The Forgotten Years of the World Nuclear Disarmament Movement, 1975–78*

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The great upsurge of anti-nuclear activism during the early 1980s is usually traced to either the dangerous Soviet–US nuclear confrontation of that era, or to NATO's December 1979 decision to deploy cruise and Pershing II missiles in Western Europe. In reality, however, the nuclear disarmament campaign began in the preceding years. Despite two earlier waves of anti-nuclear agitation, the once-vigorous citizens' movement for nuclear disarmament was dormant by the early 1970s. But, from 1973 to 1978, a variety of factors converged to awaken disarmament activists from their torpor and to spark their return to anti-nuclear agitation. These included: the end of the Vietnam War, which enabled peace activists to turn their attention elsewhere; the rise of environmental concerns, especially the growing fear of nuclear power; the 1978 UN Special Session on Disarmament, which focused movement and popular attention upon the nuclear arms race; and the erosion of Soviet–US defense. Significantly, this blend of factors included a number that went beyond the reviving Soviet–US nuclear arms race of the 1970s. In this context, the nuclear disarmament movement began to emerge as a political force once again in Western Europe, North America, and the Pacific. It also showed stirrings of life in Eastern Europe and elsewhere. Consequently, although the movement would grow far larger and more effective subsequently, by late 1978 it had created much of the structure that enabled it, in the early 1980s, to pose a substantial challenge to the nuclear policies of the great powers.

Introduction

It is commonly assumed that the revival of the nuclear disarmament movement in the early 1980s reflected a revolt against the dangerous Soviet–US confrontation that flared up during these years. The advent of the Reagan administration, with its commitment to a nuclear weapons buildup and loose talk of nuclear war, accompanied by the Soviet government's war in Afghanistan and its deployment of SS-20 missiles, seemed at that time - and subsequently - to provide sufficient explanation for popular protest. Even sophisticated scholarly studies of the anti-nuclear uprising anchor its history primarily in 1979, the time of NATO's decision to deploy cruise and Pershing II missiles in Western Europe (Carter, 1992: 108–182; Cortright, 1993: 111–115; Meyer, 1990: 74–75). But, in fact, the roots of the anti-nuclear revival go back to developments between 1975 and 1978. During these forgotten years of the nuclear disarmament campaign, nuclear disarmament agitation and organizations grew substantially in Western Europe, North America, and the Pacific. On a smaller scale, anti-nuclear protest emerged in other regions as well. Furthermore, independent and communist-led peace internationals redirected their efforts toward nuclear disarmament ventures. As a result, by 1978 a global campaign against nuclear weapons had re-emerged, laying the

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groundwork for the much larger, more dramatic anti-nuclear upheavals that would follow.

Despite two earlier waves of anti-nuclear protest – the first in the late 1940s and a second in the late 1950s and early 1960s – by the early 1970s relatively little remained of the once turbulent nuclear disarmament campaign. Many of the mass nuclear disarmament organizations of the past had disappeared, including West Germany's Struggle Against Atomic Death, Scandinavia's campaigns against nuclear weapons, Switzerland and France's Movement Against Atomic Armaments, and Canada, Australia, and Ghana's Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament. Others, like Britain's Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND), Canada's Voice of Women, and the USA's Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy (SANE) and Women Strike for Peace (WSP), had dwindled into tiny, marginal groups. In the context of Soviet-US detente – marked by nuclear arms control treaties (e.g. the atmospheric test ban treaty, the non-proliferation treaty, the ABM treaty, and the SALT I treaty) and the apparent end of the Cold War – and the obsession of peace activists with stopping the war in Vietnam, the ongoing nuclear arms race was largely forgotten by the public and by the peace movement (Wittner, 1993, 1997).

Starting in 1975, however, a number of factors converged, thus contributing to the revival of the nuclear disarmament campaign. The end of the Vietnam War that year halted the major drain on the peace movement's energies and resources. With the atmosphere of crisis that had accompanied that bloody war stilled for the moment, peace activists had the opportunity to reassess their priorities. Many concluded that halting the nuclear arms race now had to be placed high on their agenda (Jensen, 1999; Kopreitan, 1999; Musil, 1998; Young, 1999). In addition, the growth of environmental concerns in the 1970s led to a rising public furor over the environmental hazards of nuclear power plants. And this, in turn, rekindled the deep-seated fears of nuclear annihilation felt by activists and the public alike (Provance, 1999; von Hippel, 1999; Walsh, 1978: 746; Weart, 1988: 344, 376). Furthermore, in May 1978, the United Nations began a Special Session on Disarmament. This intergovernmental conference had the effect of calling attention to the problem of the arms race and, at the same time, providing a focus for movement activism (Atwood, 1997: 144–155; Oakes, 1999).

Finally, Soviet–US détente began to deteriorate years before Reagan traded denunciations and nuclear missile threats with Brezhnev, Andropov, and Chernenko. In the mid- to late-1970s, the Soviet government commenced interventionist policies in a number of Third World nations and started deploying a new generation of intermediate-range nuclear missiles, the SS-20s. Considerably more accurate than Soviet missiles of the past and armed with multiple warheads, the SS-20s targeted Western Europe for nuclear destruction far more effectively than ever before. For its part, the Carter administration, despite its desire for better relations with the Soviet Union and for nuclear arms controls, proved incapable of securing either of them. Instead, it came up with a nuclear weapon of its own, an anti-tank missile usually referred to as the neutron bomb. Slated for deployment in Western Europe, the neutron bomb relied upon radiation rather than heat and blast to kill people – a modus operandi that many persons found particularly repugnant (Garthoff, 1985: 536–1005). Not surprisingly, then, movement activity began to revive.

Western Europe

Probably the most significant outbreak of anti-nuclear agitation during these years occurred in the Netherlands. By late 1976,
the Interchurch Peace Council (IKV), a rather placid group established a decade before by the Dutch churches, had concluded that, despite the talk of détente, the nuclear powers were not moving toward the elimination of nuclear weapons but, rather, were continuing the nuclear arms race. Consequently, in September 1977, it embarked on a disarmament campaign epitomized by its new slogan: 'Help rid the world of nuclear weapons; let it begin in the Netherlands'. The assumption was that the denuclearization of the Netherlands would not upset the strategic balance, but would provide a dramatic first step toward worldwide nuclear disarmament (Everts, 1980: 46-50; Faber, 1986; Interkerkelijk Vredesberaad, 1981: 3, 6-14, 22; Interkerkelijk Vredesberaad, 1983). By mid-1978, IKV had organized over 200 local groups around its campaign. Although the Dutch political parties remained wary of this IKV venture, a poll in October showed that it had the support of 58% of the population. IKV played a less prominent role in yet another anti-nuclear campaign launched in late 1977, the 'Halt the Neutron Bomb' movement. With popular outrage widespread at the US plan for building and deploying the new weapon, the Netherlands was swept by fierce anti-neutron bomb activity, including a protest demonstration with 50,000 participants in March 1978 and the delivery of a petition to the Dutch parliament the following month, signed by 1.2 million people (Boeker, 1981; Everts, 1980: 43-44; Salomon, 1986: 115).

The movement also showed a new liveliness in Britain. CND protested against Chinese nuclear testing, called attention to the dangers of nuclear proliferation, and acquired an attractive new leader in 1977, when Monsignor Bruce Kent – a Catholic prelate with strong social convictions – became chair of the organization. Furthermore, in 1975 it also began showing The War Game – a chilling docudrama on nuclear war – to university and other public audiences around the country. Students proved especially interested in the film, which the BBC had banned from television since 1965. Many Britons in these years also were caught up in the campaign against nuclear power plants. Friends of the Earth, an environmentalist group, played a leading role, especially during the Windscale power plant inquiry of 1977. Although, initially, this crusade stayed clear of the nuclear weapons question, the connections between the two nuclear issues, highlighted by CND's participation, enhanced environmentalist and public concern about the Bomb (Oakes, 1999; Stevens, 1983: 78). Even more important, CND launched a spirited campaign against the neutron bomb, turning it into a major issue. Attacking plans for the new weapon, CND produced thousands of leaflets and posters, held meetings and demonstrations, and circulated a petition that drew 161,000 signatures (Kent, 1999). When added to the interest stirred up by the UN Special Session on Disarmament, these factors produced the first significant growth in CND for years. By 1978, although CND still had only 3,220

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1 L. J. Hogesetink to War Resisters League, 24 May 1978, Box 40, David McReynolds Papers, Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Swarthmore, PA (hereafter SCPC).
2 Minutes of the CND National Council meetings of 6 May 1978 and 11 January 1975, Reel 17, CND (Britain) Records, Harvere: reelfilm.
4 Minutes of the CND National Council meetings of 3 April and 6 November 1976, 17 September 1977, and 14 January and 16 December 1978, and Reports of the CND Organizing Secretary, 4 March 6 May and 6 May-15 July 1978, Reel 17, and Report of the CND Organizing Secretary, 4-15 December 1976, Reel 17, CND (Britain) Records.
5 Reports of the CND Organizing Secretary, 6 May-15 July, and 16 December 1978, and minutes of the CND National Council meetings of 14 January, 4 March, 6 May, and 16 December 1978, Reel 17, CND (Britain) Records.
6 Minutes of the CND National Council meetings of 12 March 1977, and 15 July and 12 August 1978, Reel 17, CND (Britain) Records.
members and three-and-a-half paid staff, it claimed 102 local groups, 293 affiliated organizations, and a new dynamism (Minzun & Bolsover, 1983: 150).7

Although the nuclear disarmament movement in West Germany was far less unified and visible, it, too, started to revive. During the 1970s, veterans of the Federal Republic's youthful, left-wing extra-parliamentary opposition began to gravitate into local citizens' initiatives (Bürgerinitiativen), where they continued their anti-establishment activities on a grass-roots level. Many of these citizens' initiatives related to environmental protection, and none proved more dramatic than the struggle against nuclear power. In 1975, storming the nuclear reactor site at Wyhl, some 20,000 activists tore down the surrounding fence and proceeded to occupy it for the next month — organizing study groups, running a 'people's school', and hosting students and other activists from all over Western Europe. In the West German campaign against nuclear power, as elsewhere, the nuclear weapons issue kept peeping through. A popular photo book showed a mushroom cloud rising out of a power plant cooling tower. A key slogan of the activists was: 'Better Active Today than Radioactive Tomorrow!' (Johnstone, 1984: 53; Merkl, 1982: 88; Mushaben, 1985: 30–31; Nelkin & Pollak, 1981: 141–142; Weatt, 1988: 344). Within church circles, as well, there was growing concern about nuclear weapons, fostered in part by the neutron bomb issue and by the activities of IKV in the Netherlands. As a result, two peace groups, Action Reconciliation/Peace Service (Aktion Sühnezeichen/Friedensdienste) among Protestants and Pax Christi among Catholics, decided to address disarmament issues. In 1978, a group of Protestant pacifists — responding to a 1975 critique of the arms race by the World Council of Churches — organized a new peace group, Live Without Armaments (Ohne Rüstung Leben), whose members signed a statement proclaiming that they would henceforth forgo weapons and would work 'to support the political development of the idea of peace without weapons in our country'. Like the protesters against nuclear power, they found themselves drawn into a growing nuclear disarmament campaign (Kubbig & Risse-Kappen, 1984: 72–73; Scharrer, 1985: 277–278).8

Disarmament activism also began to flourish in the Nordic countries. Plans for the neutron bomb touched off a wave of concern in Denmark and, especially, in Norway, where a Campaign Against the Neutron Bomb was formally launched in January 1978. Drawing the support of 20 Norwegian organizations — including nearly all the major political youth groups and a number of peace organizations — the Norwegian campaign protested the development of the bomb and urged the Norwegian government to oppose the weapon's production and deployment in Europe (Grepstad, 1981: 6–8; Sorensen, 1980: 55). The UN Special Session on Disarmament also had a significant impact on peace groups and public opinion throughout the region. In Sweden, it led to the convening of a 'people's parliament' to prepare for the gathering, with participation by the national section of the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF) and other peace organizations. In the wake of the UN conclave, Swedish activists, together with their Danish and Norwegian counterparts, convened a follow-up meeting in Göteborg (Grepstad, 1981: 8; Stähle, 1988: 141; Wiberg, 1986: 15). After the end of the Vietnam War,

7 Reports of the CND Organizing Secretary, 5 November–22 January 1976, 12 March–14 May, and 14 May–9 July 1977, and minutes of the CND National Council meetings of 12 March and 17 September 1977, and 16 September and 16 December 1978; Reed, 17, CND (Britain) Records.

Sweden also experienced a substantial upsurge of activism against nuclear power plants – a campaign that formed the basis for later mobilizations against nuclear weapons. Meanwhile, in Finland, the defunct Committee of 100 – a veteran of the nuclear disarmament crusade of the early 1960s – was revived in late 1976 and 1977. It became the key component of the Finnish Peace Union, which in 1978 began playing a more active role by serving as an umbrella organization for Finland’s small, independent peace organizations (Koddama, 1987: 5–6; Lindkvist, 1990: 159; Taipale, 1987: 20–21, 27–28).

Elsewhere in Western Europe, the movement was also stirring. Reviving in 1975 after the fall of the Greek military dictatorship, the Greek Committee for Nuclear Disarmament and Peace issued a call, signed by prominent personalities, to make the Mediterranean a ‘sea of peace’, free of nuclear weapons. In Italy, the small Radical Party organized a series of anti-militarist marches (Rossi & Ilari, 1985: 142). In Belgium, peace groups mobilized public opinion against the neutron bomb and, led by the National Action Committee for Peace and Development (a coordinating body for French-speaking activists) and inspired by the UN Special Session, turned out 10,000 demonstrators in Brussels during May 1978 around the slogan ‘Disarm to Survive’ (Galand, 1984: 2; Lubelski-Bernard, 1996: 59). The most dramatic upsurge occurred in Turkey, where a broad-based peace organization had never existed. In April 1977, during a time of substantial democratization in Turkish life, the Istanbul Bar Association helped launch the Turkish Peace Association (TPA). Within a short time, the TPA’s governing body consisted of representatives from almost 50 groups, including professional bodies and Turkey’s largest labor, women’s, and youth organizations. In its first year, the TPA held more than 40 public meetings in the country’s major cities, published a monthly journal, and participated in conferences at home and overseas. Campaigning for nuclear disarmament, the TPA sharply criticized the proposal to site the neutron bomb in Turkey’s US and NATO military bases (Furrold, 1983: 5, 9, 11; Mowlam, 1983: 30).

Throughout Western Europe, the only country in which the movement suffered a serious setback was France. For a time, developments there seemed promising enough, with a rising opposition to nuclear power cresting in 1976 and 1977. Assailing the French government’s enthusiasm for nuclear-based energy, some 50,000 protesters turned out in late July 1977 to demonstrate against the French breeder reactor at Malvill (Touraine, 1983: 26; Wear, 1988: 344–345). In other ways, however, the tide was turning against critics of the Bomb. Beginning in 1977, the Socialist and Communist delegates stopped attending meetings of the action committee against French nuclear testing in Polynesia, for both parties had decided to abandon their opposition to nuclear weapons. Their reversal of position was based, in part, upon the existence of the French nuclear weapons program, the force de frappe; in part, on a desire for the foreign policy independence that it provided for France. Their decision also reflected political opportunism, for it would free these proponents of a government of the Left of the charge that they would surrender France to the Soviet Union and would lessen the possibility that the French military, fond of its new weapons, would stage a coup to prevent their taking office. Although leaders of both parties had difficulties selling the new, pro-nuclear position to their rank and file, ultimately it prevailed (Bourdet, 1990: 9–13; Caldwell, 1980: 73–84; END Bulletin, 1981:

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9 Michael Peristerakis, untitled statement of 18 June 1975, Box 21, Series B, War Resisters League Records, SCPC.
North America

Meanwhile, the anti-nuclear movement in the United States was growing. With the Vietnam War at an end, opposition to nuclear weapons became a top issue among pacifists. WILPF renewed its emphasis on disarmament with a number of disarmament seminars in May 1975 and, thereafter, sought to build support for the UN disarmament conference. In 1976, the War Resisters League took the lead in organizing a Continental Walk for Disarmament and Social Justice, in which 'the case for disarmament' was 'taken to the people, town by town'. During the following summer, its national committee voted to make 'Disarmament and Peace Conversion' the highest priority for the next year. In September 1978, War Resisters League members staged simultaneous demonstrations in Red Square and on the White House lawn, where they unfurled banners calling upon the two Cold War antagonists to disarm (Davidson, 1976: 31). Similarly, in early 1978 the Fellowship of Reconciliation national council – after a discussion of nuclear disarmament, the UN special session, and activities at Rocky Flats – voted to 'reaffirm disarmament as our major priority'. The group's magazine, Fellowship, explained: 'Our membership and leadership are agreed that, in view of the accelerating arms race between the US and the USSR and their client states, other programmatic concerns must, for the moment, take second place' (Fellowship, 1978: 15).

As the resources and staff of the American Friends Service Committee (AFSC) dwarfed those of other pacifist groups, its change of priorities was particularly important. Ron Young, then the AFSC peace education secretary, recalled that, with the end of the Vietnam War in 1975, AFSC leaders asked themselves: 'OK, now what do we do?' For older staffors, who had cut their teeth in the anti-nuclear campaign of the late 1950s and early 1960s, the answer was easy: agitate for nuclear disarmament. But younger staffors, whose experience was limited to the intense struggle against the Vietnam War, were somewhat reluctant to return to a disarmament agenda which, initially, they viewed as somewhat old-fashioned and nebulous. Ultimately, however, they accepted it as one of the AFSC's top priorities. Young recalled that, in their eyes, nuclear war was 'what happened to the Vietnamese writ large. If you look at images of Hiroshima, Asian people, and also burned people, buildings down, and whole villages destroyed, there was a carryover'. Consequently, the AFSC stepped up its support for a nationwide campaign against the B-1 bomber, a nuclear-capable weapons system. It also expanded its local organizing efforts against nuclear weapons facilities — efforts that were beginning to take hold (Davidson, 1979: 46; Jensen, 1999; Quaker Service Bulletin, 1989: 7–8; Solo, 1988: 32–33; Young, 1999). In 1975, the Rocky Flats Action Group held its first demonstration, with 25 people. Three years later, it turned out some 6,000 (Nelkin, 1981: 38).

The USA's non-pacifist groups were also gravitating toward a nuclear disarmament agenda. Women Strike for Peace (WSP) demanded a test ban treaty, assailed the neutron bomb, and distributed a brochure entitled 'Human Beings Are An Endangered

10 Dorothy Steffens to Board Members, 2 January 1976, and minutes of the WILPF National Board meeting, 8–10 April 1978, Box 25, Series A.2, WILPF Records, SCPC.
12 Minutes of the FOR National Council meeting, 16–19 April 1978, Box 8, Series A–2, FOR Records, SCPC.
13 'Fact Sheet on History of Rocky Flats Campaign', Box 1, AFSC-Rocky Flats Project Records, University of Colorado, Boulder, CO.
Species'. It also petitioned President Carter — whom, at the outset of his administration, it rather liked — to enter into negotiations to end the arms race (Litterine, 1978; Taylor, 1998: 111, 117–120). Clergy and Laity Concerned, faced with developing a new focus after the Vietnam War, plunged not only into the campaign against the B-1 bomber, but into opposition to nuclear facilities and nuclear weapons (Jensen, 1999). Similarly, the US branch of Pax Christi, founded in 1973 and reorganized in 1975, produced newsletters and other publications that dealt principally with nuclear issues (Fehey, 1980: 61–63; Musto, 1986: 260).

Meanwhile, the Center for Defense Information — organized by retired US military officers disillusioned with the nuclear arms race — played an active role in opposing the B-1 bomber, criticizing the neutron bomb, and promoting a nuclear test ban (Carroll, 2000).

As for SANE, in the aftermath of the Vietnam War it denounced the Ford administration’s nuclear policies, publicly protested China’s atmospheric nuclear tests, and, in testimony before the platform committee at the 1976 Democratic National Convention, assailed ‘strategic arms competition and nuclear proliferation’. Quoting the party’s presidential candidate, Jimmy Carter, it demanded ‘control, then reduction, and ultimately, elimination of nuclear arsenals’. Like WSR, SANE found Carter an appealing candidate and nearly endorsed him — though an endorsement would not have counted for much for, at the time, SANE had little weight in US politics. When David Corthright became executive director the following year, the disarmament group was at a low point organizationally, with only about 4,000 members. But it gradually began to revive, assisted by the public furor over the neutron bomb, the growing concern about nuclear power, and a closer relationship with organized labor (Corthright, 1993: 7; Corthright, 1987; Gottlieb, 1998; Musil, 1998).

Anti-nuclear activities were also heating up within the US scientific community. Led by its new director, Jeremy Stone, the Federation of American Scientists (FAS) engaged in vigorous efforts to defend Andrei Sakharov. Arranging for a meeting with the dissident Soviet physicist, the FAS pressed the Soviet government for Sakharov’s inclusion in Pugwash meetings and, pending his better treatment, organized a boycott by individual scientists of Soviet scientific events. In addition, warning against ‘throwing the baby out with the bath’, the FAS issued a vigorous challenge to the US government’s ‘linkage’ of a SALT II agreement to Soviet behavior in other areas (Stone, 1999: 150–161; Stone, 1978: 38–39). Although the rapidly growing Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS), organized a few years earlier, emphasized the issue of nuclear reactor safety, in 1978 it issued a ‘Declaration on the Nuclear Arms Race’. Calling for US initiatives to halt the production of nuclear weapons, this declaration was signed by thousands of scientists, engineers, and other professionals (Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 1978: 8–10; Davidon, 1979: 45; Meyer, 1988: 118). Meanwhile, pointing to the ‘rough strategic nuclear parity’ between the United States and the Soviet Union, the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists suggested that the US government simply ‘stop the race in accumulation of new weapons and weapon delivery systems’, on a temporary basis, to see if the Soviet Union would follow its example (Feld, 1977: 9).

Many of these groups, plus others,
worked together amicably in the Coalition for a New Foreign and Military Policy, the successor to the Vietnam-era Coalition to Stop Funding the War. For the most part, the new Coalition served as the congressional lobbying arm of the US peace movement. During these years, it focused especially on the congressional passage of 'transfer amendments' that would shift billions of dollars in federal funding from military to social programs. In this way, it was hoped, organizations focused on expanding the nation's health, housing, education, mass transit, and welfare facilities would join with critics of the arms race to limit the Pentagon's expensive weapons programs. Although Congress repeatedly rejected these 'transfer amendments', they did draw substantial support from liberal legislators (Gottlieb, 1998). In addition, in 1976, peace organizations formed an Ad Hoc Working Group for Disarmament that, in early 1977, became the Coalition's Disarmament Working Group. By mid-1978, this Washington-based Disarmament Working Group consisted of more than 40 national religious, labor, peace, research, and social action organizations (Arwood, 1997: 144).

For the time being, the biggest joint disarmament project taken on by US peace groups was the campaign against the B-1 bomber. By the end of 1975, the AFSC's Terry Provance had organized Stop the B-1 Bomber groups in 180 US cities. Meanwhile, in Washington, the AFSC had drawn together a broad coalition of groups to lobby against the weapons program, ranging from peace groups like WSP, the FAS, and the Council for a Livable World, to Environmental Action and Common Cause. Although the Republican president, Gerald Ford, faced with primary challenges from the hawkish Ronald Reagan, put himself clearly on record as favoring the B-1, Carter seemed more open to influence. Consequently, peace activists bird-dogged him at every campaign stop, pressing him to scrap plans for the nuclear bomber. Meanwhile, thanks to movement lobbying, many Democrats in Congress came out against the weapon. As a result, during the Democratic primaries, Carter committed himself to opposing the B-1 — a position that, despite later equivocation on his part, activists did not let him forget. Shortly after Carter's election victory, they held a vigil outside his home in Plains, Georgia. And two days after Carter's inauguration as president, activists staged anti-B-1 demonstrations in 145 cities, including Washington, DC. 'If Carter builds the B-1, it will be a breach of faith', a WILPF activist declared. With 33 national organizations working against the B-1 during early 1977, the White House was flooded with telephone calls, letters, and appeals, including an anti-B-1 petition signed by mayors of 29 cities (Isaacs, 1999; Kox, 1988: 140–160; Provance, 1999).

US peace groups also worked together on the 1978 UN Special Session on Disarmament. Recognizing its potential for mobilizing public opinion and changing public policy, US and overseas disarmament groups promoted public awareness of the event, met together frequently, issued disarmament proposals, lobbied government officials, and even hosted seminars on disarmament for the official UN delegations from small nations. On 27 May, they staged a march through Manhattan and rally for nuclear disarmament outside the United Nations buildings that drew an estimated 15,000 to 20,000 people — probably the largest disarmament demonstration up to that point in US history (Arwood, 1997: 144–155; Arwood, 1999; Ballantyne,
Although the UN Special Session did not lead to a breakthrough in the realm of public policy, it secured an agreement by the United Nations that the arms race jeopardized the security of all nations, substantially enhanced the role of disarmament NGOs in UN affairs, focused the energies of disparate groups, and raised public consciousness. Furthermore, from the standpoint of peace groups, the UN Special Session produced an excellent ‘Final Document’ — the result, in part, of their lobbying — which championed thereafter (Arwood, 1997: 147–149, 152–155; Ballantyne, 1999).

This new concern with disarmament intersected with rising US activism against nuclear power. Organized by the Clamshell Alliance, thousands of anti-nuclear demonstrators staged a nonviolent occupation of the Seabrook, New Hampshire nuclear reactor site in April of 1977, leading to 1,400 arrests. Most of the arrested refused bail, and had to be held in jail for days or weeks. This dramatic incident led to the appearance of similar anti-nuclear power groups in other regions, including the Catfish Alliance in Alabama, the Oystershell Alliance in New Orleans, the Cactus Alliance in Utah and Arizona, and the Abalone Alliance in California. The struggle at Seabrook was now re-enacted nationwide. Although, superficially, this was an environmental movement, the underlying reality was that many of the activists viewed nuclear reactors as merely extensions of nuclear weapons. Bumper stickers, books, and buttons depicted nuclear power as the ‘silent bomb’, while activists referred to both nuclear reactors and nuclear weapons simply as ‘nukes’. The graphics used in the campaign also emphasized the nuclear connection: mushroom clouds rising from reactor cooling towers, or a reactor shaped like an egg cracking and giving birth to the Bomb (Davidson, 1979: 45; Nelkin, 1981: 36; Sweet, 1978: 53; Walsh, 1978: 746; Wasserman, 1979: 3–150).

The underlying revulsion against nuclear weapons can also be seen in the backgrounds of individual activists. Randy Kehler, one of those arrested at Seabrook, recalled that nuclear war ‘was the shadow that hung over my life’ since the early 1960s. Helen Caldicott, an Australian physician who moved to the United States in the late 1970s and produced a cutting critique of nuclear power (Nuclear Madness), recalled that she had ‘grown up with the fear of imminent annihilation by nuclear holocaust’; consequently, she had become a leader in the campaigns against French nuclear testing and Australian uranium mining (Caldicott, 1979: 3; Caldicott, 1999; Kehler, 1999). Peter Bergel, a leader in the occupations of the Trojan nuclear power plant site outside Pordland, had opposed nuclear weapons testing as a college student in the 1960s and, during the 1970s, had wanted to sail a ship into the French nuclear testing zone. Frank von Hippel, a physicist who produced devastating studies of nuclear reactor safety, was the grandson of James Franck, one of the earliest critics of the Bomb. He recalled that he had ‘always focused on nuclear weapons issues’, but ‘didn’t become active until I ... became involved ... in the nuclear energy issue’. A key reason for assailing nuclear reactors at this time was that, by contrast to the weapons, banning them seemed feasible. As one critic of nuclear power observed: ‘I can’t do anything about bombs, but I can do something about reactors.’ Bergel regarded stopping nuclear power as ‘a winnable issue, which was one of
the things I liked about it' (Bergel, 1999; Nelkin, 1981: 36; von Hippel, 1999; Weart, 1988: 323).

The kinship of the two campaigns was recognized by a new organization that united them in a nationwide movement: Mobilization for Survival. Organized at an April 1977 gathering in Philadelphia by representatives of 49 organizations, mostly peace and anti-nuclear power groups, Mobilization for Survival was officially launched in mid-year around four goals: ‘Zero Nuclear Weapons’; ‘Ban Nuclear Power’; ‘Stop the Arms Race’; and ‘Fund Human Needs’. As might be expected, the first two proved the most important foci of its subsequent activities. That August, in commemoration of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings, the Mobilization sponsored more than a hundred public gatherings. In the fall, it organized over two hundred teach-ins across the country; though some drew as few as thirty people, many attracted hundreds, and at least two (in Boston and San Francisco) drew more than a thousand participants. By the time of its first nationwide conference in December, the Mobilization claimed 330 affiliates, many of them small but militant groups formed to campaign against nuclear power plants. Assailing the idea of peaceful nuclear power, Caldicott warned the gathering: ‘Every country that builds a nuclear reactor can build a bomb.’ In May 1978, the Mobilization played the central role in organizing the demonstration at the UN Special Session on Disarmament (Moore, 1981: 61).20

Although the impact of these developments upon the broader society was modest, they did contribute to a fairly dovish mood. Between March 1975 and March 1978, polls found that the percentage of Americans favoring increased military spending never topped 29%. In 1977 and 1978, some three-quarters of the population approved of a nuclear test ban treaty. And, in July 1978, a Harris poll found that 71% of respondents favored a SALT II treaty. Only on the issue of deploying the neutron bomb was there an even split in popular sentiment (Den Oudsten, 1988; Gallup, 1979: 181–182; Public Attitudes, 1998: 20).21 In Congress, a substantial bloc of liberal Democrats challenged Pentagon priorities. Some of them, like US Senator George McGovern, of South Dakota, had warm relations with peace groups.22 In 1976, when President Ford requested funding to start production of the B-1 bomber, these Congressional Democrats passed a measure drawn up by the Stop the B-1 Bomber Campaign and its close Congressional allies to block action. Though not killing the project, it delayed a decision on production until the following year, when many hoped that a Democratic President would slay the B-1 dragon (Kotz, 1988: 146–50; Provance, 1999).

This seemed quite possible. During his 1976 campaign, the Democratic Presidential candidate, Jimmy Carter, not only proclaimed his opposition to the B-1, but called for curbs on nuclear power and proliferation, a comprehensive nuclear test ban, and movement toward the elimination of all nuclear weapons. In part, these positions reflected Carter’s humane, religious convictions, which led him to believe that mass killing was immoral. In addition, his experience as a nuclear engineer gave him a sophisticated understanding of nuclear

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21 'The Harris Survey' (10 July 1978), 'Harris Polls Folder', Box 3, Office of the Assistant to the President for Communications Records, Jimmy Carter Library, Atlanta, GA.

22 See, for example, McGovern to Ethel Taylor, 22 June and 19 December 1978, Box 1, Series A,8, WSP Records.
dangers (Brezinski, 1999; Carter, 1976: 8–14; Warske, 1999). But Carter's dovish stands on nuclear issues also reflected his interaction with Democratic Party and peace activists that year. During the primaries, he recalled, small groups of people met with him, and 'I listened to . . . their suggestions about . . . defense matters, what they were concerned about in SALT and non-proliferation. So I began to expand my mind a little bit further.' 23 In addition, Carter became a good friend that year of Harold Wollens, a California businessman who had long been a vigorous opponent of nuclear weapons and a staunch supporter of peace groups. Wollens recalled that Carter 'was very anxious to have me become a spokesman for him because he was not well-known among Northern progressives'. In private, they discussed the dangers of the nuclear arms race at length, and, according to Wollens, Carter 'was really a soulmate'. Shortly after Carter's election, the president-elect invited Wollens and his dovish associate, the actor Paul Newman, to meet with him in Washington. Here, over dinner, Wollens noted, 'we talked a lot about what . . . Carter could do as President' to curb the nuclear menace. 'And he . . . made certain commitments' (Wollens, 2000: Wollens, 1978: 7).

The nuclear disarmament campaign also began to gather momentum in Canada. With the Vietnam War at an end, the Voice of Women (VOW), like so many other peace groups, joined the struggle against nuclear power, which in the Canadian case meant opposing the manufacture, promotion, and sale of Canadian reactors abroad. However, as the UN Special Session approached, it focused more directly on the nuclear arms race. VOW sent a substantial delegation to New York City for the event, at which it lobbied, discussed disarmament strategy with its overseas counterparts, and demonstrated. 24 The UN Special Session also helped set the priorities of a new Canadian peace organization. During 1976, religious pacifists and experts on Third World economic development began discussions on the relationship between disarmament and development. On 1 January 1977, they launched Project Ploughshares, a study and action group whose name was taken from the biblical verse that spoke of the beating of swords into ploughshares and spears into pruning hooks. The Canadian Council of Churches found the venture attractive and, in the middle of that year, adopted Project Ploughshares, whose sponsorship and funding henceforth came from 12 church and civic groups. Although the peace organization initially critiqued aspects of the Canadian military budget, the advent of the UN Special Session redirected its energies toward highlighting the Soviet–US arms race (Newman, 1999: 47–48). 25

Pacific Island Nations

Although the Australian nuclear disarmament movement had less public presence during these years than the North American, it, too, was reviving. In part, this revival, like the flushes of activity in Western Europe and North America, emerged obliquely, thanks to the growth of widespread public opposition to uranium mining. Indeed, the campaign against uranium mining was the Australian counterpart to the campaign against nuclear power in Western Europe and the United States. In this uranium-rich country, critics of uranium mining pointed

24 Donna Elliott to the Membership, VOW, November 1975, VOW Newsletter (August 1978), and 'Statement of the Voice of Women . . . to the United Nations Special Session of the General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament', VOW Records, SCPC.
25 'Summary of the History of Project Ploughshares', Project Ploughshares Records, Conrad Grebel College, Waterloo, ON, Canada.
out that it caused radioactive contamination of the environment, encouraged the growth of dangerous nuclear reactors, and provided the raw material for the building of nuclear weapons. Launched in 1975 by environmentalists, peace activists, and assorted radicals, the crusade against uranium mining was soon loosely coordinated by a National Uranium Moratorium Campaign. By 1977, the campaign had become a mass movement, with frequent demonstrations held by a far-flung network of local groups. It also won the backing of the Australian Labor Party and of many unions, whose members recognized all too well what uranium mining did to workers. As Caldicott quipped: ‘They were more concerned about their testicles than their jobs’ (Burgmann, 1993: 195–198; Caldicott, 1999; Camilleri, 1979: 40–44; Summy & Saunders, 1987: 33–35). In addition, more direct disarmament activity emerged in connection with the UN Special Session. In April 1978, peace groups convened ‘Australian People’s Disarmament’ conferences in Melbourne and Sydney. Meanwhile, the Australian Peace Liaison Committee circulated an ‘Australian Disarmament Declaration’ setting out ‘seven concrete ways in which Australia could contribute to halting the arms race’. These methods included fostering a treaty to ban the use of nuclear weapons and halting the mining and export of uranium (Summy & Saunders, 1987: 38–39).26

In New Zealand, public protest developed over the visits of US nuclear-armed and nuclear-powered warships. From 1973 to 1975, New Zealand’s Labour government had banned such visits. But pressure from the US government to resume them led, in mid-1975, to the idea of Peace Squadrons, small flotillas of private boats that would block the entry of nuclear warships into New Zealand’s harbors. Their originator was the Rev. George Armstrong, a peace activist and theologian who launched the venture in Auckland that October. It would be ‘a creative, affirmative, non-violent action’, he said – ‘a symbolic gesture of resistance to the destruction of humanity’ and something that ‘could make New Zealand an island of sanity in an ocean of peace’. Their commitment was soon tested, for, the following month, Labour was defeated at the polls by the conservative National Party, which reinstituted visits by the nuclear warships. Anticipating difficulties in Auckland, the government arranged for the first US nuclear warship, the *Trident*, to arrive at Wellington. It was met there by a small Wellington Peace Squadron, as well as by a union ban on the waterfront, which prevented it from berthing. In October 1976, when the US nuclear cruiser *Long Beach* arrived at Auckland, a more substantial Peace Squadron of some 150 small yachts, dinghies, canoes, and kayaks obstructed its passage, as did individual surfboarders, flying the nuclear disarmament symbol (Clements, 1988: 108–110; Landais-Stamp & Rogers, 1989: 20; Newnham, 1986: 8, 11–19).27

Attracting very substantial publicity in New Zealand and overseas, Peace Squadron activism continued thereafter, increasingly setting the terms for public debate. In early 1978, a fleet of 100 protest vessels met the US nuclear submarine *Pintado*. Although navy and police vessels and helicopters managed to disrupt the peace flotilla, capsizing several protest boats, the event produced dramatic confrontations. The commander of the *Pintado*, disturbed by the sight of a mother cradling a baby in her arms in a small protest craft before the ship’s bow, told the press: ‘She was holding that baby to her, and I’ll never forget the way she looked at me… We were like that for 30 seconds –

26 'Appeal from the Australian People's Disarmament Conference' (April 1978), Australian Peace Liaison Committee Records, SCPC.

27 ‘Peace Squadrons’, CND (New Zealand) Records, SCPC.
30 years - who knows? It seemed a long time. With the announcement by the government of another nuclear submarine visit, Friends of the Earth, Greenpeace, New Zealand CND, the New Zealand Foundation for Peace Studies, and the Auckland branch of the United Nations Association joined the Peace Squadrons in seeking a supreme court injunction to block it. The leader of the Labour opposition, Bill Rowling, charged that the National Party was making New Zealand 'a doormat for the larger powers. . . . New Zealand should not be sucked into their war games'. Committing the Labour Party to the struggle for a nuclear-free Pacific, he declared that the region provided 'the last remaining opportunity to take a stand against the escalation of the arms race' (Clements, 1988: 111–113; Newnham, 1986: 22–36).

These events added momentum to the emerging nuclear-free movement throughout the Pacific. In early April 1975, thanks primarily to the efforts of Fiji's anti-nuclear group, ATOM, as well as to anti-nuclear organizations in New Zealand, Tahiti, Australia, and France, 88 delegates representing 85 organizations in 20 Pacific and two European countries met in Suva, Fiji, for a week-long Conference for a Nuclear Free Pacific. Discussing the French government's use of Mururoa for nuclear testing, the US government's use of Micronesia for nuclear testing and nuclear weapons bases, and other great-power uses of the region for their military purposes, the conference agreed 'that racism, colonialism, and imperialism lie at the core of . . . the activities of the nuclear powers in the Pacific. The Pacific peoples and their environment continue to be exploited because Pacific Islanders are considered insignificant in numbers and inferior as people.' This emphasis barely pandered over a division in the movement between those emphasizing nuclear issues (usually from predominantly white nations) and those emphasizing independence issues (usually from predominantly non-white colonies or recent colonies). Even so, the conference did launch the Nuclear Free Pacific Movement, with a People's Charter that called for prohibiting the tests of nuclear weapons and delivery systems; the presence of such weapons, support systems, or bases, nuclear reactors and waste storage; and uranium mining. In 1978, the movement held another international conference at Ponape, in the Caroline Islands. Although this gathering, like the one in 1975, was plagued by the difficulty of reconciling anti-nuclear and independence emphases, the delegates did endorse a new People's Treaty for a Nuclear-Free Pacific. The latter charged that 'our environment continues to be despoiled by foreign powers developing nuclear weapons for a strategy of warfare that has no winners, no liberators, and imperils the survival of all humankind' (Bedford, 1990: 20–21; Scheiner, 1987: 9).

In Japan, too, the movement was on the upswing. Soka Gakkai, a peace-oriented Buddhist group, held anti-nuclear exhibitions in Japan's cities and gathered 10 million signatures on petitions calling for the abolition of nuclear weapons. Increasing numbers of Japanese people visited the Hiroshima and Nagasaki peace memorials, which, by the end of 1978, had attracted more than 38 million visitors (Committee for the Compilation of Materials, 1981: 605). Furthermore, the growing use of nuclear reactors in Japan stirred widespread resistance (Kamata & Salaff, 1982: 49; The Meaning of Survival, 1983: 259; Wasserman,

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29 'Summary of Soka Gakkai and Daisaku Ikeda, A Ten-Point Proposal on Nuclear Disarmament (1977), p. 6, Soka Gakkai International Records, SCPG.
1979: 166–174). The most important factor behind the anti-nuclear revival, however, was the shift toward greater unity in the sharply divided nuclear disarmament movement, spurred on by the entreaties of non-political citizens’ anti-nuclear groups and by the approach of the UN Special Session. In May 1977, the two major anti-nuclear organizations, Gensuikyo and Gensuikin, agreed to hold a united world conference against atomic and hydrogen bombs, to establish a united delegation for the UN conclave, and to work toward organizational unity. Although the 1977 world conference proved a mixed success and tensions persisted between the two anti-nuclear organizations, Japanese activists considered the UN Special Session a great success. Not only did Japan’s 500-member peace delegation provide the largest overseas contingent, but it presented a nuclear abolition petition to the UN with nearly 19 million signatures, and came away delighted by the official UN declaration. When Gensuikyo and Gensuikin held another united world conference in Hiroshima on 6 August 1978, the gathering attracted the participation of numerous citizen action groups that had abandoned these kinds of meetings 15 years before (Akamatsu, 1999; Anzai, 1999; Koschmann, n.d.: 16–18; The Meaning of Survival, 1983: 253, 255, 259).

Elsewhere

In other portions of the world, however, the nuclear disarmament movement remained far weaker. Latin America – located on the outer fringes of the Soviet–US nuclear arms race and plagued by repressive governments – experienced very little anti-nuclear activity during these years, although a small group in Brazil did seek to combat its government’s moves toward developing nuclear weapons. In the Middle East and Africa, where conditions were similar, the movement remained somnolent.

Although the communist nations of Eastern Europe also had governments that severely circumscribed the opportunities for protest ventures, they were considerably closer to the front lines of the East–West nuclear confrontation. Thus, given the looming possibility of nuclear war, as well as links with Western activists, small-scale anti-nuclear activity did emerge there. In a message dispatched to the fall 1975 Pugwash symposium on ‘New Designs for Complete Nuclear Disarmament’, Andrei Sakharov pointed out that he shared the views of participants that ‘the problems of disarmament have an evident priority over other problems confronting mankind now’. Indeed, he favored ‘the total prohibition of nuclear weaponry’ through step-by-step measures. In general, Soviet scientists, sensitized by the Pugwash conferences and their reading of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, provided an anti-nuclear constituency (Evangelista, 1999: 39, 89; Sakharov, 1975: 8–9), as did Soviet ‘hippies’, who staged anti-military protests or gathered for discussions of peacemaking (Alexeyeva, 1988: 4; Iluhkina & Pavlova, 1995: 5). Even within the narrow confines of the Communist Party, reformers defended disarmament against what they called ‘Stalinist conservatism’. In articles published in 1978, Georgi Arbatov argued that there would be no winners in a nuclear war and that ‘no one will return’ from one – statements that rankled in official circles (Arbatov, 1992: 144, 243; English, 2000: 150–157).

Dissent from the official ‘peace through strength’ position also began to appear in communist East Germany. In June 1978, an


announcement by Education Minister Margot Honecker of a government plan to introduce defense studies into the ninth- and tenth-grade curriculum touched off major protests by parents, youth groups, and members of the clergy. The Evangelical Church sent a letter to its parishes urging strong opposition to the measure and, in addition, set up Peace Education initiatives at parish and regional levels. These stirrings of dissent were encouraged by the rise of the West European nuclear disarmament movement. Watching the Western anti-nuclear demonstrations on West German television broadcasts, which could be viewed equally well in most of East Germany, many citizens of the German Democratic Republic, and especially the young, were favorably impressed. Furthermore, since 1977, the Evangelical Church had been widening its contacts with the major anti-nuclear group in the Netherlands, the Inter-Church Peace Council (Allen, 1989: 96–98; Dreisahl, 1999; Mleczkowski, 1983: 187; Tismancanu, 1990: 11).

The Peace Movement
Internationals: Independent and Communist

During these years, the independent peace internationals, reflecting the ferment in their own national sections, began to place more emphasis on nuclear issues. At the April 1977 council meeting of the War Resisters’ International (WRI), David McReynolds of America’s War Resisters League, pointing to the growing demonstrations and the forthcoming UN special session, persuaded the organization to give a high priority to disarmament, with nuclear disarmament as the first step. The following year, at its July meeting, the WRI council added opposition to nuclear energy to the organization’s agenda, citing “the inevitable link between the production of nuclear power and nuclear weapons.” The faith-based internationals, ranging from the World Conference on Religion and Peace to the International Fellowship of Reconciliation, confronted the nuclear issue as well. In a statement issued on 6 August 1977, the 32nd anniversary of the Hiroshima bombing, Pax Christi International called on “all governments of the world to immediately disarm all existing nuclear weapons and to discontinue the development of even more terrible weapons of destruction.” That same month, as scientists and scholars from around the world gathered for the 27th meeting of the Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs, the organization’s governing council warned of new weapons of mass destruction, nuclear proliferation, and the impasse in nuclear arms control. It therefore called on the leaders of concerned governments, particularly those of the United States and the USSR, ‘to halt new weapons deployment and reverse the arms race and on men and women everywhere to redouble their efforts to make their governments understand and act in the face of our common peril’ (Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 1977: 6).

For the time being, however, these international peace organizations had little power to implement their recommendations. Not only were they divided by constituency, but their resources were quite minimal. After the end of the Vietnam War, the

32 Minutes of the WRI council meeting of 4–11 April 1977, Box 31, “Policy suggestions; David McReynolds, elected member, Council” (April 1977), Box 38, Recommendations made, decisions taken, and resolutions passed at WRI council meeting of 10–14 July 1978, Box 39, WRI Records.


34 Minutes of the WRI council meeting of 4–11 April 1977, Box 31, and Devi Prasad, ‘Message to the WRI Council Meeting (June 1976), Box 37, WRI Records; Joe Forest to executive staff, 29 July 1975, Box 21, Series B, War Resisters League Records.
International Confederation for Disarmament and Peace, with its roots in the anti-nuclear campaign of the early 1960s and its broad mix of constituencies, had the potential for drawing these scattered groups together into a powerful disarmament movement. And it did show a renewed interest in nuclear disarmament, particularly with the approach of the UN Special Session (Oakes, 1999; Young, 1999). But, instead of rebuilding this languishing organization, leading activists sought to create a new one. On 6 August 1977, the establishment of an International Mobilization for Survival was announced at press conferences held simultaneously in Stockholm, Washington, San Francisco, and Hiroshima. In a joint statement, the top leaders of the ICDP, the IFOR, WILPF, the WRI, Pax Christi, the World Council of Churches, and other groups called upon ‘the people of every nation to mobilize for survival’, to ‘require their governments to move beyond the rhetoric of disarmament toward concrete action’. They concluded: ‘Let the year ahead be a time of determined actions toward the abolition of all nuclear weapons and the end of the arms race. Let the year ahead affirm our common humanity and our ability to solve our differences peacefully.’ Nevertheless, although the new international maintained reasonably good momentum through the meeting of the UN Special Session, during which it hosted strategy sessions and the mass public rally in New York City, it remained a short-term, consultative venture rather than a long-term, structured organization. After the UN events, it disintegrated, leaving its US namesake as the sole survivor of the 1977–78 upsurge.

Unlike its independent rivals, the communist-led World Peace Council seemed quite able to provide international coordination for its sector of the world peace movement. In June 1975, with the Vietnam War at an end, the WPC launched a mass petition campaign called the New Stockholm Appeal, which demanded an end to the arms race. Eventually, the WPC claimed to have obtained 450 million signatures on this statement. The WPC also threw itself into the anti-neutron bomb campaign – one that, with its emphasis upon the fiendishness of an exclusively US weapon, possessed particular appeal for these pro-Soviet activists. ‘The mobilization of the public of the world against the neutron bomb is the central question of the fight for peace’, observed WPC vice president Albert Norden. Beating the drum for global protest, the WPC called upon the people of the world to unite and ‘say “No” to the US government’s “horror-bomb”’ (Peace Courier, 1977a: 1–2, 1977b: 1–2). In addition, the WPC championed the UN Special Session on Disarmament, declaring that the WPC ‘and the national organizations in it from more than 130 countries of the world will do their best to mobilize public opinion’ to ‘ensure that the Special Session achieves its full potentials’.

In fact, however, the WPC was a much less effective organization than it appeared. Its strongest and most powerful affiliates existed in Soviet bloc nations, where they were bolstered by the enormous power of party

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35 Minutes of the ICDP executive committee, 4 and 5 February 1977, Box 53, Series G, SANE Records.
37 Sylvia Kushner to Dear Friend, [1975], and WPC, ‘Declaration on Disarmament’ (January 1978), Mark Solomon Papers, West Newton, MA; N. Yoshinari, ‘Note to Secretariat: Preliminary ideas for the draft programme of the WPC for 1976’ (ca. late 1975), 93.456, Deutscher Freundesrat Records, Federal Archives, Berlin.
39 WPC, ‘Declaration on Disarmament’ (January 1978), Solomon Papers.
and state. Certainly, this accounted for the vast number of signatures on the New Stockholm Appeal. In Hungary, the Hungarian Peace Council claimed to have obtained 7.5 million signatures, a figure not much smaller than the population of that nation. But, outside of these friendly environs, the WPC could rarely field a significant peace group; indeed, many WPC affiliates existed only on paper. The world peace conferences of the WPC drew massive attendance because they provided free airline tickets, room, and board to people around the world who — often lacking any organizational base in their homelands — availed themselves of the opportunity for an all-expenses-paid junket to Soviet bloc nations. Even some WPC officials recognized that this procedure created a phantom movement, without significant roots in individual nations (Prince, 1999; Solomon, 1999). Furthermore, the Vietnam War, which had provided the most popular boost to the WPC in its history, came to an end, thus leading to a considerable loss of momentum in the WPC (Prince, 1999; Taipale, 1987: 34).

In addition, despite the overlapping concern with disarmament issues, independent and communist activists were far apart on other issues and, as a consequence, remained suspicious of one another. In contrast to the WPC’s adoration of the Soviet Union and its leaders (Turski & Zdanowski, 1976: 104), independent peace groups not only freely criticized the militarism of both Cold War blocs, but persistently criticized human rights violations. As a result of these and other incompatibilities, even in those few independent organizations where Communist Party activists had secured a foothold, they soon lost it. In Britain, CND’s dwindling membership during the early 1970s had magnified the influence of the small number of communists within the organization, and a few even emerged as CND leaders. But, in 1977, with CND undergoing a growth spurt, non-communists began to shoulder them aside (Ceadel, 1985: 226; Jones, 1998; Kent, 1990, 1999; Taylor, 1987: 170–173). For its part, the WPC did not much like independent groups. Challenging that Mobilization for Survival was no more than a CIA front, WPC President Romesh Chandra waged a fierce public campaign against it (Provance, 1999). On other occasions, the WPC joined with local communist cadres to encourage the development of competing organizations with a pro-Soviet perspective (Prince, 1999).

Conclusion

Thus, between 1975 and 1978, a nuclear disarmament campaign once more began to take shape across substantial portions of the globe. In addition to items unique to particular nations, important global developments played the key role in this revival: the end of the Vietnam War; the rise of environmentalism; the meeting of the UN Special Session on Disarmament; and the deterioration of Soviet–US détente. This blend of causative factors includes an international danger that certainly helped set the movement on course: the escalating Soviet–US nuclear arms race. Without it, the anti-nuclear campaign probably would have continued in the doldrums. Even so, as some

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40 Ilona Sebestyén to Dear Friends, January 1977, Hungarian Peace Council Records, SCPC.
41 ‘The WRI & Dissent in Eastern Europe’ (10 April 1977), and ‘Human Rights in the Socialist Countries’ (April 1977), Box 88, WRI Records; Bernard Cardinal Alfrink to Gustav Husák, 19 October 1977, and ‘Statement by Pax Christi International concerning the case of Joeri Olov’ (31 May 1976), Pax Christi International (Netherlands) Records, SCPC.
42 Minutes of WRI executive committee meeting of 20–21 May 1978, Box 31, WRI Records.
43 Frances Williams et al. to delegates of the conference to found the US Organizing Committee for the World Peace Council, 20 October 1976; and Sandy Pollack to Dear Friend, 29 March 1978, Solomon Papers.
scholars have suggested (Gleditsch, 1990: 76–80; Salomon, 1986: 115–127), factors other than the reviving Soviet–US confrontation contributed to the rise of this movement. As this account indicates, they include environmental concerns, the redirection of the peace constituency, and the political opportunities afforded the movement by external events (such as the UN special session). Nor is this surprising. While addressing their professed goals, social movements also draw upon whatever related concerns and opportunities are available to them. In this fashion, they broaden their appeal and influence.

Of course, despite its resurgence, the nuclear disarmament campaign remained fairly weak in 1978, and few could predict that it had much of a future. After all, in many nations, the anti-nuclear movement barely existed or did not exist at all. And even where it was beginning to develop a substantial presence, it dissipated its slender resources and energies among scattered projects. Furthermore, international coordination of the movement was almost entirely lacking—except, of course, from the World Peace Council, which most of the new, non-communist activists considered hopelessly one-sided. Nevertheless, after years of dormancy, public agitation against nuclear weapons was once again on the upswing. And some of the key organizations that would participate in the vast upsurge of protest in the early 1980s were now in place. All that was necessary to transform this emerging movement into a mass phenomenon was an exhibition of reckless behavior by the nuclear powers—and, given their obsession with strengthening their ability to fight and win a nuclear war, they would soon provide it (Wittner, 2003).

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