

THE "THEORY-PRAXIS NEXUS" IN MARCUSE'S CRITICAL THEORY

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Writers who deal with the critical theory of the Frankfurt School inevitably present the central problem as the attempt (generally seen as unsuccessful) to relate "theory" and "praxis." Elaboration on their concept of theory – *critical* as opposed to "traditional" theory – is usually straightforward given the fact that the Frankfurt theorists themselves were relatively clear in their definition. The difficulty with such discussions, however, is that they usually fail to deal with the ambiguous concept of praxis.

In this context, I wish to deal with the "theory-praxis nexus" by emphasizing that there are at least two levels of meaning for the term "praxis" operating in the writings of the Frankfurt School and its critics: (1) praxis as revolutionary organization and activity; and (2) praxis as an anthropological/ontological conception of human potentiality. This is certainly no new or startling insight to those familiar with critical theory. Nevertheless, this crucial distinction is often neglected by those who write of the attempt, or failure, of the Frankfurt School to "unite theory and practice." Of the "first generation" Frankfurt theorists, it was Herbert Marcuse who was most consistently concerned with developing a theory of praxis in both of the above senses. Thus, I will focus primarily on Marcuse's work in this area

below, noting the implications for the political project of critical theory.

ON "THEORY" AND REVOLUTIONARY "PRAXIS"

As opposed to "traditional theory," underlying critical theory was not simply the supposedly "value-neutral" quest for knowledge in and for itself, but a clearly acknowledged *political* project [1]. The goal was human *emancipation* – the realization of a truly free society in which class distinctions and the unnecessary domination and exploitation of individuals and groups were abolished; where social organization was based upon the needs of its citizens rather than the needs of capital *or* the Party – i.e., their conception of socialist society. Though grounded in German philosophical thought (as was Marx), the Frankfurt theorists were quick to distinguish critical theory from philosophy, as Marcuse shows in a programmatic 1937 essay:

In the conviction of its founders the critical theory of society is essentially linked with materialism... The theory of society is an economic, not a philosophical system. There are two basic elements linking materialism to correct social theory: concern with human happiness, and the conviction that it can be attained only through a transformation of the material conditions of existence. The actual course of the transformation and the fundamental measures to be taken in order to arrive at a rational organization of society are prescribed by analysis of the economic and political conditions in the given historical situation. The subsequent construction of the new society cannot be the object of theory, for it is to occur as the free creation of the liberated individuals [2].

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Since it was based upon the analysis of existing socio-economic relations, the Frankfurt critical theory of society was not *utopian*, though it *was* future-oriented. The difference is again spelled out by Marcuse:

In its concept of an ultimate goal, critical theory did not intend to replace the theological hereafter with a social one... It only makes explicit what was always the foundation of its categories: the demand that through the abolition of previously existing material conditions of existence the totality of human relations be liberated... In the theoretical reconstruction of the social process, the critique of current conditions and the analysis of their tendencies necessarily include future-oriented components [3].

Like philosophy, it opposes making reality into a criterion in the manner of complacent positivism. But unlike philosophy, it always derives its goals only from present tendencies of the social process. Therefore it has no fear of the utopia that the new order is denounced as being [4].

The critical theory of Marcuse and the Frankfurt School entails a critique of existing *domination* [5] in contemporary society, linked with an analysis of the socio-technical potential for its abolition. Following Marx, critical theory sought to point out the *historical* nature of existing social relations that tended to be reified into universals in existing ideology. But given this negative critique, there is another problem: just *how* is “emancipation” to take place? What seems necessary is a conceptualization of the type of political organization and action needed to institute the desired social transformation – political praxis in the vernacular – which is in turn advised by a critical social theory. As is often noted by critics of the Frankfurt School, the relationship between theory and political practice is itself problematic. Phil Slater (one of these critics, though sympathetic with the attempt by the Frankfurt School) describes the Frankfurt “theory-praxis nexus” in this way:

The Frankfurt School came to regard their theoretical work in the following terms: the opposing forces within society must be clearly outlined and raised to the level of self-consciousness; in this way, social tension is raised to its

extreme expression as revolutionary class-struggle; successful social praxis could resolve the objective contradictions within bourgeois society, but only by overthrowing that society. The role of ‘critical theory of society’ was, essentially, to be one of ideological enlightenment of the social forces destined to carry out this momentous act. This is the crucial link in the theory–praxis nexus [6].

Slater goes on to argue that the Frankfurt School failed to relate theory to political praxis, claiming that a “practical–critical” theory of political organization is lacking in their formulation [7]. Though a similar claim will be put forth below, a word of caution is advised here. The often-expressed desire to “unite theory and practice,” or phrases like “theory–praxis nexus” can be misleading in terms of the actual task of critical theory. To speak of the unity of theory and practice suggests to some a mystical (or “Hegelian”) union of the two; that after a long search Truth would be discovered which would guide, if not determine, our actions in the world. It was this sort of idea in the work of the more mechanistic Marxists of their day that Marcuse and the other Frankfurt theorists were trying to dispel [8]. It must be emphasized that in this context *theory* and *practice* are two separate things. Dick Howard makes this point in an extreme way in a discussion of Marx’s own critical theory:

The Truth (socialism) which praxis will achieve is not a presupposed idea, a fixed state to which praxis must ascend through a series of escalations. The critical theory does not propose to know the Truth; this is why Marx always refused to discuss the nature of the future socialist society, and why he wrote a book called *Capital* and not one called Socialism. The critical theory has limits, the same limits as any *theory* of social change: *qua* theory, it is incapable of putting the results of its analysis into action, and must give way to praxis. The critical theory does not pretend to be even a guide for praxis; Marx’s theoretical works are not a “handbook for Revolution,” and no one would think of distributing *Capital* before a factory gate... The critical theory is a theory of what is, of the ‘inverted world’; it is a true theory of a false world, and as such cannot pretend to give lessons to practice. Such a pretension would be a return to the idealism of the Young Hegelians, or to a Kantian–Fichtean ethos of subjective striving.[9].

It is important to emphasize the *disjunction* of theory and practice because this separation is important in the history of critical theory. For the Frankfurt theorists of the 1930s and 1940s the separation of theory and practice was more than conceptual; there were social and historical reasons why they felt social critique would not lead to revolutionary action. Domination in the mid-20th century was seen to take forms different from those analyzed by Marx. In a world divided between fascism, Stalinism, and the New Deal, they felt the objective conditions for emancipation had passed, and that the revolutionary subject – the proletariat – had been transformed and either crushed or assimilated. In Adorno's famous words, "philosophy, which once seemed obsolete, lives on because the moment of its actualization was missed" [10]. Their task, then, was to preserve the truth of negative critique, until objective social conditions once again made practical political action possible.

In order to discuss the project of Marcuse, however, it is necessary to make an additional clarifying point. As used above, praxis is a *means* – political action necessary in realizing the socialist goal. But there is at least one other orientation to praxis that is especially important for an analysis of Marcuse: that is, praxis as the goal *itself*, the central characteristic of socialist man and socialist society. The fact that the difference between these two definitions is rarely clarified by Marxist or non-Marxist writers leads to much confusion. Praxis in this latter sense refers to man's conscious shaping of historical conditions as opposed to being shaped *by* them. This state was what Marx meant by the "end of prehistory" [11]. It does not involve action according to a set of universal standards, but freedom to shape one's world according to one's self-conscious will. This privilege has existed only partially and only for a particular ruling class in previous historical epochs. In Slater's analysis of the Frankfurt School for example,

praxis appears to refer exclusively to concrete strategies for revolutionary political organization and action. Thus he devotes an entire chapter on various "practical–critical" theories – including those of Lenin, Stalin, the German SPD and KPD, Trotsky, and the "council communist" – bemoaning the fact that the Frankfurt School did not have their own theory of political organization, or did not significantly participate in any of the above [12]. Marcuse, on the other hand, while never rejecting the necessity of revolutionary political action, developed in his early writings an anthropological concept of praxis based primarily on an analysis of the concept of *labor*; this was influenced in turn by Marx's *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts* and the *German Ideology*. Marcuse's attempt to ground critical theory "ontologically" [13] distinguished him from his colleagues in the *Institut für Sozialforschung*, notably Horkheimer and Adorno [14]. His ideal of "authentic human praxis," coupled with his later concepts of 'Reason' [15] and authentic human *sensibility* [16] were the Archimedean points for his critical analysis of modern domination. This approach to praxis, coming from within the tradition of the Frankfurt School, is significant in that it sets Marcuse off from both the other "first generation" theorists, and later members of the School such as Habermas and Wellmer [17]. It is also interesting in its *similarity* to later developments in the work of East-European Marxists critical of the orthodox Soviet line [18]. It is thus worthwhile to comment briefly on Marcuse's early theoretical development.

LABOR AND PRACTICE: MARCUSE'S EARLY ONTOLOGY

As noted, crucial to the critical theory of Marcuse (as with Marx) was the concept of *labor*, and the distinction between *alienated* labor and *authentic* human praxis. Marcuse

developed his views on human labor as an aspect of human essence in two early articles, “The Foundation of Historical Materialism” [19] and “On the Philosophical Foundation of the Concept of Labor in Economics” [20]. The first was basically a review of Marx’s early critique of alienated labor and private property in the *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts*. In the latter, Marcuse elaborated on the concept of labor and its relationship to domination.

In the “Foundation of Historical Materialism” Marcuse draws three basic deductions from Marx’s discussion of labor in the *EPM*: (1) Labor is man’s act of *self-creation*; (2) Labor is a *knowing* and *conscious* activity – this distinguishes man’s activity from that of other animals [21]; and (3) Man is an *objectifying* being:

Man can only realize his essence if he realizes it as something *objective*... ‘material.’ Labor, understood in this way, is the specifically human ‘affirmation of being’ in which human existence is realized and affirmed [22].

objectification as such belongs – like his participation in nature – to the essence of man, and can thus not be superseded; according to revolutionary theory only a particular form of objectification – reification, ‘estrangement’ – can and must be superseded [23].

The latter quote points to the idea that there is both an authentic and an inauthentic or “estranged” form of labor. Marcuse elaborates on this in the “Concept of Labor.” He begins this essay by criticizing the narrow economic and psycho-biological theories of labor prevalent in modern social science which do not recognize that labor is “an ontological concept of human existence” [24]. Marcuse points to the following quote from Marx, taken not from the “early” writings but from *Capital*:

As the creator of use-values, as useful labor, labor is... a condition of human existence independent of all social forms; it is eternal natural necessity that mediates the material exchange between man and nature, and thus human life [25].

Labor as “the specific *praxis* of human existence in the world” stems from the relationship between labor and objectification – man’s self-expression:

In labor something happens with man and with the objectification in such a manner that the “result” is an essential unity of man and the objectification: man “objectifies” himself and the object becomes “his,” it becomes a human object. And this relation between doing and objectification not only indicates, e.g., the fact that every laboring process comes upon and “has” before it some objectivity to be worked upon. It should also designate a constitutive moment for the whole *praxis* of human existence, a “task” posed for human existence as such. Its task is the “mediation” and “appropriation,” etc. of objectification [26].

In the above “ontological” discussion of labor, one must not lose sight of the fact that for Marcuse, the first condition of human existence was man’s *historical* nature. As with Marx, Marcuse’s concept of labor has both an anthropological and a socio-historical dimension; indeed “labor” as a philosophical concept abstracted from history was seen as being as empty as Hegel’s “Absolute Spirit.” Both the objects of one’s labor and the social organization in which it takes place are socio-historical “givens” that exist prior to and determine the activities of any given individual:

the organized world is always encountered as the reality of a *past* existence: as past which is still present [27].

Man’s objective world is the reality of objectified life. Labor, as the product of human life, has become solidified and concretized in objects of use, enjoyment, decoration, etc.: home, city, and country, in all the institutions and organizations that daily surround us – in these objectified life demands, dominates and determines us at every moment... Human activity constantly interacts with that historical life that has become actualized in its objects... by simply presenting itself in an organized world in a determinate way and by forcing man to bear the determinate historicity of this world, the object of labor also brings about the historicity of the very laborer. By working, man actually places himself in the totally concrete situation of history, deals with its present, accepts its past, and works for its future [28].

So *labor*, man’s interaction with the objective material world, and *history*, the product of

man's *past* labors, merge in Marcuse's early ontology.

Also crucial for a discussion of domination and Marcuse's alternatives is his view of the nature of *capitalism* as our current "concrete situation of history" and how it relates to the labor process. There are, Marcuse points out, two poles from which labor can be considered:

On the one side, there is the doing in the service of "material" production and reproduction, i.e. the providing, procuring, and conserving of the basic necessities of existence... on the other side, there is all the labor which goes beyond those necessities and which is and remains tied to the developmental process of existence [29].

Only when relieved from procuring the basic needs can man be free to work toward realizing his own *possibilities*. This is the goal of socialism – to allow what Marcuse terms "*praxis in the realm of freedom*."

Even beyond necessities, the process of human existence remains praxis: even here "labor" has to be performed, but its character has changed. Now labor is no longer at the service of the process of development of mere human existence... labor no longer aims at shaping and fulfilling human existence as something that it has yet to create and secure but, rather, it is an event *resulting* from the form and fullness of human existence as its realization. Thus, this praxis contains its goal and end; it lacks the *being-delivered-over* to an "alien" objectivity, that continuing and stable framing of an *imposed* event to which it must give itself up so that existence can be at all... praxis in the "realm of freedom" is the authentic praxis and "goal" to which all other labor is directed: the free unfolding of existence in its true possibilities [30].

Here we get a glimpse of part of what *emancipation* meant to the early Marcuse.

After thoroughly elaborating the concept of 'labor,' Marcuse concludes his 1933 article by tying it to the notion of *domination*, which in turn involves the *alienation* of man (or certain groups of individuals) from his "essential" activity. After discussing primitive communal forms of social organization, Marcuse turns to the increasing division of labor and the emergence of class societies:

the social division of labor and the "relations of production" in the various societies, decisively oppose every "essential" division of labor (i.e. a division directed toward the most authentic possibilities of human existence)... Every historical society.. is constituted upon the basic relationship of *domination* and *servitude*. Each is constituted in a (political, economic, or social) struggle as a result of which the conquering party holds the conquered in a state of servitude under its domination. The concepts of domination and servitude, used by Hegel as categories of historical existence, designate here a universal historical fact: servitude means the enduring and constant binding of the praxis of the whole of human existence to material production and reproduction, in the service and under the direction of another existence (indeed, the one that "dominates") and its needs [31].

Regarding the concept of 'alienation':

One of Hegel's and Marx's most profound insights is in having seen that the tie that binds all of existence to material production and reproduction reifies this very existence and prevents it from stepping over into the dimension of free praxis. As a mode of being human, labor cannot be separated from man – not even in its "product." When the object of labor becomes independent and is separated from the being of the worker, the latter is also necessarily objectified: his existence is externalized, alienated, and becomes an alien objective power standing over him independently of his freedom... The lasting and permanent tie of existence to material production and reproduction cuts off at the roots the acquisition of conscious foresight and circumspection corresponding to its own possibilities [32].

With the alienation and domination of labor described above, 'labor' becomes crystalized in the *economic* dimension; "in the dimension of production and reproduction of necessities" [33]. The dimensions of *necessity* and *freedom* become socially separated, and located in different socio-economic strata and classes [34]. In later writings Marcuse dealt in a more comprehensive and specific fashion with the modern capitalist mode of production and the socio-economic relationships that preclude the realization of "praxis in the realm of freedom" [35].

THEORY AND PRAXIS RECONSIDERED

Returning to the relationship between the-

ory and praxis in the light of the above discussion, it is not quite accurate to say, as Howard does in the quote cited earlier, that critical theory does not propose to know the truth, or pretend to be a guide for political action. “Truth” here refers to the unmasking of existing structures of domination, and the revelation of the concrete socio-historical potential for authentic praxis as defined above. For Marcuse it went even further, to refer to the anthropological, and later the psycho-biological potentialities of man that were repressed in modern society. In addition, theory is always necessary for the elaboration of strategies for *collective* political action. It is true that theory and practice are not the same thing, but neither can they be separated. Praxis in *either* of the above contexts is always *conscious*, purposeful activity and as such informed by theory. There is a truth content for critical theory that is neither absolute nor relative, but grounded in socio-historical analysis. It is useful to compare the earlier-cited quote by Howard with the following statement by Marcuse:

According to Marx, the correct theory is the consciousness of a practice that aims at changing the world... Marx’s concept of truth, however, is far from relativism. There is only one truth and one practice capable of realizing it. Theory had demonstrated the tendencies that make for the attainment of a rational order of life, the conditions for creating this, and the initial steps to be taken... The rest is the task of man’s own liberated activity. Theory accompanies the practice at every moment, analyzing the changing situation and formulating its concepts accordingly. The concrete conditions for realizing the truth may vary, but the truth remains the same and theory remains its ultimate guardian. Theory will preserve the truth even if revolutionary practice deviates from its proper path. Practice follows the truth, not vice versa [36].

From the above discussion we can isolate three aspects of the project of critical theory: (1) the critique of existing domination; (2) some conception of emancipation based upon existing historical (and for Marcuse, anthropological) potentialities; and (3) the *bridge* between the two – the political organization and activity necessary to transform society. The

Frankfurt theorists were weakest on this third point, though, as noted above, they justified themselves on objective historical grounds, arguing that the potential “revolutionary subject” no longer existed. I would like to conclude by suggesting that critical theory’s weak relationship to political practice involves more than historical constraints; that there are crucial limitations inherent in the theory *itself* that stem from its ultimately *individual* level of analysis, as opposed to a study of the dynamics of the social relationships *between* individuals in advanced industrial society.

There were several reasons for the Frankfurt School’s focus on the individual, or more specifically on individual *consciousness*, in their critique of domination in modern society. Following the first wave of “Western Marxists,” especially Lukács, the Frankfurt theorists held that, contrary to the “automatic Marxism” of the Second and Third Internationals [37], the transition to socialism would not occur without the development of a conscious grasp of existing social relations by the proletariat. Going beyond Lukács (and Marx), however, they argued that the “socialization” of labor that occurred with the concentration and centralization of industrial capital in its monopoly phase did *not* lead to the development of class consciousness and significant political organization of the working class beyond trade unionism. Rather, modern man was *increasingly* alienated and fragmented under the predominant organizational form of domination, the *bureaucracy* [38]. In addition, they attempted to demonstrate that “superstructural” forms, including the State and the modern phenomenon of mass culture, were increasingly important in “administering” the atomized consciousness of modern man, linking knowledge, belief, and artificially created “needs” to the system as a whole [39]. Finally, and perhaps most significant, they did not feel that a critique of political economy, or even ideology at the *collective* level à la Lukács, was sufficient

to explain the failure of the proletarian revolution to occur with the breakdown of the system of capitalism prior to World War II. For the Frankfurt theorists it was necessary to analyze the *internalization* of attitudes and “needs” that thwarted resistance, or channeled it into areas that did not threaten the status quo. This led them to ground their critique of domination in Freud in attempting to explain the psychological conditioning of modern man by linking the “rational” domination of nature characterizing the development of Western civilization to the increasing domination of man himself through the repression of his own instinctual “nature.”

There were thus legitimate reasons for emphasis on individual consciousness when discussing domination in advanced industrial society. This level of analysis made it difficult, however, to include *within* their critical theory a discussion of the type of *social* activity and organization necessary for *political* praxis. In Marcuse’s case, for example, as his work developed over the years, he opposed the “one-dimensional” consciousness and instrumental thought that he saw as characteristic of modern man with a critical, historically-grounded “Reason”; alienated labor with authentic human praxis; excessive sensual repression *and* the pacifying process of modern sensual permissiveness [40] with a concept of non-repressive, erotic (vs. merely sexual) sensibility. But as employed here, these are all *individual* attributes. What seems to be lacking is the theoretical counterpoint to the mass culture of modern society so vividly portrayed in the writings of the Frankfurt theorists; a sphere of social *interaction* in which the alienation of “individuals” itself would be overcome through the development of a liberated *communal* consciousness. It is in getting beyond the negative “Great Refusal” of the individual that the first generation Frankfurt theorists fell down. Marcuse, with his “anthropological” assertions was able to go further than his former colleagues in de-

picting the condition of individual freedom. And it is true that he was not interested in constructing a model of “socialist society”; as noted at the first of this essay, he felt that “the new society cannot be an object of theory” insofar as it was “the free creation of the liberated individuals” [41]. But it is the task of critical theory to specify *all* the historically-determined prerequisites necessary for realization of this possibility. Any theory of a transformation of society must include a discussion of the social organization and political action necessary to achieve this goal, and perhaps even the specification of *possible* alternative forms of social organization in the new order. As the Frankfurt theorists rejected both totalitarian dictatorship and anarchism, the organization of political practice and, ultimately, “socialist society,” must involve some form of democratic decision-making and communication, some kind of normative ‘community.’ It is here the work of Jürgen Habermas, as well as that of the so-called “phenomenological” Marxists (who focus on *intersubjectivity* and the social construction of the *Lebenswelt*) are necessary complements to the first generation Frankfurt theorists [42]. *Individual praxis* requires the development of individual consciousness; but such “praxis in the realm of freedom” is only possible for the few in class society. Political practice that aims to transform society is predicated on the development of a *social* consciousness on a mass scale. Without it, “practical–critical” activity becomes the preserve of an informed elite à la Lenin’s vanguard Party – which, in Marcuse’s view, was a precursor to Stalin’s totalitarianism and anyway no longer feasible [43]. For Marcuse, a key weakness of Soviet Marxism was the view that the *end* justified the *means*; rejecting this, political practice itself must be the activity of a self-conscious and self-directed revolutionary Subject (as opposed to a number of individual “subjects”). Perhaps it is necessary to posit a third definition of praxis as yet another aspect

of the project of the Frankfurt School: Praxis in the Greek sense, as employed by Habermas (and Hannah Arendt), as undistorted *political discourse*. The institutions of the transformed society would be aimed at generating both free, self-conscious individuals in Marcuse's sense, and, through such discourse, a normative *community*. It would seem that the emancipation called for by the Frankfurt theorists requires a theory capable of encompassing "practices" in all three senses here defined. It follows that exclusive focus on any *one* definition of the terms can give but an incomplete picture of the project of critical theory.

NOTES

- 1 The programmatic Frankfurt School statements on the difference between traditional and critical theory are two 1937 essays, Max Horkheimer's "Traditional and Critical Theory," trans. in *Critical Theory* (New York: Seabury Press, 1972); and Marcuse's "Philosophy and Critical Theory" in *Negations* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1968).
- 2 *Negations*, p. 135.
- 3 *Ibid.*, p. 145.
- 4 *Ibid.*, p. 143.
- 5 "Domination is in effect whenever the individual's goals and purposes and the means of striving for and attaining them are prescribed to him and performed by him as something prescribed. Domination can be exercised by the individual on himself, and appear in the form of autonomy. This second form plays a decisive role in Freudian instinct theory: the superego absorbs the authoritarian models, the father and his representatives, and makes their commands and prohibitions its own laws, the individual's conscience." (Marcuse, *Five Lectures*, Boston: Beacon Press, 1970, pp. 1–2.)
- 6 *Origin and Significance of the Frankfurt School* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1977), p. 54.
- 7 *Ibid.*, pp. 28, 54–93.
- 8 This is also reflected in their general abhorrence of 'identity theory.' See Martin Jay, *The Dialectical Imagination* (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1973), pp. 46–47; and "The Concept of Totality in Lukacs and Adorno," *Telos* no. 32, Summer 1977, pp. 117–137.
- 9 "On Marx's Critical Theory," *Telos* no. 6, 1969, pp. 224–242.
- 10 *Negative Dialectics* (New York: Seabury Press, 1973), p. 3.
- 11 For example see Melvin Rader, *Marx's Interpretation of History* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979), pp. 223–224. The reference comes from Marx's well-known "Preface" to his *Contribution to a Critique of Political Economy*. In Marx, these two meanings are not clearly distinguished; revolutionary praxis in the sense of self-conscious political activity is the beginning of the "end of prehistory." See Shlomo Avineri, *The Social and Political Thought of Karl Marx* (Cambridge: Cambridge U. Press, 1968), pp. 124–149, on the development of Marx's conception of praxis. Here, the two meanings have been distinguished, both because of my own analytic separation of the aspects of the critical project, and because they have become distinct in the works of contemporary writers, often unconsciously.
- 12 Slater, *op. cit.*, pp. 54–93.
- 13 Though we are discussing Marcuse's "ontological" assumptions, we must be aware of the particular, open-ended usage of the term here. It refers primarily to *man's* nature, and "human nature" for Marcuse was not a set of absolute characteristics. The most important attribute of man for Marcuse, as for Marx, was his *historical* nature, and the fact that through *praxis* man creates his *own* world, which in turn was reproduced in the individual through his encounter with the external environment. This flexibility was seen to extend to man's "instinctual nature" as well; the psychological mechanisms of repression and ego development that Freud saw as universal human attributes were viewed by Marcuse and the other Frankfurt theorists as structured by the specific socio-economic environment in which the individual and his family were located.
- 14 Jay, *Dialectical Imagination*, p. 75.
- 15 For example see Marcuse's "Philosophy and Critical Theory," *op. cit.*; and the "Preface" to *Reason and Revolution* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1960).
- 16 See for example *Essay on Liberation* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1969), 7ff.; 23ff.
- 17 Most significant here is Habermas' criticism of Marx's (and Marcuse's) concept of praxis, which he sees as too simplistic in that it does not distinguish *work* from communicative *interaction*, *techné* from praxis in the classical sense. For the development of Habermas' notion see Part I of *Knowledge and Human Interests* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1971), and "Labor and Interaction" in *Theory and Practice*, (Boston: Beacon Press, 1973), pp. 142–169.
- 18 For example the contributors to the journal *Praxis*. Compare also for example, David Rasmussen, "Marx: On Labor, Praxis, and Instrumental Reason," *Dialectics and Humanism*, 6(3), Summer, 1979, pp. 37–52.
- 19 *Studies in Critical Philosophy* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1973), pp. 1–48 (orig. published in 1932).
- 20 *Telos* no. 16, Summer 1973, pp. 9–37 (orig. published in 1933).
- 21 In both the *EPM* and *Capital Marx* remarks that while "a bee would put many a human architect to shame... what distinguishes the worst architect from the best of bees is that the architect builds the cell in his mind before he constructs it in wax." (*Capital* vol. I, New York: Vintage, 1977, p. 284.)

- 22 "Foundation," p. 14.
- 23 *Ibid.*, pp. 17–18. Marcuse had made the following distinction earlier in the article:
 "Reification" denotes the general condition of "human reality" resulting from the loss of the object of labour and the alienation of the worker which has found its "classical" expression in the capitalist world of money and commodities. There is thus a sharp distinction between reification and objectification... Reification is a specific ("estranged", "untrue") mode of objectification (*Ibid.*, p. 11, n. 2).
- 24 "Concept of Labor," p. 11.
- 25 *Ibid.*, p. 13.
- 26 *Ibid.*, pp. 13–14.
- 27 *Ibid.*, pp. 23–24.
- 28 *Ibid.*, p. 26.
- 29 *Ibid.*, p. 29.
- 30 *Ibid.*, p. 31.
- 31 *Ibid.*, p. 34.
- 32 *Ibid.*, p. 35.
- 33 *Ibid.*
- 34 *Ibid.*, pp. 35–36.
- 35 For example see *Reason and Revolution*, op. cit., pp. 289–322; "Some Social Implications of Modern Technology," in *The Essential Frankfurt School Reader* (New York: Urizen, 1978); Andrew Arato and Eike Gebhart (eds.), pp. 138–162 (orig. published in 1941); "The Obsolescence of Marxism" in *Marx and the Western World*, Nicholas Lobkowitz (ed.), (South Bend: U. of Notre Dame Press, 1967), pp. 409–17; and much of Marcuse's most well-known work, *One-Dimensional Man* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1964).
- 36 *Reason and Revolution*, pp. 321–322.
- 37 See Russell Jacoby's "Toward a Critique of Automatic Marxism," *Telos* no. 10, Winter 1971, pp. 119–146.
- 38 Marcuse's most concise discussion of the relationship between domination and the bureaucratization of modern industrial society is in his important, if little-known essay "Some Social Implications of Modern Technology," op. cit.
- 39 See the classic essay on "The Culture Industry," in Horkheimer and Adorno's *Dialectic of Enlightenment* (New York: Seabury Press, 1972).
- 40 I refer here to Marcuse's controversial concept of "repressive desublimation." See *One-Dimensional Man*, pp. 71–81.
- 41 *Negations*, p. 135.
- 42 Though there are significant differences in the theoretical development of such thinkers as Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, Henri Lefebvre, and Agnes Heller, what characterizes their work is a concern for intersubjectivity and the constitution of the *Lebenswelt*. In America this tradition is most consistently represented in the journal *Telos* (for example, see Pier Aldo Rovatti, "Critical Theory and Phenomenology," *Telos* no. 15, Spring 1973; Paul Piccone, "Phenomenological Marxism," *Telos* no. 9, Fall 1971.)
- 43 On this point see Marcuse's most politically-oriented book, *Counterrevolution and Revolt* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1972), pp. 42–43.