dynamic potential of resistance and transcendence. But where the second dimension of nineteenth century bourgeois culture was intrinsically lacking in concrete objectivity – its very essence being its spirituality – the libidinal centre, Marcuse recognized, is the nexus of culture and civilization, the ideal and the material. In this sense what I have called the inner second dimension is much more important for Marcuse's critical theory than was affirmative culture precisely because it underlies both culture and material reproduction. There is nothing in the objectified world not touched by instinct; thus the forces of resistance and liberation must necessarily pass through the instinctual core that Freud postulated in his profound structural theory of personality. Bourgeois culture was doomed from the start to merely placate those who suffered alienation in the historical present. Its conciliatory power was precisely its aloofness. The instincts by contrast are anything but aloof.

The concept of man that emerges from Freudian theory is the most irrefutable indictment of Western civilization – and at the same time the most unshakable defense of this civilization. According to Freud, the history of man is the history of his repression. Culture constrains not only parts of the human being but his instinctual structure itself. However, such constraint is the very precondition of progress [6].

Thus Freud is powerfully critical of the present order that represses biological instinct in order to facilitate material progress.

How does the libidinal core depicted by Freud function as a source of emancipatory impulses? Marcuse suggests that the function of the unconscious is to drive towards the unity

of freedom and necessity in sensuous gratification; thus the unconscious joins what had been sundered since Aristotle, if only on the level of memory and dream. Freud, as a creature of the bourgeois order, felt that the progress of civilization required increasing libidinal repression, thus vitiating the possibility of happiness. But, according to Marcuse, the “truth” of the unconscious “continues to haunt the mind; it preserves the memory of past stages of individual development at which integral gratification is obtained” [7]. Thus memory has a “truth value” that is the beginning of the emancipatory struggle, first against deeply internalized domination (false needs) and then against class society as a whole. Memory comes to perform the function of a transcendent culture.

The psychoanalytic liberation of memory explodes the rationality of the repressed individual. As cognition gives way to re-cognition, the forbidden images and impulses of childhood begin to tell the truth that reason denies. Regression assumes a progressive function. The rediscovered past yields critical standards which are tabooed by the present. Moreover, the restoration of memory is accompanied by the restoration of the cognitive content of phantasy. Psychoanalytic theory removes these mental faculties from the noncommittal sphere of day dreaming and fiction and recaptures their strict truths. The weight of these discoveries must eventually shatter the framework in which they were made and confined. The liberation of the past does not end in its reconciliation with the present. Against the self-imposed restraint of the discoverer, the orientation of the past tends toward an orientation on the future. The *recherche du temps perdu* becomes the vehicle of future liberation [8].

Marcuse here links memory to the liberating function of phantasy, returning us directly to the concerns of the early *Zeitschrift* essays. Phantasy grounded in the memory of infantile gratifications can show us the way beyond the present reality principle that subordinates gratification to a strict regimen of surplus labour and surplus consumption. Phantasy does not, however dwell within the infantile but is a resource for mature planning of a different civilizational order. Marcuse here prefigures his views on the emancipatory function of art.

Freud's metapsychology here restores imagination to its rights. As a fundamental, independent mental process, phantasy has a truth value of its own, which corresponds to an experience of its own – namely, the surmounting of the antagonistic human reality. Imagination envisions the reconciliation of the individual with the whole, of desire with realization, of happiness with reason. While this harmony has been removed into utopia by the established reality principle, phantasy insists that it must and can become real, that behind the illusion lies *knowledge*. The truths of imagination are first realized when phantasy itself takes form, when it creates a universe of perception and comprehension – a subjective and at the same time objective universe. This occurs in *art*. The analysis of the cognitive function of phantasy is thus led to aesthetics as the “science of beauty”: behind the aesthetic form lies the repressed harmony of sensuousness and reason – the eternal protest against the organization of life by the logic of domination, the critique of the performance principle [19].

Interestingly Marcuse resurrects art as a liberatory medium where in the 1930s he lamented its demise, its integration into the one-dimensional. By grounding art in the phantastic functions of the unconscious Marcuse strengthens its resolve and further insulates it against the coopting forces of society. Of course art is insufficient by itself to transform the given order; it merely gives phantasy a form and begins the long struggle to abolish alienation. This form is usually of such a kind that art serves to reawaken sensuous pleasure in us. Art, while unpractical, sides with sensuousness against a repressive reality principle – not to elevate the sensuous above the realm of material reproduction, as in hedonism, but to point towards a synthesis of the two realms.

The philosophical effort to mediate, in the aesthetic dimension, between sensuousness and reason thus appears as an attempt to reconcile the two spheres of the human existence which were torn asunder by a repressive reality principle. The mediating function is performed by the aesthetic faculty, which is akin to sensuousness, pertaining to the senses. Consequently, the aesthetic reconciliation implies strengthening sensuousness as against the tyranny of reason and, ultimately, even calls for the liberation of sensuousness from the repressive domination of reason [10].

Marcuse thus does not celebrate art or phantasy per se but utilizes them to harness the

power of the unconscious and its memory of past gratifications – the *recherche du temps perdu*. Recollection according to Marcuse can be much more than a therapeutic tool in the psychoanalytic encounter; it can also be a mode of rebellion and resistance inasmuch as it plumbs the past (the analogue on a phylogenetic level of the unconscious) for the forgotten possibility of beauty and happiness. While the civilizational past has been barren of workable utopias, the ontogenetic past, according to Freud, is a veritable garden of Eden. The necessity to grow out of the oceanic phase in which the infant tries to engulf the world in satisfaction of raw libidinal needs does not detract from the liberating “polymorphous eroticism” of the small child. The recollection of this eroticism, harshly overcome in class society as adults face up to their “duties” as workers, can be a powerful spur to critique and praxis. Marcuse does not substitute recollection, captured in phantasy and art, for transformative action but suggests that one might prepare the way for the other.

This is readily caricatured by more sober Marxists who do not concern themselves with the dynamics of ontogeny. Class struggle, according to the orthodox theory, will spring full grown from the womb of capitalist internal contradictions. But Marcuse is writing in a period in which he contends that bourgeois subjectivity has been eclipsed by the all-embracing forces of administration. This notion of the decline of the individual is addressed in a number of Frankfurt studies, notably in Horkheimer's 1947 lectures in New York that appeared as *Eclipse of Reason* [11]. The individual's defenses against mobilization are drastically weakened and a bland happiness replaces the critical anxiety that would otherwise arise from knowledge of the false social totality. And this prefigures the more systematic statement in *One-Dimensional Man* in 1964.

We have suggested that the individual's awareness of the prevailing repression is blunted by the manipulated restric-

tion of his consciousness. This process alters the contents of happiness. The concept denotes a more-than-private, more-than-subjective condition; happiness is not in the mere feeling of satisfaction but in the reality of freedom and satisfaction. Happiness involves knowledge; it is the prerogative of the *animal rationale*. With the decline in consciousness, with the control of information, with the absorption of the individual into mass communication, knowledge is administered and confined. The individual does not really know what is going on; the overpowering machine of education and entertainment unites him with all the others in a state of anaesthesia from which all detrimental ideas tend to be excluded. And since knowledge of the whole truth is hardly conducive to happiness, such general anaesthesia makes individuals happy. If anxiety is more than a general malaise, if it is an existential condition, then this so-called “age of anxiety” is distinguished by the extent to which anxiety has disappeared from expression [12].

The key to Marcuse’s analysis of the decline of an autonomous individual is his thesis on the decline of a bourgeois mode of socialization rooted in patriarchal authority. The decline of the socialization functions of the family hastens what he and Horkheimer call the decline of the individual. Somehow the stage of successful ego-formation is skipped.

Now, however, under the rule of economic, political, and cultural monopolies, the formation of the mature super-ego seems to skip the stage of individualization: the generic atom becomes directly a social atom. The repressive organization of the instincts seems to be *collective*, and the ego seems to be prematurely socialized by a whole system of extra-familial agents and agencies [13].

This development becomes even more marked in the 1970s, addressed by Christopher Lasch’s *Haven in a Heartless World: The Family Besieged* [14] and his subsequent *The Culture of Narcissism* [15] where he essentially popularizes themes laid out by the Frankfurt School thirty years before. According to Marcuse, domination is streamlined as the “social atom” replaces what earlier was a rugged individual, insulated to some extent from the surrounding social system. In this analysis Marcuse does not glorify bourgeois individualism or the patriarchal family but suggests that they, like idealist culture, at least preserved the ideal of ego autonomy which, he recognizes, is required

in an emancipatory system. So the notion of declining ego autonomy emerges from Marcuse’s attempt to preserve what is valuable in psychoanalytic concepts. The ideal of mature adulthood, fastened on more recently by Habermas as the goal of critical theory, is contained in the psychoanalytic structure of ego development and preserved by Marcuse as a resource of subjective autonomy [16]. This autonomy is not sufficient in itself but is the necessary point of departure for a fuller blown social activism, even class struggle.

BASIC AND SURPLUS REPRESSION

The objective character of subjectivity requires that we confront the crucial interaction of culture and biology; Freud, according to Marcuse, offered a profound if ahistorical analysis of the alternation between cultural progress and biological repression. Freud did not foresee the possibility of dialectical and not simply unilinear historical notion and thus his metapsychology tended to pit life instinct against death instinct and concluded that progress in civilization would be instinctually unrewarding. Marcuse adds Marxism to Freud precisely where he suggests that the amount of libidinal repression is variable and can be altered by changing the social structure. This is a possibility that Freud’s sociology of instinct could not admit – not, it must be noted, because he was a bald partisan of late nineteenth century Viennese capitalism but because he, like Max Weber, was fatalistic about what he took to be the inevitable trade-off between progress and happiness. This *fin-de-siècle* fatalism characterizes a wide range of important bourgeois intellectual developments: Freud’s psychoanalysis, Weber’s sociology and Wittgenstein’s philosophy. All of these thinkers in different ways provided immanent critiques of late bourgeois civilization, indicating its contradictions but providing no envisaged solution.

In preserving an objective theory of subject-

tivity Marcuse could grapple with the historical relationship between biology and culture and show simultaneously the new depths of domination in administered society and the biological ground of rebellion in the unconscious, through phantasy, memory and art [17]. He felt that the truth of Freud's science of the unconscious is in his profound recognition of the trajectory of ego maturation, its passage through the infantile stages. But Freud in moving from ontogeny to phylogeny suggested that culture must necessarily triumph over biology. Marcuse as a Marxist reads the relationship between culture and biology as dialectical and thus can suggest that the amount of repression exacted by civilization can be lessened and the human being freed from what he calls a repressive reality principle [18]. Here Marcuse introduces one of the central concepts of his critical reading of Freudian psychoanalysis: the concept of surplus repression.

Marcuse suggests that Freud erred when he characterized the fact of scarcity as necessitating repression of libidinal instinct both on a biological and socio-historical level. Marcuse wants to distinguish between what is "basic" in our phylogenetic inheritance and what as "surplus" can be eliminated. Repression in the biological sense properly refers to the process by which the human individual comes to grips with his infantile past and his unfulfilled desires and channels them through sublimation into socially useful modes of activity. But repression in the socio-historical sense arises not from the fact of scarcity *per se* but from its social organization in class-society.

(Freud's argument) is fallacious in so far as it applies to the brute *fact* of scarcity what actually is the consequence of a specific *organization* of scarcity, and of a specific existential attitude enforced by this organization. The prevalent scarcity has, throughout civilization (although in very different modes), been organized in such a way that it has not been distributed collectively in accordance with individuals' needs, nor has the procurement of goods for the satisfaction of needs been organized with the objective of best satisfying the developing needs of the individuals [19].

Thus it is not the reality principle that dominates individuals but "the specific interests of domination (that) introduce *additional* control over and above those indispensable for civilized human association" [20]. Marcuse envisages a type of reality principle that organizes scarcity in such a way that it does not dominate individuals and allows them to satisfy their needs *within* the realm of necessity through collective work. He makes it clear, however, that the basic organization of mature personality required in every civilization via repression and sublimation of id energies is not to be undone; he does not endorse liberation from the reality principle but only from its present-day form, the "performance principle". This principle subordinates all human experience and instinct to mobilization by social order premised on the pursuit of private profit. Surplus repression is repression beyond the biological requirements of an organized adult ego; it describes the way in which human beings in advanced capitalism eschew the promise of liberation, functioning both as dutiful workers and busy consumers. Surplus repression is internalized alienation that protects the system by diverting human beings from the promise of an end to toil.

A great deal of criticism has been directed at Marcuse's subsequent utopian concept of "non-repressive sublimation". Some critics take this to mean that beyond the performance principle people will no longer engage in even basic repression of libidinal energies. But this is not what Marcuse suggests. He sketches a dialectical relationship between biology and culture such that the elimination of surplus repression will not require the elimination of basic repression; by "non-repressive sublimation" he simply means that basic repression can itself be transformed under the rule of a "rationality of gratification" [21]. While the process of ego formation will, according to Freudian theory, never be entirely painless, its pain can be lessened and indeed transformed into what one might call mastered necessity.

Freud's dualism of biology and culture is the western dualism of necessity and freedom; but Marcuse suggests that in a non-antagonistic social order the biological "necessities" might be made virtually painless.

We do not have categories that express the synthesis of freedom and necessity. The term "repression" itself smacks of unfreedom. But when the biological "necessities" are situated in a non-antagonistic social order they may lose their character as necessities, just as Marcuse suggests at the end of *Eros and Civilization* that death itself might become painless. So Marcuse here repeats Marx's early suggestion that productive and creative work can meet on the common ground between the realms of necessity and freedom. We can only know how painful biological necessity will be when we liberate it from the surplus repression of a social order premised on unequal reward. In the meantime, it is imperative to point out that biology and culture have an historical relationship and need not be seen as perpetual enemies.

Indeed Eros is a force that joins biology and culture through "non-repressive sublimation" and liberates sexuality from narrow restriction to the genital zones. In a free society all sorts of non-genital activities could be eroticized without losing their inherence in the realm of necessity (e.g., productive work), as will be discussed in the last section of this paper.

... against his notion of the inevitable "biological" conflict between pleasure principle and reality principle, between sexuality and civilization, militates the idea of the unifying and gratifying power of Eros, chained and worn out in a sick civilization. This idea would imply that the *free* Eros does not preclude lasting civilized societal relationships – that it repels only the suprapressive organization of societal relationships under a principle which is the negation of the pleasure principle [22].

Marcuse thus suggests that the character of the realm of necessity is itself historical; he characterizes scarcity as an "excuse" [23] that keeps people in chains, where actually scarcity can be organized in such a way that labour is

freed from the performance principle. Technological progress coupled with our increasing mastery of nature "enhances the means for fulfilling human needs with a minimum of toil" [24]. This is not to suggest, as Marcuse cautioned in the early *Zeitschrift* essays, that "necessity" will disappear; it will be mastered in such a way that it can become optimally a realm of freedom as well. In this sense Marcuse breaks through western dualism that has conceived of necessity as a drag on human freedom, indeed as something to be conquered. For Marcuse, necessities, whether those of material reproduction or of "biology", are not hindrances to freedom but vehicles for maximizing freedom. With early Hegel, Marcuse believes that we humanize ourselves in and through work; with Freud, he believes that we achieve mature adulthood in and through the mastery of instinct. The objective character of subjectivity, in the case of the instincts, means that we cannot escape our biological inheritance. Indeed Marcuse in *Eros and Civilization* suggests that Eros partakes equally of the realms of freedom and necessity, at once biological and rational.

Thus biology and culture can only be liberated together, the one through the other. By coming to grips with the exigencies of material reproduction and the instincts we liberate ourselves for creative work and polymorphous eroticism. But today these possibilities are closed off the more that we master the realm of necessity.

But the closer the real possibility of liberating the individual from the constraints once justified by scarcity and immaturity, the greater the need for maintaining and streamlining these constraints lest the established order of domination dissolve. Civilization has to defend itself against the specter of a world which could be free. If society cannot use its growing productivity for reducing repression... productivity must be turned *against* the individuals; it becomes itself an instrument of universal control. Totalitarianism spreads over late industrial civilization wherever the interests of domination prevail upon productivity, arresting and diverting its potentialities. The people have to be kept in a state of permanent mobilization, internal and external [25].

Marcuse suggests that surplus repression is necessary in a system where technological abundance “threatens” to liberate human beings from an ascetic regime of self-denial. The virtual conquest of scarcity must be shielded from human beings who, in the interests both of social control and profit, must keep their noses to the grindstone. The regimentation of sexuality is increasingly necessary in such an order; along with the ever sharper distinction between a tight genital sexuality and generalized Eros goes an ever sharper distinction between the realms of necessity and freedom. But in reality the realm of “freedom” is increasingly mobilized as “leisure time” spent either in narcotic pursuits such as television watching or in consumption. A generalized Eros would spill over into the realm of necessity and would threaten to eroticize and liberate work. This is why surplus repression must keep the id impulses in increasing check. The memory of infantile gratifications must be stifled lest the remembrance of a *temps perdu* become a liberating mode of revolutionary phantasy [26].

The emancipatory vision of non-repressive sublimation, the eroticization and liberation of the body and of work, is countered in totally administered society by what Marcuse calls “repressive desublimation”, superficial release of sexual and genital perversions that, like hedonism, do not challenge the prevailing order. Thus sexual promiscuity, based on the anonymous market principles of fair exchange (body for body), does not challenge bourgeois monogamy. This monogamy, based on tight genital organization, is best challenged not by a series of insensitive one-night stands but by deep and intimate sharing between mature egos who temporarily banish (and thus rise above) total administration. Thus Marcuse can defend true diadic intimacy because it, like bourgeois culture in an earlier period, nurtures true community. An erotic and intimate solidarity that challenges the atomization of late bourgeois society is captured in the lasting love relationship and not in a superficial promiscuity.

In this sense Marcuse argues for an end to surplus repression and the return to “polymorphous eroticism” rooted not in indiscriminate infantile gratifications but in a mature adulthood that has overcome tight genital organization in the service of the “performance principle.” Marcuse’s call for polymorphous eroticism is caricatured as 1960s free love by those who do not appreciate his distinction between basic and surplus repression [27]. The eroticized body will engage in successful repression and sublimation; indeed, as I remarked earlier, the strict notion of repression will itself change under a social order based on true eroticization. Marcuse here aims for a blurring of the distinction between the sexual and the sensual such that all sorts of productive and interpersonal activities, once eroticized, will afford sensual as well as intellectual gratification. People will touch and be touched without the inevitable arrival at genital encounters; indeed polymorphous eroticism will very possibly be bisexual, where people of the same sex can touch without shame. As the strict demarcation between sexuality and sensuality is blurred, the very character of repression and sublimation will change in accord with the constructive transformation of the life instincts.

... civilization has subjugated sensuousness to reason in such a manner that the former, if it reasserts itself, does so in destructive and “savage” forms, while the tyranny of reason impoverishes and barbarizes sensuousness. The conflict must be resolved if human potentialities are to realize themselves freely [28].

Marcuse takes great pains to argue that the liberation of Eros – non-repressive sublimation – is not monadic but eminently social. Freud’s generalization of the opposition between biology and culture is paralleled by his notion that personal and social freedom are antithetical. As Marcuse notes, Freud was never sanguine about the possibility of happiness in advanced civilization. But this historically correct interpretation can itself be super-

seded in a social order where individuals are not pitted against each other either as economic combatants in the marketplace or sexual combatants in the genital erogenous zone. And implicit in this notion of sexual freedom as social freedom is a powerful drive towards women's liberation, where human beings ultimately incline towards greater androgyny and where men, particularly, undergo "feminization" (eroticization) [29].

So Marcuse suggests that non-repressive sublimation will burst the shackles of surplus repression, historically peculiar to late capitalism, and liberate human beings for both polymorphous erotic encounters and, in a Marxian vein, for what Marcuse terms "libidinal work relations". In his penultimate chapter he calls for "the transformation of sexuality into Eros" as the basis of a new rationality of both work and play. Sexuality when freed from the strictly procreative function will imprint itself in successfully sublimated form on all sorts of human activities, notably on work. It is here that Marcuse finds his solution to the dualism of freedom and necessity. He discovers, with the help of Freud's categories, that the erotic life instinct can be harnessed to push work from the realm of strictly society and species-reproductive toil into a more nearly artistic and sensual realm without losing its productive content. This, according to Marcuse, is the goal of socialism: to produce a "rationality of gratification", wherein work and play are re-united.

"LIBIDINAL WORK RELATIONS": TOWARDS A "RATIONALITY OF GRATIFICATION"

Eros, according to Marcuse, contains both work and play elements, lying in the common ground between the realms of freedom and necessity. In this sense, the universality and inviolability of Eros is equivalent to the universality and inviolability of reason in the idealist tradition; however it is broader than reason and includes it. Thus ends Marcuse's

search for a biological and cultural principle of synthesis that overcomes the ancient Greek separation of the realms of material reproduction and freedom and beauty. These forces, of work and freedom, spring from a common source in the life instincts of the human individual. In this way, Freud's psychoanalysis, freed from its historical fetters, contains a deeply liberatory vision, a new rationality that does not choose between necessity and freedom but joins them in common cause.

This is a "rationality of gratification" that replaces the repressive reality principle, the "performance principle", and joins happiness and freedom.

To the degree to which the struggle for existence becomes co-operation for the free development and fulfillment of individual needs, repressive reason gives way to a new *rationality of gratification* in which reason and happiness converge. It creates its own division of labor, its own priorities, its own hierarchy [30].

Marcuse takes pains to show that the elimination of surplus repression does not spell the end of repression and the abolition of work *per se*. A rationality of gratification is still oriented to human self-externalization in nature. The "necessity" of reproducing the material conditions of existence affords the fortuitous "freedoms" of self-expression, as early Hegel and early Marx both recognized. And Freud too recognizes the deep mystery that our biological destiny – having to grow up, to properly repress infantile desires, etc. – is also a token of our freedom, although he was less optimistic than Marcuse that freedom could result in happiness.

Those critics who suggest that Marcuse disdains the economic in favour of the aesthetic accuse him of what he takes to be a false choice:

We have suggested that the prevalent instinctual repression resulted not so much from the necessity of labor, but from the specific social organization of labour imposed by the interest in domination – that repression was largely surplus repression. Contend to eliminate, not labor,

but the organization of the human existence into an instrument of labor. If this is true, the emergence of a non-repressive reality principle would alter rather than destroy the social organization of labor: the liberation of Eros could create new and durable work relations [31].

Marcuse here opposes both orthodox Marxists who misinterpret Marx to suggest that freedom and necessity must be further sundered and labor organized from above by a Party elite, and those neo-Weberians who believe that freedom can only be attained in a “post-industrial” society where all work has been automated and the domain of leisure time greatly expanded. This neo-Weberian view functions as ideology by sanctioning the division of work time and leisure time in the here and now, compensating workers for ungratifying work existences by giving them ever increasing doses of commodities in leisure time [32]. Marcuse believed that, as capitalism undergoes total mobilization, “leisure” is increasingly linked to the needs of political economy, making the escape from work a false solution to the problem of alienation.

Progress beyond the performance principle is not promoted through improving or supplementing the present existence by more contemplation, “higher values”, through elevating oneself and one’s life. Such ideas belong to the cultural household of the performance principle itself [33].

Alienation in work can only be overcome by reconstructing work according to a rationality of gratification; this will not make work and freedom identical but it will blur the barrier between them. In this way Marcuse avoids both left-wing and right-wing economism that enshrines an ethic of productivity and promises freedom either in a distant future age (as Lenin did) or in the “private” hours of leisure time, spent in endless consumption and other inauthentic hedonistic pursuits. Leisure time is governed in this society by the irrationality of repressive de-sublimation.

In a very important passage in *Eros and Civilization* Marcuse confronts the notion of in-

stinctual liberation and suggests that instead of tearing apart vital social institutions it would inhibit its own gratificatory aims and eventuate in mature eroticization and not persevere sexualization under the tyranny of tight genital organization. As I noted above, the transition from narrow sexuality to broader Eros has the effect of transforming libidinal impulses that now engage in “self-sublimation”.

These prospects seem to confirm the expectation that instinctual liberation can lead only to a society of sexual manias – that is, to no society. However, the process just outlined involves not simply a release but a *transformation* of the libido: from sexuality constrained under the genital supremacy to eroticization of the entire personality. It is a spread rather than an explosion of libido... [34].

While inhibiting its own aims, this non-surplus repressive libido would also achieve erotic gratification in a host of activities including work heretofore thought to be devoid of sensual elements. The instinct is not “deflected” from its aim; it is gratified in activities and relations that are not sexual in the sense of “organized” genital sexuality and yet are libidinal and erotic [35].

Indeed Marcuse suggests that work and play can merge, if not achieve total identity.

... if work were accompanied by a reactivation of pregenital polymorphous eroticism, it would tend to become gratifying in itself without losing its *work* content. Now it is precisely such a reactivation of polymorphous eroticism which appeared as the consequence of the conquest of scarcity and alienation. The altered societal conditions would therefore create an instinctual basis for the transformation of work into play [36].

This idea of preserving work’s “content” (material reproduction) while retaining its eroticization is a rephrasing through Freudian vocabulary of young Marx’s vision of work that was at once productive and creative. Marcuse goes further and suggests that creative work is necessarily instinctually gratifying, self-sublimating. Again, this ruptures the dualist philosophical tradition that in its latter-day sociological translation glorifies productiveness as a virtue, the

triumph of duty over individual happiness. But Marcuse suggests that socially useful work can also directly fulfill individual needs so long as it is performed under a rationality of gratification and is not subject to surplus repression.

A great deal of controversy surrounds Marcuse's image of "libidinal work relations" largely because he did not spell out its concrete socio-historical contours. Elsewhere I have tried to expand on Marcuse's imagery by suggesting that non-surplus repressed eroticized work would be self-managed, subject to what Marcuse terms "rational" administration. Because his book on Freud was addressed to a largely non-Marxist audience, and because of the inherent limitation of his subject matter, Marcuse did not directly confront the "shape" of eroticized labour. I have tried to join early Marx on the nature of non-alienated labour and Marcuse on the rationality of gratification in order to show more concretely what "libidinal work relations" might mean. I suggest that for "work" to be experienced as a fusion of work and play components it must be both owned and directly controlled by workers. This is to address the question that many critics of Marcuse have raised about what they contend is the hidden authoritarianism of his approach. Just how, they ask, is eroticized labour to be organized? What will its institutional forms be? In the final chapter of the book on Freud, he sketches the outlines of an answer, although he leaves unresolved the precise contours of how eroticized labour is to be mustered in a non-authoritarian way. In the last chapter, Marcuse addresses more directly the "shape" of the rationality of gratification for he realizes that it is not enough to leave the image of Eros dangling, without giving it an institutional underpinning. He plots the ultimate synthesis of instinct and reason.

EROS AND THANATOS

Marcuse's investigation of the instinctual grounds of liberation is incomplete without

considering the institutional and moral implications of non-repressive sublimation. Throughout this discussion I have noted the tendency of his critics to fasten on notions such as polymorphous eroticism that seem to unhinge civilized rationality as well as surplus repression. Marcuse's earlier distinction between basic and surplus repression is extended in the final chapter in his discussion of the life and death instincts, Eros and Thanatos.

The striving for *lasting* gratification makes not only for an enlarged order of libidinal relations ("community") but also for the perpetuation of this order on a higher scale. The pleasure principle extends to consciousness. Eros redefines reason in its own terms. Reasonable is what sustains the order of gratification [37].

Here Marcuse wants to suggest that libidinal instinct must be mediated by reason in order to secure a lasting place in human community; after all, the theory of instinct *per se* is not a theory of political institutions. Here, in the brief last chapter of his book, Marcuse moves beyond his reading of psychoanalytic theory and confronts the more explicitly Marxian question of what sort of institutional shape these impulses ought to take in the social world. His remarks are only suggestive because he presupposes, and does not explicate his debt to, a non-authoritarian reading of the Marxist tradition; indeed apart from a vague reference in the original preface to Horkheimer and the Institute for Social Research in Frankfurt, Marcuse leaves the uninformed reader in the dark about his own theoretical investment. Only Marxists trained in recondite European philosophy and social theory will recognize that *Eros and Civilization* moves within a thoroughly Marxian orbit and is directly a contribution to critical theory. Only the initiated will connect Marcuse's early essays and those of his Frankfurt colleagues to his discussion of Freud. In fact, the book is less about Freud than it is about advanced capitalist social structure.

In a few concluding pages Marcuse confronts

the great problem of political theory from Plato to Rousseau: the problem of authority [38]. The convergence of reason and happiness implies distinctive relations of authority and a division of labour; the “liberated” individual is not left floating in thin air, unconnected to the body politic.

Hierarchical relationships are not un-free *per se*; civilization relies to a great extent on rational authority, based on knowledge and necessity, and aiming at the protection and preservation of life. Such is the authority of the engineer, of the traffic policeman, of the airplane pilot in flight. Once again, the distinction between repression and surplus-repression must be recalled. If a child feels the “need” to cross the street any time at its will, repression of this “need” is not repressive of human potentialities. It may be the opposite. The need to “relax” in the entertainments furnished by the culture industry is itself repressive, and its repression is a step toward freedom. Where repression has become so effective that, for the repressed, it assumes the (illusory) form of freedom, the abolition of such freedom readily appears as a totalitarian act. Here, the old conflict arises again: human freedom is not only a private affair – but it is nothing at all unless it is *also* a private affair. Once privacy must no longer be maintained apart from and against the public existence, the liberty of the individual and that of the whole may perhaps be reconciled by a “general will” taking shape in institutions which are directed toward the individual needs. The renunciations and delays demanded by the general will must not be opaque and inhuman; nor must their reason be authoritarian. However, the question remains: how can civilization freely generate freedom, when unfreedom has become part and parcel of the mental apparatus? And if not who is entitled to establish and enforce the objective standards? [39].

The problem of educating the educators has been paramount in Marxian theory since Marx wrote the theses on Feuerbach. But the traditional authoritarian answer, to pass down truth from an elite to the masses, is no longer satisfactory in liberal society. Marcuse here explicitly comes out on the side of anti-authoritarianism in spite of what some of his “democratic” critics suggest about his elitism. Marcuse makes it clear that critical theory is not another vanguardist preserve but states clearly that its truths are available to everyone on the basis of *reason*. “Utopias are susceptible to unrealistic blueprints; the conditions for a free

society are not. They are a matter of reason” [40]. Marcuse maintains this posture throughout his career. He suggests in *One-Dimensional Man* that false needs are simply those not arrived at rationally, in a self-determining fashion. Similarly, he postulates a socialist “general will”, borrowing Rousseau’s image, that is made up of human beings who recognize the truths of social freedom, praxis, community and Eros. True needs are left to chance, admittedly, and Marcuse never itemizes what he predicts they will be once the veil of domination is lifted. But he thinks there is a good chance that individuals through reason will agree on what they should be. And if they do not, he has already provided for the function of “recognized authority”, such as that of the pilot or policeman.

Reason and instinct are both inherently democratic for they are universal. But they must be joined for “instinct itself is beyond good and evil” [41]. Marcuse here suggests that there is a tension between personal and general freedom. And this tension is at the centre of human existence. My erotic desires for another person may not be reciprocated; and in a free society they would not have to be. And we might not find each other attractive. The identity between personal and general freedom is not guaranteed but is a product of the institutionalization of a kind of rationality that grounds social freedom and sets up limits to the gratification of private desire. These are of course the normal bounds of civilization, although in a socialist society they will be freely erected and obeyed, not imposed by force.

While Marcuse has suggested the possibility of non-repressive sublimation, where the person inhibits the aim of libidinal desire and bends it in a constructive direction, it is not guaranteed. Authority must deal with those cases where aim-inhibition is imperfect. In this way Marcuse never abrogates the dialectic of particular and general or, in another context, of individual and class. The group is always to some extent opaque to the individual;

it preexists him and will outlast him. The clash between instinct and reason can only be resolved in provisional ways and not eternally. And this clash is mirrored in Freudian terms by the clash between Eros and Thanatos, life and death instincts. Here in the recognition of a longing for eternal bliss in death Freud profoundly confronted our mortality and the problem of its relationship to the immortality of the species and society. Marcuse has noted, “(human freedom) is nothing at all unless it is *also* a private affair” [42]. As a Marxist he will not tolerate a history that is the slaughter-bench of individuals. This is why he upholds individual biological need as the dynamic core of his critical theory; but at the same time history is a slaughter-bench anyway since we all must die. Does the fact of ineluctable mortality, captured by Freud in his notion of Thanatos, cancel revolutionary possibility? Is the urge to transform society in radical ways not a form of neurosis, given our mortal limitations?

If death is inevitable, why should we struggle? Marcuse responds that “the necessity of death does not refute the possibility of final liberation” [43]. He seeks to redefine Thanatos not as the death instinct but as an instinct that wants to avoid pain. Otherwise death’s inevitability takes a heavy toll in manipulating us to relish the present since we cannot triumph in the end.

The mere anticipation of the inevitable end, present in every instant, introduces a repressive element into all libidinal relations and renders pleasure itself painful. This primary frustration in the instinctual structure of man becomes the inexhaustible source of all other frustrations – and of their social effectiveness. Man learns that “it cannot last anyway”, that every pleasure is short, that for all finite things the hour of their birth is the hour of their death – that it couldn’t be otherwise. He is resigned before society forces him to practice resignation methodically. The flux of time is society’s most natural ally in maintaining law and order, conformity, and the institutions that relegate freedom to a perpetual utopia; the flux of time helps men to forget what was and what can be; it makes them oblivious to the better past and the better future [44].

But Marcuse suggests that the harsh contradiction between Eros and Thanatos can be ameliorated if Thanatos is reinterpreted as Nirvana, the longing for the absence not of life but of pain. “... the conflict between life and death is the more reduced, the closer life approximates the state of gratification” [45].

He suggests that reason and instinct can unite in the struggle, not against death *per se* but against unreasonable death, premature and painful at the hands of class society. He decries the therapeutic cult of death that prepares us for dying: a “death with dignity” is impossible when life itself has no dignity. “Theology and philosophy today compete with each other in celebrating death as an existential category. Perverting a biological fact into an ontological essence, they bestow transcendental blessing on the guilt of mankind which they help to perpetuate – they betray the promise of utopia” [46]. He is referring here to Heidegger’s existential philosophy; and today he would refer to works like Kühbler-Ross’s on dignified death. Marcuse is not denying death as a biological fact but only suggesting that the death wish and its cult in the present society are deeply conservative. By transforming Thanatos into Nirvana, Marcuse suggests that instinct can be harnessed not to aggressive and self-destructive projects but to the perpetuation of gratification. And this will also require reason, for, as he noted earlier, instincts are beyond good and evil; a completely privatized Nirvana principle would necessarily fail unless it was channelled into socially acceptable modes of gratification. Pure Nirvana would result in the endless drug trip and not the gratification of real needs; and yet by replacing Thanatos with Nirvana Marcuse suggests that there is an instinctual basis for liberation rooted in our perpetual quest for the absence of pain.

A complete reconciliation of reason and instinct would involve a combination of pleasure and pain; Nirvana would not be unproblematically given but would have to be achieved.

After all, the biological fact of death is omnipresent. And raw instinct is inherently contradictory to the aims of civilization. Only by binding reason and instinct can Marcuse utilize the Nirvana principle in the struggle for liberation from an order that glorifies death by equating its stoic acceptance and the acceptance of bourgeois duty.

In contrast, a philosophy that does not work as the handmaiden of repression responds to the fact of death with the Great Refusal – the refusal of Orpheus the liberator. Death can become a token of freedom... Like the other necessities it can be made rational – painless. Men can die without anxiety if they know what they love is protected from misery and oblivion. After a fulfilled life, they may take it upon themselves to die – at a moment of their own choosing [47].

Indeed the recognition of our mortality is at once a sign of disappointment and a token of our liberatory possibilities. By grounding rebellion in instinct as well as reason Marcuse reveals the deep ambiguity in his thought and indeed in all of Marxism. The individual is driven to desire liberation, according to Marcuse, and to join a revolutionary group even when his own mortality cancels the possibility of final liberation. The tension between particular and general can never be undone; while the person is mortal, the species, “humanity”, may be eternal. But humanity cannot be free unless individuals are free.

Eros thus is the wellspring of liberatory possibilities, never totally manipulable by dominant interests and, at the same time, the token of our mortality. Marcuse’s thought dwells within this dialectic and never tries to cancel it. This dialectic of instinct and reason is mirrored by the dialectic of individual and class. While in general terms the class can express the individual’s interest, it can never embody every particular interest. Similarly, reason must always temper instinctual desire in the interest of preserving social institutions. So while institutions have to be created in order to provide for individual needs, they also tend to entrap the individual. Marcuse suggests that this

is an inevitable fact of human existence. But because reason and instinct (or individual and class), are not identical, this does not mean that they must be seen as eternal enemies. Freud is important because he points out the biological grounds of social rationality and, once properly historicized, serves as an optimistic prophet of enhanced rationality – one of gratification and not repression.

Marcuse is one of the few Marxists to confront this inexorable tension between the biological and cultural. While social transformation is obviously important, it must not ignore the grounds of individual instinct and needs. These needs are important because it is in their name, and through them, that social change is sought. Marcuse opposes epistemological and normative relativism by suggesting that reason and instinct are inviolable. The truth of a non-repressive order is obvious, he implies; this truth can be uncovered only through sustained self-reflection and introspection [48]. Against those who view Freud as an alchemist of mind, always avoiding empirical evidence against the existence of instincts, Marcuse suggests that Freud’s findings can be duplicated through self-examination. These truths about the inviolability of reason and instinct can be plumbed by anyone. Once domination is lifted, reason and instinct, merged through a new rationality of gratification, will be transparent to all. Marcuse is not elitist, illuminating a biological or intellectual darkness that only he can see, but dialectical. Once we are free to reason we will recognize our self-interests and social interests. And the essence of social freedom is precisely the opportunity to determine our needs free of the scars of social control. He is profoundly optimistic that reason and instinct, once liberated together, will emerge in an order premised on non-repressive sublimation.

In this sense, and in his reinterpretation of the death instinct, Marcuse attempts to supply a missing “Marxist” theory of human nature; where Marx only hinted at the biological core of human nature, Marcuse confronts our bio-

logical heritage directly and makes of the objectivity of subjectivity a resource for liberatory struggle. In our mortality, Marcuse implies, lies the promise of a truthful existence, where we are not enshackled against ourselves. The individuation of rationality is imperative lest we sacrifice individuals to a history over their heads. And the biological foundation Freud provides is just that source of individuation that Marcuse was seeking in his early essays. Reason as negative thinking is powerless without a body; by itself reason is impotent because it can never penetrate externalized domination. After all, as Marcuse notes in his final chapter on life and death instincts, the most reasonable thing to do is to succumb to the facticity of the present: we are dead anyway. But reason in harness to the life instincts, becoming a rationality of gratification, rises above the damaged present in seeking a new order that fulfills the primal desires of our infantile pasts. In the repressed material of the unconscious Marcuse finds the most powerful weapon against present domination; the false promises are reinterpreted not as infantile desires, inherently unfulfillable, but as rational goals of social change. In this sense instinctual repression opens the door to mature eroticization and eventually emancipatory praxis.

Freud has established a substantive link between human freedom and happiness on the one hand and sexuality on the other: the latter provided the primary source for the former and at the same time the ground for their necessary restriction in civilization [49].

The pitfall of philosophical dualism, which contained a hidden political theory that separated work and freedom, was the gulf it perceived between mind and matter. Marcuse draws on Freud to show that reason is not a “pure” function but infected with instinctual content, with biology. And this instinctual core is what joins human and nonhuman nature, in a way that Marx first noted in the early manuscripts where he urged the simultaneous liberation of human and material nature. We

are our bodies, an insight paralleled later in the existential phenomenologies of Sartre and Merleau-Ponty. Marcuse suggests that instincts are natural forces that interact with reason as the infant matures; biology is always historical. He simply suggests that Freud falsely equated the fact of scarcity with its hierarchical organization and thus derived a theory of invariant repression. But the amount of repression required is variable precisely because “scarcity” can be lessened by a rational social organization of labour. Thus Marcuse postulated the prospect of non-repressive sublimation rooted in our basic technological capacity to master nature and *thus* to liberate ourselves for creative, eroticized labour. While others have also postulated the conquest of scarcity, they have not correspondingly speculated about the liberating effects this might have on the instinctual structure. And they have tended to define the abolition of scarcity in terms of thoroughgoing automation and not in terms of a more rational, non-authoritarian organization of labour in the short term.

Marcuse eases the distinction between culture and biology precisely because he understands what Marx called our imbeddedness in nature. And he recalls that it is only through our interactions with nature that we can become truly human. What he adds to early Marx’s vision is the notion that our true humanity resides not in an abstract intellectual concept of freedom but in the liberation of our Eros. Eros is both a rational and natural force; it binds us into nature and at once lifts us above it. The unique character of human existence is our ability to engage in transcendental activity that allows us to imprint our own wills on a nature to which we belong. Thus Marcuse grounds emancipatory activity not in pure mind but in a mind that confronts its own objective biological centre and attempts to master that centre. The gratifications we experience from “eroticized” labour are both intellectual and sensual; indeed as Marcuse’s critical theory so eloquently sug-

gests, we can no longer adequately distinguish between the two. And the problem of philosophical dualism is resolved as freedom and necessity are subsumed under the overarching category of Eros.

FROM RATIONALITY TO PRAXIS

The great contribution of Marcuse's *Eros and Civilization* was to generate a theory of subjectivity that grounds emancipatory struggle in instinct as well as in reason. He resolves the philosophical problem of dualism by suggesting that necessity and freedom inhere in our life instincts; and thus it is possible, he postulates, to create a mature "rationality of gratification" that harnesses libidinal energy to socially useful activity. He reinterprets Freud's categories and historicizes them through his distinction between basic and surplus repression, the one universal and the other a particular product of class domination. Thus the elimination of surplus repression becomes a desideratum of socialist theory, along with the elimination of surplus value.

But this return to subjectivity both as a way of explaining the depth and persistence of false consciousness, while preserving the possibility of libidinal revolt is more a philosophical corrective than a direct contribution to a theory of praxis. Indeed in 1955 Marcuse did not have a theory of praxis. Western capitalism was in the midst of post-war reconstruction and the subsequent obliteration of critical consciousness proceeded apace. Marcuse could not even count on an informed philosophical audience for his book on Freud, let alone a political one. The Eisenhower years were the apex of what Marcuse was later to call one-dimensionality [50]. So the political theory remained dormant, hidden in the nuances of his rereading of Freud. As in the 1930s, critical theory lacked a volatile political situation in which to apply philosophy directly to action.

The relevance of the "rationality of gratification" was not to come for another decade,

until the late 1960s and the rise of the new left. And even that was an equivocal phenomenon, located somewhere between populism and Marxism. But the rise of the new left and counter-culture at least challenged neo-Marxists to speculate about necessary revisions to the theory of class struggle, most notably in terms of a theory of subjectivity and subjective rebellion. In this sense, Marcuse's Freudianism acquired political significance, if only an ephemeral one, in the late 1960s. When he wrote *Eros and Civilization* he was more concerned with working out a coherent materialist concept of reason on the level of philosophy and psychology. But before he addressed the turmoil of the late 1960s, Marcuse needed to take the theory of subjectivity one step further and to explain on a sociological level how the phenomenon of domination operated. The book on Freud was a necessary prologue, as it solved the problem of philosophical dualism first stated in the early *Zeitschrift* essays. But it was thin in its treatment of the new socio-historical configuration of late capitalism. Marcuse asserted in *Eros*, with the aid of Freud, that subjectivity was objective. Yet he did not apply that understanding to concrete social analysis. That was not to happen until he wrote *One-Dimensional Man*. There the categories that he drew from Freud and refashioned dialectically were applied to his important analysis of "false needs" and "one-dimensional" consciousness.

NOTES

- 1 See, for example, Theodor Adorno, "Psychology and Sociology", in *New Left Review*, no. 46 (1967), pp. 67–80; no. 47 (1968), pp. 79–97.
- 2 Gad Horowitz in his *Repression: Basic and Surplus Repression in Psychoanalytic Theory* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1977) attempts systematically to unravel Marcuse's Freudianism and to compare it to Reich's. See especially his last chapter on psychoanalysis and dialectical materialism.
- 3 H. Marcuse, *Eros and Civilization* (New York: Vintage, 1955), p. xvii.
- 4 This concept of the objectivity of subjectivity is examined in detail in Russell Jacoby, *Social Amnesia* (Boston:

- Beacon, 1975); and in my own "On Happiness and the Damaged Life," in John O'Neil (ed.), *On Critical Theory*, (New York: Seabury Press, 1976), pp. 12–33.
- 5 cf. Herbert Marcuse, *Reason and Revolution* (New York: Humanities Press, 1954).
 - 6 Marcuse, *op. cit.*, 1955, p. 11.
 - 7 *Ibid.*, p. 17.
 - 8 *Ibid.*, p. 18.
 - 9 *Ibid.*, p. 130.
 - 10 *Ibid.*, p. 164.
 - 11 See Max Horkheimer, *Eclipse of Reason* (New York: Seabury, 1974). I point out problems with the concept of declining subjectivity in my "Dialectical Sensibility I: Critical Theory, Scientism and Empiricism," *Canadian Journal of Political and Social Theory*, vol. 1, No. 1 (1977), pp. 3–34.
 - 12 Marcuse, *op. cit.*, 1955, p. 94.
 - 13 *Ibid.*, p. 88.
 - 14 Christopher Lasch, *Haven in a Heartless World* (New York: Basic, 1977).
 - 15 Lasch, *The Culture of Narcissism* (New York: Norton, 1979). Lasch has also written the introduction to Jacoby's book (*op. cit.*). He has essentially popularized themes of the Frankfurt School and reapplied their concepts to the latest stage of advanced capitalism. There is considerable irony in the fact that Lasch was recently invited by President Carter to the White House for dinner and conversation, presumably as an important social critic and assessor of the public mood who could give Carter good political advice. There is also considerable irony that Lasch's *The Culture of Narcissism* was trumpeted in the pages of *People* magazine, along with a feature story on Lasch and his family, and that the book has been reprinted in a cheap paperback edition and now sells briskly in bus stations and airports alongside the other "self-help" books and Gothic novels that are symptoms of the culture of narcissism.
 - 16 cf. Habermas *Theory and Practice* (Boston: Beacon, 1973); this goal of mature autonomy is at the core of Habermas' effort to reconstruct critical theory. See, for example, Thomas McCarthy, *The Critical Theory of Jurgen Habermas* (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1978), especially pp. 77–91.
 - 17 cf. Alkis Kontos, "Between Memory and Dream" in David P. Shugarman (ed.), *Thinking About Change* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1974), pp. 53–70.
 - 18 For another interesting approach to this question of the relationship between biology and culture, see Stanley Diamond's work on dialectical anthropology. Stanley Diamond, *In Search of the Primitive* (New Brunswick: Transaction Books, 1974).
 - 19 Marcuse, *op. cit.*, 1955, p. 33.
 - 20 *Ibid.*, p. 34.
 - 21 *Ibid.*, p. 205.
 - 22 *Ibid.*, p. 39.
 - 23 *Ibid.*, p. 84.
 - 24 *Ibid.*, p. 84.
 - 25 *Ibid.*, p. 85.
 - 26 For an interesting Frankfurt-oriented treatment of the notion of remembrance, see Christian Lenhardt, "Anamnestic Solidarity," *Telos* no. 25; Lenhardt builds on some of the ideas of Walter Benjamin and Horkheimer.
 - 27 Marcuse himself confronts the infantilism of the new left in his *Counterrevolution and Revolt* (Boston: Beacon, 1973). "The common denominator for the misplaced radicalism in the cultural revolution is the anti-intellectualism which it shares with the most reactionary representatives of the Establishment: revolt against Reason – not only against the Reason of capitalism, bourgeois society, and so on, but against Reason *per se*," p. 129.
 - 28 Marcuse, *op. cit.*, 1955, p. 170.
 - 29 According to Horowitz (*op. cit.*), Freud contains important hints about the interaction of bisexuality and polymorphous eroticism that are largely, if subtly, preserved in Marcuse. And according to Juliet Mitchell, it is not at all clear that the reading of Freud as a scientific defender of patriarchy is an accurate one. See Juliet Mitchell, *Psychoanalysis and Feminism* (London: Allan Lane, 1974).
 - 30 Marcuse, *op. cit.*, 1955, p. 205.
 - 31 *Ibid.*, p. 140.
 - 32 I have explored this neo-Weberian ideology in my forthcoming *Social Problems Through Conflict and Order* (co-authored with Susan A. McDaniel) (Toronto: Prentice-Hall of Canada, 1981). I read Weber as the most sophisticated sociological exponent of the legacy of Frederick Taylor's "scientific management".
 - 33 Marcuse, *op. cit.*, 1955, p. 142.
 - 34 *Ibid.*, p. 184.
 - 35 *Ibid.*, p. 190.
 - 36 *Ibid.*, pp. 196–197.
 - 37 *Ibid.*, pp. 204–205.
 - 38 I treat this question of authority in my "Work and Authority in Marcuse and Habermas," *Human Studies*, 2 (1979), pp. 191–208.
 - 39 Marcuse, *op. cit.*, 1955, pp. 205–206.
 - 40 *Ibid.*, p. 206.
 - 41 *Ibid.*, p. 206.
 - 42 *Ibid.*, p. 205.
 - 43 *Ibid.*, p. 216.
 - 44 *Ibid.*, pp. 211–212.
 - 45 *Ibid.*, pp. 214–215.
 - 46 *Ibid.*, p. 216.
 - 47 *Ibid.*, p. 216.
 - 48 In this sense, Marcuse converges with Habermas' argument about the universality and liberating power of self-reflection. See Habermas' *Knowledge and Human Interests* (Boston: Beacon, 1971). What they share in common is the German idealist tradition. What separates them is instinct-theory, idealism's "biological" foundation.
 - 49 Marcuse, *op. cit.*, 1955, p. 245.
 - 50 I treat this phase in the development of monopoly capitalism in chapter four of my *Western Marxism: An Introduction* (Santa Monica: Goodyear, 1979). See "Hegelian Marxism II: The Theory of Domination," pp. 145–188.