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MARXIST HUMANISM: PERSPECTIVES ON PHILOSOPHY AND SOCIAL THEORY

Kevin Anderson
Special Issue Editor
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This special issue of Quarterly Journal of Ideology on Marxist humanism is dedicated to the memory of Raya Dunayevskaya, 1910-1987, the founder of Marxist humanism in the United States, whose death came, sadly, just before the earlier special issue on Marxist humanism (Vol. 10:4) had come off the press. Dunayevskaya was author of four books and hundreds of articles, most of which are gathered in the Raya Dunayevskaya Collection at Wayne State University. Taken together, these writings constitute one of the most original contributions ever made to Marxian and Hegelian thought. To those like myself (and many of the other contributors to this issue) who also knew her personally, the loss was one of a dear colleague, friend and supportive critic, who generously offered her time again and again to help others with their work, while at the same time continuing right up to her death to work prodigiously on her own groundbreaking studies, such as her book, left uncompleted at her death, which she had tentatively entitled “Dialectics of Organization and Philosophy: The ‘Party’ and New Forms of Organization Born Out of Spontaneity” (see the RD Collection, Vol. 13). It should be pointed out that her friends and colleagues were not only intellectuals, but also drawn from the rank and file workers, Blacks, women’s liberationists and youth. Fittingly, her last public lecture was to an overflow audience of 400 at Northern Illinois University in April 1987 on “Youth of the 1980’s, Youth of the 1960’s, the Other America and the Idea of Freedom.”

Some of the truly dialectical spirit of her generous mind can be seen in the first four contributions, which take up her correspondence with another great philosopher and social theorist, Herbert Marcuse. These letters, brief but representative selections from which are published here for the first time, are commented upon by Marcuse biographer Douglas Kellner and by Kevin Anderson, who edited them for this publication.

The next contribution is by Mihailo Markovic, a Yugoslav Marxist humanist philosopher of international standing, who here discusses incisively the liberal and Marxian notions of rights. His article in memory of Dunayevskaya appears in the journal which he founded, Praxis International (Vol. 8:3, 1988), along with one of her last writings. Following Markovic’s article is a new and imaginative exploration by Lou Turner, author of a book on the African revolutionary Frantz Fanon and Black thought, which carried an introduction by Dunayevskaya. His topic is the relation of Fanon to Hegel.
Discourse to Hegel and feminism, where she affirms the importance of Dunayevskaya's work to a feminist reading of Hegel. Andrew Kliman's article, which follows, builds upon work by Dunayevskaya to offer us a new look at the relationship of Marx's economic theory to his overall humanist dialectic, contrasting Marx's concepts to the far narrower perspectives of Engels.

The final article, appropriately, is by Peter Hudis, a secretary to Dunayevskaya during her last years, who has written an original article on Dunayevskaya's new vantage points in her last years on Hegel's Phenomenology and on Marx's 1844 Essays, drawing important contrasts between her work and that of Georg Lukács. As a whole, this issue will be a success if it serves as a memorial to Raya Dunayevskaya which is also proof of the ongoing importance for the 1990's and beyond of Dunayevskaya's concept of Marxist humanism. The proof of that, of course, is the response of the readers, who are invited to examine the perspectives of Marxist humanism as pointing toward a way out of the deep crisis affecting American philosophy and social theory as the century draws to a close, burdened down already by a full decade of what Dunayevskaya aptly called "Reaganism's ideological pollution."

December 7, 1954

Dear Herbert Marcuse:

Although I do not know you in person, you are of course familiar to me for your Reason and Revolution. I was so impressed with the work at the time it was published that I then got your address from Meyer Schapiro and intended to write you. I intended also to visit you, but you were then living in Washington, D.C. and I in Pittsburgh. I hope when next I come east, there will be an opportunity to meet you in person.

Now let me introduce myself. I am Raya Dunayevskaya. You might have read my translation of "Teaching Economics in the Soviet Union" that appeared in the September, 1944, issue of the American Economic Review. The introduction that I wrote to it, "A New Revision of Marxian..."
Dear Raya Dunayevskaya:

April 14, 1955

I have now read the notes on Hegel which you lent me. This is fascinating, and I admire your way of concretizing the most abstract philosophical notions. However, I still cannot get along with the direct translation of idealistic philosophy into politics: I think you somehow minimize the “negation” which the application of the Hegelian dialectic to political phenomena presupposes. I would like to discuss these things with you, and I hope that we can do so in the near future; I shall let you know as soon as there is a chance.

As to the Sixth Chapter I wonder whether it is really novel enough contained in the *Theorieen über Mehrwert* [Theories of Surplus-Value]. . .

With best wishes & greetings,
Yours, Herbert Marcuse

May 5, 1955

Dear Herbert Marcuse:

. . . You seem to think that I . . . minimize the “negation” which the application of the Hegelian dialectic to political phenomena presupposes. But surely Hegel’s Absolute Idea has nothing in common with Schelling’s conception of the Absolute as the synthesis or identity in which all differences are absorbed by the “One.” Lenin sort of put a period in that chapter when Hegel speaks of the Idea as Nature, pointing out that Hegel was stretching a hand to materialism. That was as far as 1915 could reach. It was far enough: for his transformation of everything into its opposite was no abstraction but the transformation of the imperialist war into a civil war.

But this is 1955, and if 4 decades does not mean all new, we should surely start at least not with Lenin on the eve of revolution but Lenin after conquest of power. 1922-3 shows how hard Lenin labored to find the something which would make his Universal—that everyone “to a man” run production and the state—a reality. He came up with the notion that what is needed is that “the work of the party must be checked by the non-party masses.” No small thing for the creator of the party as the knowing of the proletariat!

30 years later when neither the state withered away nor the party checked itself but, on the contrary, turned into the one-party state, we must see that the point today is the liberation from the party. The withering away of the state (Doesn’t Hegel’s phrase about the “falling off” of the Idea remind you of this?) is no overnight job and the party not in power does remain the knowing of the proletariat and hence a much more complex job, its withering away or “falling off.” But in that contradiction does lie the movement toward liberation and theoreticians can least of all allow themselves to be enslaved by any divisions between philosophy and politics. In truth, only when you do have the “translation” in mind, you can hear the Idea at all. How is it that Hegel phrases it? “The self-determination in which alone the idea is is to hear itself speak.” . . .

Yours,
Raya Dunayevskaya

December 2, 1955

Dear Raya Dunayevskaya:

I apologize for my long silence: (1) I did not have your address en route, (2) I was so busy with the final rush of the publication of my Freud book that I had to abandon all correspondence. In addition, I was most of the time not in Cambridge and picked up your letters with great delay. However, I have read—at least as a first reading—your notes and I should like to tell you that I must encourage you to go ahead with the elaboration. Your ideas are a real oasis in the desert of Marxist thought—there are many things I have to discuss with you—points of disagreement and points which require clarification, but I am at present just unable to come to New York or even Detroit and also unable to write my comments down. We will have to wait until my schedule and program is a little easier. . .

Cordially,
Herbert Marcuse
Excerpts from Marcuse's 1958 Preface to Marxism & Freedom:

... Failure to elucidate the function and the full content of dialectical materialism has marred much of the Marxist and non-Marxist discussion of Marxian theory. With some notable exceptions (such as Georg Lukács's Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein and the more recent French reexaminations of Marxism), dialectical materialism was minimized as a disturbing "metaphysical rest" in Marxian theory, or formalized into a technical method, or schematized into a Weltanschauung. Raya Dunayevskaya's book discards these similar distortions and tries to recapture the integral unity of Marxian theory at its very foundation:

... While the author of the Preface agrees in all essentials with the theoretical interpretation of the Marxian oeuvre in these first parts, he disagrees with some decisive parts of the analysis of post-Marxian developments, especially with that of the relationship between Leninism and Stalinism, of the recent upheavals in Eastern Europe, and, perhaps most important, with the analysis of the contemporary position, structure and consciousness of the laboring classes. Marx's concept of the proletariat as "revolutionary class in-itself (an sich)" did not designate a merely occupational group, i.e., the wage earners engaged in the material production—as a truly dialectical concept, it was at one and the same time an economic, political, and philosophical category. As such it comprised three main elements—(1) the specific societal mode of production characteristic of "free" capitalism, (2) the existential and political conditions brought about by this mode of production, (3) the political consciousness developed in this situation. Any historical change in even one of these elements (and such a change has certainly occurred) would require a thorough theoretical modification. Without such modification, the Marxian notion of the working class seems to be applicable neither to the majority of the laboring classes in the West nor to that in the communist orbit.

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Now, what I should like to ask you is first, your own considered evaluation as far as the situation in this country is concerned, and secondly, if it isn't asking too much—reference to American literature on the problems pro and contra. I know that your own evaluation runs counter to the thesis of reconciliatory integration of the worker with the factory but I would also like to know whether there is any sensible argument for the other side. . . .

Sincerely,

HM

August 16, 1960

Dear R.D.:

I feel pretty bad for not having answered your various notes and letters, the main reason that I am neurotically busy with my new book and equally neurotic about the slightest interruption. Please accept my apology. I am sure you will understand. I should even feel worse about it because my new book with the tentative title Studies in the Ideology of Advanced Industrial Society, is some sort of Western counterpart of Soviet Marxism—that is to say it will deal, not only with the ideology but also with the corresponding reality. One of my problems will be the transformation of the laboring class under the impact of rationalization, automation and particularly, the higher standard of living. I am sure you will know what I mean if I refer to the discussion among the French sociologists in Arguments and especially Serge Mallet's articles. It is question of a changing—that is to say—a more affirmative attitude of the laborer not only towards the system as a whole but even to the organization of work in the more highly modernized plants. Mallet's field study of French workers in the Caltech establishment in France points up sharply the rise of a highly cooperative attitude and of a vested interest in the establishment.

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Sincerely,

HM

August 16, 1960

Dear HM:

... Your letter of the 8th came at an auspicious time since the special issue of NEWS & LETTERS, which will be issued as a special pamphlet, WORKERS BATTLE AUTOMATION, has just come off the press and should be of value to you both because you will see the workers speaking for themselves on the conditions of labor and the alleged high standard of living. I know, from the time I last spoke to you, that you considered these views as being the result of my influence. While it is true that Charles Denby and some (by no means all) of the writers of this pamphlet are Marxist Humanists, you would make a serious mistake if you considered their views so exceptional that they did not represent the American proletariat. They represent a very important segment of the American workers and in all basic industries—auto, steel, coal—and the conditions they describe are what they experience on the line, not what some sociologists see in a "field study." I would like to call your attention also or especially to p. 6, "Which Way Out" because, contrary to the also or especially to p. 6, "Which Way Out" because, contrary to the also or especially to p. 6, "Which Way Out" because, contrary to the also or especially to p. 6, "Which Way Out" because, contrary to the also or especially to p. 6, "Which Way Out" because, contrary to the also or especially to p. 6, "Which Way Out" because, contrary to the also or especially to p. 6, "Which Way Out" because, contrary to the also or especially
would have to be totally different, “something completely new, not just
tied up with life” (p. 275) here rejects Automation altogether whereas
the editor insists that if the workers managed the factory it would not
be a House of Terror and works along the more traditional channels
of workers’ control of production, shorter workday, etc. . . .

Now then the American literature on the subject: I have long since
stopped paying attention to sociologists who have rather degenerated
into the school of “social psychology” which the workers in the factory
rightly call “head shrinking” so my list cannot be exhaustive but I can
give you the major references. Since the class struggle was never accepted
in American sociology as the framework of analysis, your reference to
those who speak of alleged cooperative attitude of worker to management
and even “organization of work” (!) must have in mind ex-radicals and
near radicals whose recent outings of the virtues of capitalism are sort
of summed up in the person of Daniel Bell and his rung-out articles
called a book, The End of Ideology by which they mean, of course,
the end of the class struggle. . . .

There are all sorts of shouting on The End of Industrial Man (Peter
Drucker), the end of political man The Politics of Mass Society by William
Kornhauser. Now none claim that the end of the economic, industrial,
political man, even as his thinking too has been taken over by the electronic
brain, is happy or content with his work. In that respect the ambivalence
is seen clearest in Daniel Bell’s “Work and Its Discontents” whose claim
is that the attenuation of the class struggle has nevertheless occurred,
if not in the factory, then by the new hunger the candied carrot.” How
much have we heard of those TV sets and “occupational mobility” and
David Riesman’s flip side record from the Lonely Man to “Individualism
Reconsidered” of the need to increase automatization in work—but for
the sake of pleasure and consumption and not for the sake of work
itself.” As least Bell has one good catch phrase that the descriptions
that issue from the so-called “human relations” projects are “not of human,
but of cow, sociology.” . . .

It is true that Automation and state capitalism are not only
“quantitative” but qualitative changes in our contemporary society and
that predominant fact would also affect a part of the proletariat.
But a part is not the whole. Indeed, the fact that gives the appearance
of an affluent society not only in the bourgeois sector but in the masses—
the millions of employed so that the 5 millions unemployed look “little”—
does not show that those unemployed are predominantly in the production
workers. No suburbia here. It is all concentrated in the industrial centers,
among an organized but wildcatting proletariat and aggravated by the
Negro Question which is by no means quiescent and among a youth

that has shown that they are not rebels without a cause but with one.
I know you do not accept my view that they are is search of a total
philosophy and are not getting themselves ready for the dustbin of history.
But it is a fact that not only among the proletariat and the million that
were striking just when Khrushchev was visiting and Eisenhower wanted
to show him American superiority in industry, not industry at a standstill,
it is a fact that in just the few months that Negro college youth began
sitting in the whole question of freedom and youth “coming up to the
level of the West European” has been moved from the stage of the future
to that of the present. . . .

Yours,
Raya
August 24, 1960

Dear R.D.:

It was wonderful to get from you such quick and good help. I read
at once the issue of NEWS AND LETTERS. Don’t misunderstand me:
I agree with practically everything that is said there, and yet, somehow,
there is something essentially wrong here. (1) What is attacked, is NOT
automation, but pre-automation, semi-automation, non-automation.
Automation as the explosive achievement of advanced industrial society
is the practically complete elimination of precisely that mode of labor
which is depicted in these articles. And this genuine automation is held
back by the capitalists as well as by the workers—with very good reasons
(on the part of the capitalists: decline in the rate of profit; need for
sweeping government controls, etc.; on the part of the workers: technological unemployment). (2) It follows that arrested, restricted
automation saves the capitalist system, while consummated automation
would inevitably explode it: Marx, Grundrisse der Kritik der politischen
Oekonomie p. 539-539. (3) re Angela T.: you should really tell her about
all that humanization of labor, its connection with life, etc.—that this
is possible only through complete automation, because such humanization
is correctly relegated by Marx to the realm of freedom beyond the realm
of necessity, i.e., beyond the entire realm of socially necessary labor in
the material production. Total de-humanization of the latter is the
prerequisite.

But all this has to be discussed orally. I hope we can do so in the
winter. And again, my great gratitude! . . .

Cordially,
Herbert
Dear HM:

... Lest you consider my contrary stress on subjectivity as "pure" idealism, will you permit me to sum up what it is I have been doing since 1953 when I became so preoccupied with the Absolute Idea? The essence of those May letters was that there is a movement from practice to theory as well as from theory to practice. The reason that it stirred up such a fuss in the sectarian movements is that heretofore... this statement of fact was made equivalent to *instinct* workers, of course, had the "right instinct" and Marxism, "of course," had correctly generalized this instinct into a revolutionary theory, but... without Marxist theory the revolutionary practice would get "nowhere." Above all, it was stressed, only Marx could have seen this where Hegel's idea of practice was for the theory of knowledge "only." Therefore, to deduce this movement from practice from Hegel's *Philosophy of Mind*, ran the argument against me, is sheer abandonment of the real world for that of ivory towers, a return from the world of action to that of talk of "philosophers." The "philosophers," on their part, were as little inclined to bend their ears to the earth and listen for any new impulses for theory. A short month after my letters were dispatched the first revolt from behind the Iron Curtain started so that both the man on the street and the philosopher, not to speak of the vanguardists, had to change the question: Can man gain freedom from out of totalitarian stranglehold to will he?

From 1953 to 1956 (Hungarian Revolution) we were confronted, on the theoretical front, by the sudden attacks of Russian Communism on Marx's humanist writings which turned out to have been used by "revisionist" Marxists as the banner under which they fought Communism not only in Western Europe but in far away Africa where, on the practical front, the most significant revolutions of our epoch were unfolding. As my ideas on the Absolute Idea got worked up in MARXISM AND FREEDOM they were quite general. It was clear I was walking gingerly not because I found myself outside any "recognized" movement but because I was dealing more with Marx's age than ours. More than a 100 years divide our age from the period when the founder of Marxism first stood Hegel right side up and very nearly dismissed Hegel's compulsion to go from the Absolute Idea in the *Logic* to Nature as "boredom, the yearning for a content," on the part of "the abstract thinker who, made clever by experience and enlightened beyond its truth, has decided under many false and still abstract conditions, to abandon himself and to substitute this *otherness*, the particular, the determined, for his self-contained being, his nothingness, his universality and his indeterminateness" (Critique of the Hegelian Dialectic). Nevertheless the young Marx cannot stop there and does follow Hegel from Nature to Mind, breaking off, however, in very short order.*

From then on the Marxian dialectic is the creative dialectic of the actual historic movement and not only that of thought. The continuation therefore resides in the three volumes of *Capital*, the First International, the *Civil War in France* and the *Critique of the Gotha Program*. A rich enough heritage not to get mummified, but the objective world has its own way of magnetizing so to speak a single point in thought.

Only with the collapse of that world does Lenin feel the compulsion to return to the Hegelian origins of Marxism but the Russian Revolution has a world to remake and no time for abstract discussion on the Absolute Idea. Lukács limits Hegelianism to the single field of consciousness as *organization*, or the party as the proletariat's "knowing." In any case the period between 1923 and 1953 is a period of standstill in theory so that the movement from practice finds no theory to match it even as the new stage in production finds only in the workers battling automation any new points of departure for theory as for practice.

Now those who stop with "knowing," whether they are neutral partisans of a technology sans class nature or thought embodiment, or Communist adherents to *partitio* (be it理想istically a la Lukács or cynically a la Kadar), fail to grasp that both in Hegel and in Marx the question of cognition is not an abstract question but a concrete, dialectical-empirical one of the how thought molds experience or gives action its direction. If the Whole governs the Parts even when the whole is not yet fact, then surely, whether Hegel knew it or not, the pull of the future on the present also tugged at his "system" with such overwhelming force that he could not escape, ivory tower or no ivory tower, any more than personal capitulation to the Prussian State could compel his philosophy to stop there to genuflect instead of rising out of it and even out of religion into the absolute or the new society he as person could not envisage.

Somewhere D.H. Lawrence says of the relationship of artist to the work of art: Artists are the biggest liars and are not to be taken at face value. But that art, if it is really great art, is truth and will reveal both society and the vision of the artist he buries in his explanatory lies. It is even truer of philosophers in general and Hegel in particular. Subjectivity as objectivity absorbed is not for the philosophers, but for the masses and it is they who are writing the new page of history which is at the same time a new stage in cognition. Even as every previous great step in philosophic cognition was made only when a new leap to freedom became possible, so presently the new struggles for freedom the *world* over will certainly shake the intellectuals out of the stupors so that they too can create freely a new "category." While I may not be awaiting breathlessly for these ideologists, I am for the "developing subject" that

November 22, 1960
is the “negative factor.” You can’t really mean that you are “giving up” the masses, can you?

Yours,
Raya

*Curiously my letter on Philosophy of Mind began with par. 385, without my having been aware that Marx had broken his MSS off at par. 384.

December 22, 1960

Dear RD:

I do not want the year let go without thanking you for your letters. I read them several times, but I am unable to discuss them in writing—there is just too much to say.

To me, the most important passages are those in which you stress the need for a reformulation of the relation between theory and practice, and the notion of the new subject. This is indeed the key, and I fully agree with your statement that the solution lies in the link between the first and second negation. Perhaps I would say: in the self-transcendence of materialism, or in the technological Aufhebung of the reified technical apparatus.

But again, although I am trying hard, I cannot see why you need the Absolute Idea in order to say what you want to say. Surely you do not need it in order to demonstrate the Marxian content of self-determination, of the Subject, etc. The very concept of the Absolute Idea is altogether tied to and justifies the separation of material and intellectual productivity at the pre-technological stage. Certainly you can “translate” this part of Hegel—but why translate if you can speak the original language?

Please don’t mind my all too brief and inadequate reaction. I am still too much absorbed by these and other problems. But one day soon I hope there will be more.

With the very best wishes for the new year,

Yours,
HM

January 12, 1961

Dear HM:

... dealing with your question as to why I “need the Absolute Idea. with you when you say that “The very concept of the Absolute Idea

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and that is why the world must be our country, i.e., the country of the self-developing subject. Back then to that final paragraph of the A.I., the insistence that we have not just reached a new transition, that this determination is “an absolute liberation, having no further immediate determination which is not equally posited and equally Notion. Consequently there is not transition in this freedom. . . . The transition here, therefore, must rather be taken to mean that the Idea freely releases itself in absolute self-security and self-repose. By reason of this freedom the form of its determinateness also is utterly free—the externality of space and time which is absolutely for itself and without subjectivity.”

You see I am not afraid either of the “system” of Hegelian Philosophy, or of the idealism of the Absolute Idea. The A.I. is the method of cognition for the epoch of the struggle for freedom, and philosophic cognition is not a system of philosophy, but the cognition of any object, our “object” being labor. The unity of object and subject, theory and practice and the transcendence of the first negation will come to realize itself in our time.

One minor word on the question as to why Hegel continued after he “ended” with Nature, which is the way he ended the smaller Logic and which is the logical transition if you transform his Science of Logic into a system as he did in the Encyclopedia and move from Logic to Nature to Spirit or Mind. Marx, too, had three volumes to his Capital and likewise was going to end the first volume “logically,” i.e., without entering this sphere of Accumulation. When he decided, however, to extend the book to include the notion, not as mere “summation” of all that preceded, but, to use a Hegelian phrase once again, “the pure Notion which forms a Notion of itself,” he also included an anticipation of what Volume II and III would contain. Volume II, as we know, is far from being Nature; on the contrary, it is that fantastic, pure, isolated “single society” (“socialism in one country,” if you please, only Marx thought it was state capitalism). It was so pure and so logical and so unreal that it completely disorganized poor Rosa when she contrasted that phantasmagoria to the rapacious imperialism living off all those underdeveloped countries it conquered. And, finally, he tells us also that he will indeed come down from those heights to face the whole concrete mess of capitalism and rates of profit and speculation and cheating, but we would only lose all knowledge of what society really is if we reversed the method. And even though Volume III stopped before he had a chance to develop the chapter on Classes, we know that it was not really the class but the full and free development of the individual that would signify a negation of a negation that was not merely destructive of the old, but constructive of the new. In this sense, and in this sense only, Hegel’s last sentence about the Notion perfecting “its self-liberation in the philosophy of Spirit” must be translated, stood right-side up. And Hegel will certainly help us a lot in that book as he goes on to describe freedom, not as a “have,” but as an “is” . . .

Yours,
Raya

January 12, 1965

Dear R.D:

Thanks for your letter. In the meantime I have read your review of my book which is probably the most intelligent one so far—as I expected it would be.

As to your prospective visit, the 12th of February unfortunately is not a University holiday, but I shall certainly reserve time Thursday afternoon or evening. It will be good seeing you.

Best regards and adieu,

HM

January 31, 1978

Dear HM,

How are you? Do you know whether you’ll have any free time April 21 or 22? My lecture tour this year calls for my speaking in San Diego those two days, and I thought I would like to talk with you. . . .

As you know, I have been working for some time on a study of Rosa Luxemburg and today’s WLM. I’ve been concentrating on the period 1910-14, which is when Rosa broke with Kautsky, heightened her agitation not only on the general strike, but the opposition to imperialism, not only “in general,” but most specifically the SD’s [Social Democracy’s] failure to carry on a campaign during the Morocco crisis, and writing to get your reaction. . . .

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Best regards and au revoir,

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Yours,
Raya
Douglas Kellner
University of Texas

With the death on June 9, 1987, of Raya Dunayevskaya, the tradition of Marxist-Humanism has lost one of its major theorists and activists. Dunayevskaya's life and work spans the entire history of revolutionary socialism in the twentieth century. Few thinkers have reflected so deeply and written so insightfully on the trajectory of revolutionary history from Marx's day to our own. And perhaps no other writer and activist has contributed so significantly to illuminating the trajectory and dynamics of contemporary revolutionary theory and history.

For my own generation of New Left activists, Dunayevskaya's book *Marxism and Freedom* (1958) served as one of the key introductions to Marxian revolutionary theory. Dunayevskaya's emphasis on the revolutionary humanism of the young Marx and insistence on the continuity of the Hegelian-revolutionary philosophical roots of Marxism throughout Marx's writings deeply influenced us, and provided what I still consider as one of the best introductions to Marxian thought and one of the most illuminating interpretations of the work and contributions of Karl Marx.

Dunayevskaya's *Philosophy and Revolution* (1973) theorized the period of the upsurge of Third World Revolutionary struggles that began with the Cuban Revolution and that was continuing in the Vietnamese and other revolutionary struggles of the time. Her studies showed the linkage between actual revolutionary struggles and revolutionary philosophy, and thus also provided important theoretical and political guidance for contemporary revolutionary theory and practice by underscoring the importance of revolutionary theory for the revolutionary process.

Dunayevskaya's connection with two other theoretical mentors of the New Left—Herbert Marcuse and Erich Fromm—sheds light on the multifaceted nature of her work, relationships, and influence. Dunayevskaya carried out a voluminous correspondence over three decades with both Marcuse and Fromm. She perceived these European exiles from fascist Germany as two of the only people in the United States who possessed a high level of knowledge of Hegel and Marx, and thus perceived them as individuals with whom she could develop a productive theoretical and political relationship. Her extremely rich correspondence with Marcuse and Fromm contain fascinating insights into her own struggles with the complex and difficult tradition of Hegelian Marxism, and shed light on her efforts to relate Hegelian and Marxian philosophy to current theoretical and political problems.

While Dunayevskaya often engaged in sharp polemical exchanges with...
Marcuse, he had the utmost respect for her and frequently consulted with her on theoretical and political issues. In 1957, Marcuse wrote a Preface for the first issue of Dunayevskaya’s *Marxism and Freedom* and when several years later he was writing on the studies that became *One-Dimensional Man* he wrote her on Aug. 8, 1960, requesting information on contemporary American literature on “the transformation of the laboring class under the impact of rationalization, automation and, particularly, the higher standard of living.” Dunayevskaya answered Marcuse on Aug. 15, 1960, with a five-page single-spaced letter summarizing recent work by Marxist-Humanists on the problem and describing in detail a wealth of other literature on the topic from a variety of positions.

Dunayevskaya also conducted a long and voluminous correspondence with Fromm who had much more respect for Dunayevskaya than Marcuse (indeed his letters to her are full of criticisms of his one-time colleague in the Institute for Social Research). Fromm invited both Dunayevskaya and Marcuse to contribute to his symposium *Socialist Humanism* which was published by Doubleday in 1965; this collection contains a wealth of studies which exhibit the international range of humanistic Marxism. Dunayevskaya’s contribution “Marx’s Humanism Today” contains a characteristic attempt to make the tradition of Marxist-Humanism come alive for the present political situation. On Nov. 30, 1968, Fromm volunteered to provide any potential help with publishers for “I have great respect for your knowledge, your penetration, your honesty and your courage and I believe that you have something to say which should be known as much as possible.”

Dunayevskaya’s correspondence with Fromm and Marcuse has been collected and is available in the microfilm collection (Dunayevskaya, 1986). I would urge all of those interested in contemporary Marxism to ask their libraries to purchase this collection, and look forward to articles and discussion of the correspondence.

Raya Dunayevskaya combined tremendous intellect, learning, and political experience in a life devoted to revolutionary theory and activism. Her contributions are enormous and provide a living heritage of revolutionary Marxist-Humanism. While she will be missed her ideas and tradition will live on in the revolutionary struggles of the present and future as we move out of the Reagan era into a new age of revolution.

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A PRELIMINARY EXPLORATION OF THE DUNAYEVSKAYA-MARCUSE DIALOGUE, 1954-79

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A real treasure in dialectical philosophy which is in fact a living legacy to future generations—the lengthy dialogue which occurred during the years 1954 to 1979 between Raya Dunayevskaya and another great and original Marxist philosopher, Herbert Marcuse—is contained in Vol. XII of the Raya Dunayevskaya Collection (1986), the last volume of her papers which Dunayevskaya personally prepared for the Wayne State University Labor Archives, in the year just preceding her death in 1987.

These letters, which total almost one hundred pages of single-spaced text (Dunayevskaya 1986:9889-9975), combined with the two thinkers' public debate on each others' work during the same period, may constitute one of the most serious and extended dialogues between two Marxist philosophers in the post-World War II period. One central theme in the correspondence is Dunayevskaya's early development of her dialectical concept, Hegel's Absolutes as New Beginnings.

In 1954, at the beginning of the correspondence, Marcuse was a well-known Marxist philosopher, author in 1932, the year they appeared in German, of the first important discussion anywhere of Marx's 1844 Essays, an article which stands to this day as one of the most original (Marcuse 1973). Douglas Kellner, Marcuse's most serious intellectual biographer, demonstrates in detail "how the (1844) Manuscripts "liberated" him from Heidegger and turned him closer to Marx" (1984:77). After Marcuse fled Nazi Germany, he authored Reason and Revolution (1941) in English, a study of Hegel's major works which linked Hegel's concept of dialectical Reason to Marx's 1844 Essays (Marcuse 1960).

When their correspondence began in 1954, Dunayevskaya was known to Marcuse mainly as Trotsky's Russian Secretary and as author of groundbreaking studies of Russia as a state capitalist society. Where Marcuse's Reason and Revolution moved from philosophy to "social theory" and then to modern sociology, Dunayevskaya's theoretical work was going in the opposite direction: from economic studies of Russian totalitarianism—which from the beginning took up not only Capital but also in preliminary form the 1844 Essays—toward a full vision of Hegel's Absolutes as the pathway to the dialectics of liberation for our age. Thus, by 1953, she had penned her provocative "Letters on Hegel's Absolutes" (Dunayevskaya 1989a).

The Early Years, 1954-57

From the beginning of the correspondence Dunayevskaya had p/
In March 1960, Marcuse had penned his essay "In International," concluding, "that early of the Aberrar's Hegel's dialectic to political negation," which the direct translation of the Hegelian dialectic to political action. He returns to Hegel's Absolute, with its emphasis on the 'negation' which the application of the Hegelian dialectic to political phenomena presupposes" (HM to RD, April 4, 1955).

Dunayevskaya does not let this go. She responds, trying to convince Marcuse both on the working class—inviting him to Detroit to meet her worker colleagues such as Charles Denby—and on Hegel and Schelling: "Now that the school season is drawing to a close perhaps you will take that trip to Detroit, and thus see that it is not a question of 'my' direct translation of idealistic philosophy into politics; I think you somehow minimize the 'negation' which the application of the Hegelian dialectic to political phenomena presupposes. But surely Hegel's Absolute Idea has nothing in common with Schelling's conception of the Absolute as the synthesis or identity in which all differences are absorbed by the 'One'" (RD to HM, May 5, 1955).

Marcuse responds (June 22, 1955): "Your answer to my brief remarks on Hegel does not satisfy me." He gives a few more objections, and concludes: "But this is not supposed to be an argument—just to show you that I am really thinking about these problems," Six months later, that despite areas of disagreement, "Your ideas are a real oasis in the desert of Marxist thought" (HM to RD, Dec. 2, 1955). In the period of The Newness of Our Philosophic-Historical Contribution," Dunayevskaya (1986:4407-16) singled out this passage repudiating dialectical Reason as a key one in Marcuse's path toward one-dimensional thought. Thus, by 1960, Marcuse was not only abandoning the working class, but also moving away from Hegel's concept of dialectical Reason.

By 1960 he breaks with the magnificent vision of dialectical Reason he had presented in 1941, going so far as to revise it in his new Preface: "I believe that it is the idea of Reason itself which is the undialectical element in Hegel's philosophy" (1960:xii). Years later, in her 1969 essay "The Newness of Our Philosophic-Historical Contribution," Dunayevskaya (1986:4407-16) singled out this passage repudiating dialectical Reason as a key one in Marcuse's path toward one-dimensional thought. Thus, by 1960, Marcuse was not only abandoning the working class, but also moving away from Hegel's concept of dialectical Reason.

While Douglas Kellner certainly is aware of Marcuse's abandonment of the working class, he seems to miss this key alteration by Marcuse of his concept of dialectical philosophy arguing that "Marcuse's 1960 preface "A Note on the Dialectic," shows how his own emphasis on the 'power of negative thinking' and the 'great refusal' is rooted in the Hegelian..."
Marcuse in the 1960's—and his apparent non-affinity to Marcuse's earlier this shift. A close study of the Dunayevskaya—Marcuse documents makes moving away from Hegel at the very time when Dunayevskaya was deepening her journey toward her 1970's concept of "Hegel's Absolutes as New Beginning," first worked out in Philosophy and Revolution (1973).

Culmination and Break-Up of the Dialogue, 1960-61

Dunayevskaya continues to write Marcuse on Hegel's Absolutes. On Oct. 16, 1960, she writes on the Absolute Idea and the Hungarian and African Revolutions, and also on the limits of Lenin and Hegel, where she skipped over the last paragraph of Hegel's Science of Logic in his Philosophical Notebooks:

"But the materialist in Lenin so overwhelmed him at this point of historic revelation that, you will recall, he wanted to stop where 'Hegel stretched his hand to materialism' as he 'ended' with Nature. Since that was so in the Smaller Logic, but here was another very important paragraph to go in the Science of Logic, the dividing point for our epoch is precisely on this free, individual, total liberation who show, both in thought and struggles, what they are aiming [at] and thus compelling me in any case to read and reread that Absolute Knowledge, Absolute Idea, Absolute Mind as each developing struggle on the world scene deepens." The letter ends with the statement that she is "dying to go to Africa," where Dunayevskaya does actually go in 1962.

Still failing to get a serious response from Marcuse on the Absolutes, on Dec. 12, 1960, Dunayevskaya completes her "Notes on Hegel's Phenomenology." These include critiques of Castro at the very time when Dunayevskaya's "Two Worlds" column had hit out at Castro's turn toward Russia (Dunayevskaya 1960). So important to her were these 1960 Notes that she published them in News and Letters on May 8, 1987, writing a substantial new introduction and entitling the whole: "Why Hegel's Phenomenology? Why Now?" Sometime in late 1960, she sends Marcuse an excerpt of an early draft of material for Philosophy and Revolution (Dunayevskaya 1986:4817-26).

Marcuse does write once more on Hegel's Absolutes, responding both to her letters and to the draft material, on which he writes a handwritten critique. His letter states: "To me, the most important passages are those in which you stress the need for a reformulation of the relation between the key, and I fully agree with your statement that the solution lies in the link between the first and second negation. Perhaps I would say:

in the self-transcendence of materialism, or in the technological Aufhebung of the reified technical apparatus."

Marcuse continues: "But again, although I am trying hard, I cannot see why you need the Absolute Idea in order to demonstrate the Marxian content of self-determination, of the Subject, etc. The very concept of the Absolute Idea is altogether tied to and justifies the separation of material and intellectual productivity at the pre-technological stage. Certainly you can 'translate' also this part of Hegel—but why translate if you can speak the original language?" (HM to RD, Dec. 22, 1960). This is really the end of Marcuse's grappling with the Marxist humanist concept of Hegel's Absolutes.

Dunayevskaya answers him at great length in a letter dated Jan. 12, 1961, in the midst of her own notes on Hegel: "If I must further justify myself, I would say that, frankly during the 1940's, when I first became enamored with the Absolute Idea, it was just out of loyalty to Marx and Lenin; Hegel was still hardly more than gibberish, although by how the music of his language got to me even if I couldn't read the notes. But once the new technological period of Automation got to the miners and they started asking questions about the kind of labor, the return to the early Marx also meant the late Hegel. As I said, I do not agree with you that the Absolute Idea relates to a pre-technological stage. So long as classes still exist, the dialectic will, and Absolute Idea will forever show new facets. What I do agree with is that once on the world scale, we have reached the ultimate in technological development, then the responses of the masses in the pre-technological underdeveloped economies are the spur to seeing something new in the Absolute Idea. Be it backward Ireland in 1916, or backward Russia in 1917, or backward Africa in 1960, somehow that absolute negativity of Hegel comes into play."

Marcuse does not answer her on this level. Instead he picks a fight over how Dunayevskaya had called Isaac Deutscher a Stalinist. Marcuse accuses her of being somehow in league with the capitalist system for her sharp attacks on Deutscher, Castro, etc. (HM to RD, March 6, 1961). Here is where the correspondence breaks off, as Dunayevskaya answers him very sharply. In the June-July 1961 News & Letters, Dunayevskaya publishes her critique of Marcuse's Soviet Marxism (1958), entitled "Intellectuals in the Age of State Capitalism."

Aftermath and Divergence, 1961-79

Meanwhile, Dunayevskaya has (1) continued her notes on Hegel to include both Hegel's Larger and Smaller Logics, in January and February 1961 and (2) begun her series of Political Letters in response to the Bay of Pigs invasion by Kennedy. Thus the break with Marcuse was over (1) Hegel's Absolutes, (2) Dunayevskaya's critique of de-Stalinized
Stalinists, and (3) differing concepts of the working class.

Dunayevskaya continues her Hegel studies as she develops the book Philosophy and Revolution. The debates between the two thinkers now become more public, as in Dunayevskaya's critique of Marcuse's One-Dimensional Man, an article she entitled "Reason and Revolution versus Conformism and Technology," published in the Fall 1964 issue of the student journal, The Activist (Dunayevskaya 1986:1070-72). Marcuse writes her: "I have read your review of my book which is probably the most intelligent one so far—as I expected it would be" (HM to RD, Jan. 12, 1965).

Years later, as she began to work out her book, Rosa Luxemburg, Women’s Liberation and Marx’s Philosophy of Revolution (1982), Dunayevskaya wrote in 1978 to the Scottish worker-revolutionary Harry McShane on the differences between her concept of dialectic and that of Marcuse, even at the stage of the Reason and Revolution. In 1978 she stressed that their early affinity hid the fact that "much as I learned from Marcuse, we were not only on different planets ‘politically,’ but philosophically" (Dunayevskaya 1986:6434).

The dialogue continued intermittently until Marcuse’s death in 1979, when Dunayevskaya wrote her moving tribute “Herbert Marcuse, Marxist Philosopher.” There she wrote: “The death of Herbert Marcuse on July 29 marks a sad day on the historic calendar of young revolutionaries as well as old Marxists” (1979:10). Referring to the publication of Reason and Revolution during World War II, Dunayevskaya continued: “In that seminal work, Marcuse established the Humanism of Marxism, and re-established the revolutionary dialectic of Hegel-Marx, for the first time for the American public. It is impossible to forget the indebtedness we felt for Marcuse when that breath of fresh air and vision of a truly classless society was published—and we were actively opposing that imperialist war” (1979:10-11). This is what makes the Dunayevskaya-Marcuse correspondence a living dialogue on the dialectic for serious revolutionary thinkers and activists the world over, not as history, but as a reaching toward the future.

Reference Notes

1 See also Dunayevskaya’s critique (1982:80-81) of Marcuse’s silence on women’s liberation in this 1932 analysis of Marx’s 1844 Essays.

2 It is a particular merit of Kellner’s book that he makes Marcuse as Marxist thinker its central theme, as against other recent treatment which stress either aesthetics or “pure” philosophy. See also the early Marxist humanist analysis by Greeman (1968), centering around a critique of Marcuse’s concept of the modern working class as “one-dimensional.”
A COMMENT ON THE DUNAYEVSKAYA-MARCUSE DIALOGUE

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Kevin Anderson's Raya Dunayevskaya/Herbert Marcuse dialogue article was fascinating, and some comments follow:

1) Anderson claims that Marcuse abandons Hegel's notion of dialectical reason but does not really describe what he abandons and what he replaced it with. If he is correct, he has spotted a fundamental shift in Marcuse's thought of which previous critics were unaware. Yet he does not really document this alleged "shift" or really flesh out its implications.

My own view is that Marcuse presented different views of Hegelian dialectics at different stages yet always considered himself a dialectician and always saw Hegel as an important source of revolutionary dialectics. Basically, he stressed different categories at different stages; certainly, in the 1960 Preface to Reason and Revolution he presents dialectics in terms of Hegel's categories though there may be different emphasis from early presentations. I think it is an exaggeration to say that Marcuse abandons, or moves away from, "Hegel's concept of dialectical reason."

It is true, however, that Marcuse explicitly rejects Hegel's notion of determinate negation in a 1966 lecture presented at the International Hegel conference in Prague and claims that revolutionary forces are now only to be found outside the system. He was sharply criticized for this notion of external mediation, and returned in some 1970's works to a notion of internal mediation, seeing revolutionary forces emerge from within the system of contemporary capitalism (see Kellner 1984:291ff).

2) Marcuse's major difference from Dunayevskaya concerning Hegelian dialectics concerned the concept of the Absolute in Hegel. Marcuse, like Karl Korsch and others, generally thought that this concept was a form of idealist mystification and tended to reject the term. Dunayevskaya, of course, thought otherwise. To flesh out her difference from Marcuse and others on this issue, one might say more about why she thought that the notion of Hegel's "absolutes" (why the plural?) were productive for revolutionary thought.

3) Finally, I think that Anderson's notion of Dunayevskaya's "break with Marcuse" is somewhat exaggerated. Obviously, they had their differences, and their sharp polemics in both letters and published texts no doubt caused some distance and tension which produced occasional breaks in the correspondence. But as their later exchanges and Dunayevskaya's positive tribute to Marcuse after his death indicate, they always had the utmost respect for each other and were aware of their profound bonds in the undialectical and counterrevolutionary atmosphere of the USA.

I hope that these comments will help in clarifying and developing an interesting study of the relationship between Dunayevskaya and Marcuse.
RESPONSE TO KELLNER ON THE DUNAYEVSKAYA-MARCUSE DIALOGUE

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Douglas Kellner's critique is a most serious one. First, Kellner takes issue with my conclusion that "Marcuse abandons Hegel's notion of dialectical reason" after 1960. Here, I think, Marcuse's own texts (some of which I quoted) speak well enough for themselves, such as his 1960 Preface to *Reason and Revolution*, written at the very time that he and Raya Dunayevskaya were arguing over Hegel's Absolute Idea. In the Preface, even Hegel's concept of dialectical Reason is critiqued by Marcuse, because it "comprehends everything and ultimately absolves everything" (1960:xii). He develops all this further in *One-Dimensional Man*: "The web of domination has become the web of Reason itself," while "transcending modes of thought seem to transcend Reason itself" (1964:169). He substitutes what he terms avant-garde art's Great Refusal of capitalist rationality for Marx's concept of the living revolutionary subject, the proletariat. This was certainly not his view in the main text of *Reason and Revolution*, first published in 1941, where his concept of dialectical Reason included the workers as a "revolutionary class" possessing "free rationality" (1960:319).

Writing in the midst of 1968, Marcuse saw the youthful New Left as an example of the Great Refusal, embracing it quite uncritically in *Essay on Liberation* (1969). As Kellner suggests, it is true that after the defeat of 1968, in *Counter-Revolution and Revolt*, Marcuse did shift his position again, challenging the New Left's hostility to theory, its "revolt against Reason—not only against the Reason of capitalism, bourgeois society and so on, but against Reason per se" (1972:129). But even here, his critique did not pose the idea of a return to philosophy by the Movement.

That perspective was articulated by Dunayevskaya alone, not only during the high point, but especially in their 1973 *Philosophy and Revolution*, which connected together the New Left's rejection of labor as a subject of revolution with its rejection of Hegelian dialectics: "Lack of confidence in the masses is the common root of all objections to 'idealististic, mystical Hegelianism'" (1989:289). As against the "endless activism" of the New Left, Dunayevskaya wrote that "what is needed for our age is a restatement of Marx's concept of the 'realization' of philosophy, that is, the inseparability of philosophy and revolution" (1989:291). The beginnings of this difference can, I think, be seen in the Dunayevskaya-Marcuse correspondence in 1960-61.

Kellner's second point, his critique of what he calls my "somewhat exaggerated" notion of a "break" between Dunayevskaya and Marcuse is well-founded, and I would agree with his view that "they always had the utmost respect for each other."
The third and most serious set of questions Kellner raises centers around the concept of the Absolute in Hegel. He notes that both Marcuse and Korsch rejected Hegel’s Absolute as “a form of idealist mystification.” Secondly, he asks why I used the term “Absolutes” in the plural. Here one needs to look again at Marx’s 1844 “Critique of the Hegelian Dialectic,” which itself centers around Hegel’s Absolute Knowledge in the *Phenomenology.* Dunayevskaya alone picked up this thread, writing that “nowhere is the historic character of Hegel’s philosophic categories more evident than in Absolute Knowledge” (1989:11), and suggesting that “absolute negativity” was what Marx had singled out in 1844.

In her 1953 letters and in her correspondence with Marcuse, but especially in *Philosophy and Revolution* and after, Dunayevskaya developed her discussion by looking at Absolute Idea in Hegel’s *Science of Logic* and the Absolute Mind in the *Philosophy of Mind* as well as Absolute Knowledge in the *Phenomenology,* seeing each as a distinctive dialectic. In her 1986-87 notes for her new book Dunayevskaya (1988) called our attention to the error of lumping these together.

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