

LUKÁCS, MARCUSE AND AFTER

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Let me begin in *medias res*. As is well known, the term “romantic anti-capitalism” was coined by Georg Lukács when describing his youthful anti-capitalist attitude. To be sure, it is possible to establish a historical continuity with regard to Romanticism that has begun with the Schlegel-Novalis generation, continued with the young Marx and then with Toennies right up to the beginning of the 20th century, that is, to Georg Lukács and Ernst Bloch. After a break in the 1930s and 1940s, it reappeared in the most recent wave, the generation of the 1960s.¹

Within the framework of this paper I cannot go into the controversies regarding a definition of Romanticism; however, some basic themes or concerns can be identified, such as: alienation, a longing for *Gemeinschaft*, concern with nature, and a critique of science-technology. In political terms, it can go left or right; for example, both Communism and fascism contained elements of Romanticism. (Henry Pachter was surely thinking of such ambivalence when he called Lukács “an orthodox heretic and Stalinist romantic.”)² Michael Löwy, discusses Lukács’s case at some length in a paper, entitled, “Naphta or Settembrini — Lukács and Romantic Anti-Capitalism.”³ Indeed, romantic anti-capitalism may be the key to the understanding of the young Lukács and his conversion to Marxism. *Die Seele und die Formen* and *Die Theorie des Romans* and other early essays in Hungarian and his correspondence document his preoccupation with the Romantics as well as his own attitude. Instead of harking back to the past, Lukács was dreaming of a utopian future, of a breakthrough towards a new epoch of world history. Instead of the re-establishment of the ancient Greek or medieval closed worlds, he perceived as the ultimate aim the creation of a *new community* and a *new man*.⁴

Before coming to the discussion of the Lukács-Marcuse connection, I should briefly mention the relationship between Lukács and the Frankfurt School. It is a surprising fact that up to now no serious

attempt has been made to explore this relationship; consequently, misunderstanding and confusion abound. Just to mention a few examples: George Lichtheim lists both Karl Korsch and Lukács as associates of the Frankfurt Institute. (“Lukács was briefly associated with the Institute but so were heretics like Karl Korsch.”)⁵ At the other extreme, Lucio Colletti asserts that “von vielem was Adorno, Horkheimer und Marcuse geschrieben habe, müsste man sagen, dass es geistiger Diebstahl aus *Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein sei. . .*”⁶ As a third example, I wish to mention István Hermann, first husband of Ágnes Heller, and one of Lukács’s first students in Hungary, who quotes Lukács as having said that he at one point saved Marcuse’s life when the latter planned to stay in the Soviet Union; Lukács advised him to leave because of the incommensurability of Marcusean and Soviet Marxism.⁷ The examples referred to deal with the Lukács-Frankfurt School connection at either the personal or theoretical level. I will look at the connection at both these levels but this time on the basis of facts that can be “verified.”

Contacts on the personal level were minimal and they had their beginnings in Vienna in the 1920s. Lukács lived there in exile after the defeat of the 1919 Hungarian Commune. Adorno went to Vienna in order to study composition with Alban Berg. Still as a *Gymnasiast*, Adorno read Lukács’s *Die Theorie des Romans* and while in Vienna, he ardently wished to meet its author. The meeting took place in June 1925 and Adorno subsequently reported his impressions in a letter to Siegfried Kracauer:

Mein erster Eindruck war gross und tief, ein kleiner zarter, ungeschickt blonder Ostjude mit einer talmudischen Nase und wunderbaren, unergründlichen Augen; in einem leinenen Sportanzug recht gelehrtenhaft, aber mit einer ganz konventionslosen, totenhaft klaren und milden Atmosphäre um sich; durch die von der Person nur Schüchternheit leise durchdringt. Das Ideal der Unscheinbarkeit verwirklicht er und freilich auch die Idee der Intangibilität. Ich fühlte sofort ihn jenseits auch nur möglicher menschlicher Beziehung und habe mich auch in dem mehr als dreistündigen Gespräch entsprechend verhalten und zurückgehalten.⁸

As for the content of their discussion, at the center were Adorno’s favorite, *Die Theorie des Romans*, and Kierkegaard. According to Adorno, “Lukács desavouierte zunächst gründlich die Romantheorie, sie sei ‘idealistisch und mythologisch.’” As for Kierkegaard: “er sei [hier

wurde er — Lukács — in der üblichen Weise hämisch] ein ideologischer Repräsentant des versinkenden Bürgertums.”⁹ Let me note just in passing that Adorno’s description of Lukács, “der Ostjude,” comes perilously close to Thomas Mann’s portrait of Leo Naphta in *Der Zauberberg*; it has been established that Mann met Lukács in Vienna in January 1922. One could speculate as regards the wording of Adorno; was his reading of *Der Zauberberg* (1924) subconsciously coloring his description?¹⁰ In any case, neither Mann’s nor Adorno’s perception of Lukács comes close to that of the so-called founding father of a so-called Western Marxism, as some would-be Marxists called Lukács in the 1960s in their search for ideological ancestors.

As reported by Marta Kreilisheim, one-time student of Karl Mannheim in Frankfurt, Lukács lectured in Frankfurt am Main, on January 26 and 27, 1933, just at the time of Hitler’s *Machtergreifung*.¹¹ On this occasion, Lukács met Karl Mannheim just appointed *Ordinarius* there as well as members of the Frankfurt Institut für Sozialforschung. The Lukács-Mannheim encounter was an extremely cool one because of their political differences and the fact that Mannheim’s *Ideologie und Utopie* (1929) contained much of what Colletti would have called “geistiger Diebstahl” from *Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein* — and both men were aware of this. As could be learned from Lukács’s letter written to Horkheimer in 1948, Lukács’s Heidelberg-library was deposited at the Frankfurt Institute by Lukács’s friends, the Staudingers. Lukács intended to retrieve the most important items from his collection but was prevented from doing so by the *Machtergreifung* and the necessity to flee Germany.¹²

The Lukács-Frankfurt relationship in the 1950s and 1960s is a well-known story; it is that of mutual debunking. An enraged Adorno, for example, called Lukács’s *Die Zerstörung der Vernunft* the “destruction of Lukács’s own reason.” And Lukács in the “Foreword” to his newly published *Die Theorie des Romans* mocked the Frankfurt School as the leading segment of German intelligentsia that has “taken up residence in the ‘Grand Hotel Abyss . . . a beautiful hotel, equipped with every comfort, on the edge of an abyss, of nothingness, of absurdity. And the daily contemplation of the abyss between excellent meals or artistic entertainments, can only heighten the enjoyment of the subtle comforts offered.”¹³

The most recent attempt to establish the connection between Lukács and the Frankfurt School was made by Joseph Maier, a student and friend of Horkheimer, in an essay entitled “Georg Lukács and the Frankfurt School.” Maier inquires into the impact of Judaic thought on Lukács and the Frankfurt thinkers and by doing so makes use of relevant analyses by Hannah Arendt, Werner Cahnman and Jürgen Habermas. Maier concludes that Lukács shares with the Frankfurt School thinkers “a full blown philosophy of history, in particular the theological concept of history as a history of fulfillment and salvation.” Maier traces the inspiration of Lukács and the Frankfurt thinkers back to Jewish mysticism and messianism.¹⁴

Concerning the Lukács-Marcuse connection, things are somewhat different. To the best of my knowledge, Lukács and Marcuse never met in person; neither were they systematic readers of each other’s works. Needless to say, the young Marcuse read and learned from *Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein*. And the old Lukács read that famous product of the 1960s, the *One Dimensional Man*. With regard to the life-work of the two thinkers, the following common themes can be established: First, there is a certain “existentialist flavor” in both cases. Lucien Goldmann states that in a sense, “*Die Seele und die Formen . . . stellt . . . einen entscheidenden Abschnitt in der Entstehung des modernen Existentialismus dar.*”¹⁵ I regard it as more important that they share the “existentialistische Marx Interpretation” — to use Alfred Schmidt’s expression.¹⁶ Elsewhere I have argued for the life-long continuity of an existentialist strand in Lukács’s thought and won’t go into it here and now.¹⁷ Second, there is the vision of the “New Man” that Lukács yearned for, at least since 1915 when in a letter to Paul Ernst, he hailed Ropshin’s (a.k.a. Boris Savinkov) “new man.”¹⁸ Marcuse too believed that by the Great Refusal and by changing needs a new human type would emerge. Third, both Lukács and Marcuse endorsed violence, the use of force to bring about historical change. In 1910, in the essay “Tactics and Ethics,” Lukács quoted Hebbel’s Judith: “Even if God had placed sin between me and the deed enjoined upon me — who am I to be able to escape it?”¹⁹ Lukács lived up to his creed as the Political Commissar of the Eighth Army during the Hungarian Commune when he ordered the decimation of a group of retreating soldiers. As far as Marcuse is concerned, the most illustrative statement on the use of

force can be found at the conclusion of his famous essay, "Repressive Tolerance." Marcuse talks about those who struggle against law and order which protect the established hierarchy and states:

If they use violence, they do not start a new chain of violence but try to break the established one. Since they will be punished, they know the risks, and when they are willing to take it, no third person, and least of all the educator and intellectual, has the right to preach abstention.²⁰

By no means do I wish to propose a direct link between Marcuse's words and the violence pursued by some members of the Left of the 1960s, as some in the Federal Republic of Germany have claimed. There was plenty of violence spread about in those times on all sides in the United States: the murders of the Kennedys, Martin Luther King, the students at Kent State University, Malcolm X, the Black Panthers of Chicago etc. Finally, without discussing it in detail, the use of the concept of totality by both Lukács and Marcuse should be mentioned. To be sure, totality was the quintessence of Marxism for Lukács, while Marcuse was thinking of the totality of late capitalist society and the total negation of that society. Similarly, a shared life-long interest in ontology with different underlying assumptions must be mentioned. Marcuse's *Habilitationschrift*, entitled *Hegel's Ontology* was published in 1932; Lukács's three-volume torso of *Ontology* was posthumously published in Hungarian in 1976 and there is not one single reference to Marcuse in it. Lukács's *Ontology* was built on Nikolai Hartmann while Marcuse's foundations lay in Marx and Heidegger's work.

Yet, one cannot and should not overlook some basic differences between Lukács and Marcuse, the most important being their attitude toward Freud and Freudianism. Marcuse's attempt to integrate the theories of Marx and Freud is in sharp contrast with Lukács's life-long vehement rejection of Freudianism, as attested in his *Die Zerstörung der Vernunft* in which Freud is featured as a representative of the "irrational current" leading up to Nazism. The responsibility of Lukács and his pupils in the suppression of Freudian psychoanalytic theory in post-war Hungary cannot be ignored. Lukács's pupil Ágnes Heller lamented even in 1955 (!), after the death of Stalin, that "irrational ideology is still influential in Hungary. Our doctors have not rid themselves completely of Freudianism."²¹

There are also some puzzling and so far unanswered questions concerning the Lukács-Marcuse relationship. I am thinking of the problematic Barry Katz broached in his biography of Marcuse. Katz writes about Marcuse's "exhaustive line-by-line critical analysis of Heidegger's *Being and Time* and regards it as a "vital question . . . why Marcuse appears not to have been equally attracted to the philosophical work that had accomplished a comparable renewal within Marxist theory itself: Lukács's *History and Class Consciousness*."²²

The main part of my paper and reflections is devoted to only one phase of Marcuse's long intellectual career, to the *One Dimensional Man* and *An Essay on Liberation* phase and its aftermath with reference to North America. The story has its beginnings in the 1950s. According to a well-known and often-told story, when a philosophical department of a university was discussing the course scheduling for the coming semester somebody asked the question: "And who is going to teach Hegel?" Hans Reichenbach's answer was: "If possible, nobody!"²³ This answer expressed best the general sentiment of academic philosophy in America of the 1950s. Those were the quiet and prosperous Eisenhower years in America with both analytic-scientific philosophy and functionalist sociology triumphantly esconced in academia — seemingly there to stay. This state of affairs was irrevocably shattered in the next decade, with the escalation of the war in Vietnam, the commencement of the Civil Rights movement and assorted equal rights demands (women, homosexuals, et al.). American campuses echoed the increasingly sharp critical voices of students and faculty alike. Marcuse's *One Dimensional Man* was published in 1964, followed in 1970 by Alvin Gouldner's *The Coming Crisis of Western Sociology*. Both books not only became bestsellers but the Bible for a segment of the 1960s generation. As to the question: Why? In Hegel's words, because "to comprehend what is, this is the task of philosophy . . . Philosophy is its own time, apprehended in thoughts."²⁴ To be sure, Marcuse's *One Dimensional Man* in the 1960s comprehended and critiqued the 1950s, and thus expressed the mood of rejection of the 50s, meaning, the rejection of "one dimensional man, society and thought." It was unfortunate, though, that the book drew heavily on second-rate secondary sources such as the work of pop-sociologist Vance Packard, which, nevertheless, facilitated its popularity. On the other hand, the coating of

more popular themes in Marcuse's turgid German style deterred quite a few would-be readers.

Let me add as a caveat the comment of Paul Breines, former Marcuse student: "*One Dimensional Man* and the essay "The Repressive Tolerance," let alone his earlier works, remain unread by large portions of the Left; only a very small percentage has, or cares to have, more than the vaguest comprehension of the philosophical tradition in which Marcuse stands."²⁵

Lewis Coser in his book on refugee scholars in America and their impact reports in a less serious vein on Marcuse:

This principal adversary of the capitalist system was not even averse to playing the stock market from time to time. I remember a conversation with him, after he had delivered a fiercely "critical" lecture on American society at Brandeis, where he had suddenly asked me after a few drinks, "Lew, you know more about these matters than I do, should I sell my General Motors shares and buy some General Electric?"

But even Coser thinks that Marcuse remained much truer to his original stance than did all the other members of the Frankfurt Institute and that supposedly explains in part why, at an advanced age, he became "the guru of the New Left . . . which otherwise tended to distrust anyone over thirty."²⁶

It is also thought to be a matter of historical irony that the highly pessimistic *One Dimensional Man* should have had a major impact on a social movement that wanted to take up the challenge of changing a thoroughly decayed Western society depicted in Marcuse's book. Coser expressed perplexity — and Marcuse too — at this state of affairs. It has to be assumed that there have been common bonds to foster compatibility. If one looks for these common bonds between Marcuse, that is, the Frankfurt School, Lukács and the North American New Left, three elements come to mind: first, secular Jewish background; second, romantic anti-science/technology attitude; and third, the ultimate *Versöhnung* with reality. I'll elaborate on the first and the third point.

The Jewish background was important in many ways and an aspect was masterfully captured by Hannah Arendt in her discussion of the case of Walter Benjamin. She wrote that "his outlook was typical of an entire generation of German-Jewish intellectuals." Partly it is related to the material-existential aspect since

its basis was the mentality of the fathers, successful businessmen who did not think too highly of their own achievements and whose dream it was that their sons were destined for higher things. It was the secularized version of the ancient Jewish belief that those who “learn” — the Torah or the Talmud, that is, God’s Law — were the true elite of the people and should not be bothered with so vulgar an occupation as making money or working for it.²⁷

Arendt thinks that the father-son conflicts in most cases were resolved by “the sons laying claim to being geniuses, or, in the case of numerous Communists from well-to-do homes, to being devoted to the welfare of mankind . . . and the fathers were more than willing to grant that this was a valid excuse for not making a living.”²⁸ Lukács’s is a case in point. His father provided a yearly appanage of 10.000RM during his stay in Heidelberg in the 1910s when Lukács aspired to become a Privatdozent.²⁹ The situation was similar with Marcuse and many members of the Frankfurt School, as well as with the American New Left (although in the latter case there were no grounds for laying claim to being geniuses).

Moving ahead to more recent times, one has to recognize the significance of the historical factors that are responsible for the changed mood of the 1970s and 1980s. It has to start with the ending of the Vietnam war and the abolition of the draft which robbed the protest of its urgency and desperate energy. The subsequent Watergate scandal resulted in increased cynicism and the tightening of America’s belt. The unforeseen result of the excesses of the spending of the Great Society and oil crisis humiliated a nation exposed to dependency. All of these things contributed to the rising wave of conservatism and patriotism. Inflation and unemployment, not to speak of the contraction of the academic labor market, turned a new generation towards professional achievement and financial rewards, in one word, toward “making it” in capitalist society and not even criticizing it, let alone fighting it. The question of why Marcuse is “ein vergessener Denker” and the examination of the fate of a whole generation which was the carrier of his ideas, have to take place within this historical context.

I mentioned before the aspect of the “Versöhnung mit der Wirklichkeit.” Looking at the 1960s generation today, two basic types of this generation are discernible who made their peace with reality. The first type is represented by the so-called turn-coats who made a 180 degree

turn; the second group made a less spectacular adjustment to reality. A prime example for the first group would be Susan Sontag, who declared in 1967: "The white race *is* the cancer of human history This [United States] is a doomed country, it seems to me; I only pray, when America founders, it doesn't drag the rest of the planet down, too."³⁰ She is now the spokesperson of certain conservative circles in America, preaching, for example, that Communism=Fascism. As for the second group, it includes the producers and consumers of adversary culture, who for the most part are located in academia, especially in the social sciences and humanities, in publishing houses and/or foundations. Thus, sociologist Paul Hollander may have a point when he writes about "the survival of the adversary culture," meaning that what had once been considered radical social criticism is being absorbed, with some modifications, into main-stream culture.³¹ One is reminded of Karl Korsch's remark in a July 1939 letter to Paul Partos, that there is an immense flexibility and capacity in American capitalist society to neutralize all real opposition and to absorb all countertrends.³²

I agree with Mannheim that "the problem of generations is important enough to merit serious consideration. It is one of the indispensable guides to an understanding of the structure of social and intellectual movements."³³ This leads me to the next point. If "the social phenomenon generation represents . . . a particular kind of identity of location, embracing related 'age groups' embedded in a historical-social process," then a look at the generation of the 1980s helps in understanding the contemporary predicament. Today's generation is called "the unromantic generation." What does that mean? A sociological survey of college graduates between the age of 22 to 26 showed the following characteristics: the perceived goal is to be married at the age of 30, well-established in their respective career, to acquire a home, maybe a dog, but no kids yet. In other words, this "unromantic generation" is career-oriented, self-centered and both aware and unashamed of it. Romantic love and sexual indulgence are out, the first due to work-exhaustion, the second to AIDS. A second survey of 300,000 college undergraduates found that their primary objective is to be very well-off financially: 73.2% answered this way compared to 49.5% in 1975. The objective of developing a meaningful philosophy of life declined from 64.2% in 1975 to 40.6% in 1986.³⁴

As Mannheim states, in social life “it is necessary continually to transmit the accumulated cultural heritage.” A problem clearly arises if a large segment of either culture or counter-culture as present in the 1960s is abandoned by its one-time carrier itself, and if, in addition, there was a radical shift in structural terms. We have to ask how much of the ideas of “the Great Refusal” can be transmitted from the one-time Marcuse generation, that is, from the “romantic generation” to the present “unromantic generation”? This is a question that does not lend itself to easy answers. What do the numbers tell? For example, the American Sociological Association has an approximate membership of 15,000 and the membership of its “Marxist” section amounts to 400. Paul Hollander recently noted that over 500 courses in Marxist philosophy are offered at American universities. Both figures represent a quantum leap from the 1950s, but remain insignificant in terms of total membership and course offerings of the 3,000 universities and colleges. It cannot be ascertained how much space is allocated to Marcuse within the Marxist courses and seminars. What we do know is that interest in Marxism in the United States took an “analytic turn” represented, for example by the work of John Roemer and G. A. Cohen.

One of the ever-present obstacles to a wider Marcuse reception remains his language. We have heard a lot about Horkheimer’s complaint regarding the “treacherous lucidity” of the English language and Adorno declared that one of his reasons for returning to Germany was the language.³⁵ Marcuse did neither of these things and managed to write his major works in his adopted tongue. Regardless of his “turgid German” that supposedly showed through, the reaction to his writings was mixed.

I propose that in order to establish “What is Living and What is Dead” in the ideas of Marcuse, we split him into two: the prophet and the philosopher. He was a false prophet of what Jürgen Habermas called *die Scheinrevolution* with its romantic dream of a grand alliance of diverse outsiders, the *Lumpenproletariat*, the *Lumpenintelligentsia*, the students and the peoples of the Third World. Nothing ever came out of this. The *Lumpenproletariat* is hooked on drugs, at least in North America, and AIDS takes its high toll among them. And as Marx clearly established, it never was a truly revolutionary force, anyway. The students have turned into professors and professionals, or even

deans in the 1980s and to a large extent suppress the memories of the past. As to the Third World, its people could never become a truly organized real political force in the international arena even under talented leaders, such as Nasser, Nehru, or Tito. And the sexual revolution with a dialectical twist has evolved into a New Puritanism, understandably so in the era of AIDS. Now the old teach-ins against war and racism are evoked only as AIDS teach-ins as a recent one in New York City, recalling the Leninist battle cry: What is to be Done?, but this time about AIDS.

If Marcuse is “living”, it is only as the philosopher. The translation of his *Hegels Ontologie und die Grundlegung einer Theorie der Geschichtlichkeit* was recently published in the USA and this may — but only may — open the possibility of a new appraisal of Marcuse, the philosopher.³⁶ It certainly won't happen in American mainstream philosophy, but only in selected philosophy departments constituting pockets of Continental philosophy in the U.S.

I wish to conclude on an optimistic note, however. Predictions may be possible by means of cyclical interpretations of American history juxtaposed with the sociology of generations. Here cycle is defined as “a continuing shift in national involvement, between public purpose and private interest” or as a swing from liberalism to conservatism and back. Eleven such alternations up to 1947 are mentioned by historians. The objective was to increase democracy in six of the periods and in five of them to contain it. Often in the former periods the released energies turned destructive: city riots, campus turmoil, assassinations, drugs, Watergate, the fall of the President are some of the consequences. These periods were followed by national disillusion and exhaustion. By the late 1970s, the compass swung back toward “private interest” reaching culmination in the present “age of Reagan.”³⁷

A new cycle of “public purpose” is thus due — sometime in the 1990s — maybe? Such a period *may* become more hospitable to Marcusean and related critical ideas and *may* bring them back from oblivion.

NOTES

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colloquium at the Goethe Institut, Paris on June 26, 1987. I wish to thank Gerard Raulet for the invitation.

¹ Richard Löwenthal, *Der romantische Rückfall* (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1971).

² Henry Pachter, "Lukács Revisited: Orthodox Heretic, Stalinist Romantic," *Dissent*, Spring 1975, pp. 177–88.

³ Michael Löwy, "Naphta or Settembrini — Lukács and Romantic Anti-Capitalism," In Judith Marcus and Zoltán Tarr, eds. *Georg Lukács: Theory, Culture and Politics. A Centenary Volume* (New Brunswick-London: Transaction Books, 1988).

⁴ Judith Marcus and Zoltán Tarr, eds. *Georg Lukács: Selected Correspondence, 1902–1920* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), p. 245.

⁵ George Lichtheim, *From Marx to Hegel* (New York: Seabury, 1974), p. 129.

⁶ Lucio Colletti, *Marxismus als Soziologie* (Berlin: Merle Verlag, 1973), p. 81.

⁷ István Hermann, *Lukács György élete* (Budapest: Corvina, 1985), p. 148.

⁸ Cited in Rolf Wiggershaus, *Die Frankfurter Schule* (München: Carl Hanser Verlag, 1986), p. 92.

⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰ See Judith Marcus, *Georg Lukács and Thomas Mann. A Study in the Sociology of Literature* (Amherst, Ma.: University of Massachusetts Press, 1987).

¹¹ Interview with Marta Kreilisheim in Budapest on August 24, 1984.

¹² Georg Lukács's letter of June 28, 1948 to Max Horkheimer.

¹³ Georg Lukács, *The Theory of the Novel* (Cambridge, Ma.: The M.I.T. Press, 1971), p. 22.

¹⁴ Joseph B. Maier, "Georg Lukács and the Frankfurt School," In Judith Marcus and Zoltán Tarr, eds., *Georg Lukács: Theory Culture and Politics . . .*

¹⁵ Lucien Goldmann, *Dialektische Untersuchungen* (Neuwied: Luchterhand, 1966), p. 173.

¹⁶ Herbert Marcuse and Alfred Schmidt, *Existentialistische Marx-Interpretation* (Frankfurt am Main: Europäische Verlagsanstalt, 1973).

¹⁷ Zoltán Tarr and Judith Marcus, "Recent Lukács Scholarship in Eastern Europe: A Trend Report from Hungary," In *Studies in Soviet Thought*, 31 (1986), pp. 27–37.

¹⁸ Judith Marcus and Zoltán Tarr, eds. *Georg Lukács: Selected Correspondence . . .*, pp. 244–48.

¹⁹ Georg Lukács, *Political Writings, 1919–1929*. Trans. Michael McColgan, ed. by Rodney Livingstone (London: NLB, 1972), p. 11. See also, Lee Congdon, "Lukács, Camus, and the Russian Terrorists," in *Continuity*, No. 1, pp. 17–36.

²⁰ Herbert Marcuse, "Repressive Tolerance," In Robert Paul Wolff, Barrington Moore, Jr., Herbert Marcuse, *A Critique of Pure Tolerance* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1965), p. 117.

²¹ Ágnes Heller, In *MTA II. osztály közleményei*, VI, 1–2 (1955) p. 165.

²² Barry Katz, *Herbert Marcuse and the Art of Liberation* (London: NLB, 1982), p. 62.

²³ Cited in Richard Rorty, *Consequences of Pragmatism* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1982), p. 224.

²⁴ *Hegel's Philosophy of Right*, transl. by T. M. Knox (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967), p. 11.

²⁵ Cited in Zoltán Tarr, *The Frankfurt School* (New York: Schocken Books, 1985), p.

- ²⁶ Lewis A. Coser, *Refugee Scholars in America* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984), p. 98.
- ²⁷ Hannah Arendt, "Introduction" to Walter Benjamin, *Illuminations*, transl. by Harry Zohn (New York: Schocken Books, 1969), p. 26.
- ²⁸ *Ibid.*
- ²⁹ Judith Marcus and Zoltán Tarr, *Georg Lukács: Selected Correspondence . . .*, p. 237.
- ³⁰ "What is Happening to America?," *Partisan Review*, XXXIV, 1 (1967), pp. 57–58.
- ³¹ Paul Hollander, "The Survival of the Adversary Culture," *Partisan Review*, LIII, 3 (1986), pp. 344–357.
- ³² Cited in Tarr, *The Frankfurt School*, pp. 116–117.
- ³³ Karl Mannheim, *Essays on the Sociology of Knowledge* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd., 1968), pp. 286–287.
- ³⁴ Bruce Weber, "Alone Together. The Unromantic Generation," *The New York Times Magazine*, April 5, 1987, pp. 22ff.
- ³⁵ See Joseph B. Maier, "Contribution to a Critique of Critical Theory," in Judith Marcus and Zoltán Tarr, *Foundations of the Frankfurt School of Social Research* (New Brunswick and London: Transaction Books, 1984), pp. 29–54.
- ³⁶ Herbert Marcuse, *Hegel's Ontology and the Theory of Historicity*, tr. & intro. by Seyla Benhabib (Boston, Ma., MIT Press, 1987).
- ³⁷ Arthur M. Schlesinger, jr., *The Cycles of American History* (Boston, Ma., Houghton Mifflin, 1986).

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