of values and a doctrine of "person" and "personality." This leads him
directly to an exposition of the theory of liberty formulated by Nicolai
Hartmann in his ethics, considered by the author as the "last word" in
modern philosophy as far as this grave problem is concerned.

The book is developed with clarity and precision of language, re-
vealing a sure mastery of the subject-matter with which he deals. It
forms a good, well-ordered introduction to some of the most important
of the various tendencies of phenomenology, especially with regard to
his Schelerian interpretation, modified by that of Nicolai Hartmann.
The facility with which he makes use of the most varied elements of
each of them in order to arrive at a synthesis—a synthesis concordant
with the most deeply rooted convictions of sound, sane, and balanced
common-sense. This is one of the qualities of the book and, perhaps,
its greatest weakness. He insists more on the solutions than on the
problems, more on the agreements than on the discrepancies. The bring-
ing together of so many elements into the unity of a single conception
is in itself a serious problem. We constantly have the impression that
things are not really so clear as they seem.

In spite of some over-simplification, and even, perhaps, because of
it, this book is an excellent "invitation" to participate in some of the
more constructive results of phenomenology in its various branches.
And that alone is quite an achievement. Compared with it the diffi-
culties and the problems involved are of secondary importance.

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Reason and Revolution: Hegel and the Rise of Social Theory

By Herbert Marcuse. New York, Oxford University Press, Pp. 431

Only a few studies have been made on the very interesting and
important transition from Hegel to Marx, from "reason" to "revolu-
tion," though F. Engels already had challenged the German professors
by the paradoxical statement that the German labor movement was to
be the heir of Hegel's philosophy. A stimulus for the renewal of these
studies, presented by J. Plenge (1911), G. Lukacs (1923), and S.
Hook (1935), was the first publication of the full text of Marx' earlier
manuscripts and of Hegel's Jenenser Real-Philosophie. The diffi-
culties which these texts offer, by their conceptual language as well
as by their content, are so great that one cannot expect Marcuse's
effort to transform the German of Hegel and Marx into English
to give pleasure even to the most patient and intelligent reader. On
the other hand the poor sense of common sense is no criterion
or abstract philosophical terms. Hegel and Marx are as concrete
as one can be in analyzing a phenomenon thoroughly. But unfortunately the evidence, fullness, and even beauty of Hegel's terms is lost in the English translation—however correct it may be—because it is almost impossible to preserve in another language the associations, implications, and connotations of the spoken language which remain at the root of these terms like a natural atmosphere and nourishing soil. A term, for instance, like "Bei-sich-selbst-sein im Anderssein," translated by Marcuse with "to be itself in the otherness," has in German a background which makes it intelligible, while its English translation sounds merely abstract if not meaningless.

Another difficulty in appreciating Marcuse's scholarly work is caused by himself. He has the ambition to demonstrate that Hegel's basic concepts are hostile to the tendencies that have led into Fascist theory and practice; nay, that Fascism and National Socialism have their roots in the positivistic reaction against Hegel, "while Hegel wandered from Marx to Lenin." Marcuse's apologetic defense against the charge that Hegel prepared the way for the totalitarian state has no real significance, for it forces him to take the opposite stand while remaining on the same level as his opponents, insisting that Hegel was an anti-Fascist who prepared the way for Marx. According to Marcuse's presupposition and exposition it seems that Hegel was the only real Marxist before Marx. It is curious that a man of the intelligence, knowledge, and ability of Marcuse can be so much blinded by the obsolete alternatives, either "Fascist" or "Marxist," as to spoil his subtle research by the queer question: Is Hegel pro or contra the "Weltanschauung" of Mr. A. Rosenberg or E. Kriek? Though a political intention determines Marcuse's point of view the value of his work fortunately is to a great extent independent of his own tendency.

The book gives in its first part an excellent analysis of the foundations of Hegel's philosophy, placing special emphasis upon his earlier writings which have not been translated into English. The second part deals with the transition from Hegel's philosophy to Marx's social theory, including a brief discussion of Feuerbach and Kierkegaard in so far as they were concerned with the problem of society. In both parts the analysis of Hegel's and Marx's concept of labor is of paramount importance, since it reveals that the relation between Hegel and Marx is much closer and more essential than in the traditional interpretations. In a third section Marcuse tries to verify his thesis by examining the development of post-Hegelian social and political theory in the writings of the positivist opponents of Hegelianism: Saint-Simon, A. Comte, F. J. Stahl, and Lorenz von Stein. Despite the differences of their backgrounds and attitudes they all move away from
Hegel's and Marx' universal and dialectical philosophy towards an indialectical acceptance of the given "facts," studying the social relations after the pattern of nature and its laws, and emancipating sociology from philosophy instead of "realizing" the latter as Marx pretended to do.

One could object that Hegel too was a "positivist," when compared with Fichte and Kant, for nobody acknowledged (anerkannte) "what is," i.e., the totality of the actual world, with more emphasis than he, though discriminating between ephemeral existences and true reality which is reasonable in itself. I agree with Marcuse's statement that positivistic philosophy is a contradiction in adjecto, because true philosophy never is a mere synthesis of empirical knowledge; but I disagree with Marcuse's own presupposition—determined by his opposition to the acceptance of given facts—that the task of philosophy is primarily the criticism of the given state of affairs, with the Marxist tendency, to change the world for the sake of "happiness." The young Hegel certainly was much nearer to Marx's social and political criticism than the author of the Philosophy of Right and Religion. But Hegel's general concept of philosophy cannot be judged by a thinker who was completely dependent on the conceptual structure of his opponent and a total stranger to Hegel's broadminded "An-Erkennung." While Marx transformed Hegel's "Aufhebung," i.e., conservation and at the same time negation, into a simple abolition of the existing contradictions, Hegel never meant that the contradictions between the infinite and the finite, between freedom and destiny, or between state and society, could and should be dissolved. What Hegel urges is no more and no less than to master them through a progressive mediation and reconciliation on higher levels. Hegel is neither reactionary nor revolutionary; his Philosophy of Right has at least two equal important aspects, theoretically expressed in his two-fold criticism of Plato's state and of Rousseau's society. That a fact like the existence of a proletariat "contradicts the alleged reality of reason" is a statement as senseless for Hegel as it is decisive for Marx, for whom the notions of "reason," "negation," and "freedom" have not the same meaning as for Hegel. Certainly both made an effort to transform the "estranged" world of given facts into a world of our own, so that the subject may know and possess itself in all its objects or in its "otherness." But Hegel moves in the realm of the "absolute spirit" and thereby in that of Christianity, while Marx struggles in the region of bourgeois society, asserting that religion is a "perverted world." Hegel started from an interpretation of Christ, Marx from that of two classic atheists. And since for Hegel Christianity was the absolute though historical religion,
the "historical content" in Hegel's abstract concepts, on which Marcuse lays so much stress, cannot be reduced to the social-political setting. It seems to me quite absurd to state with Marcuse that Hegel's history of the world is the "self-consciousness of middle-class society" that "exalts and enshrines the history of the middle-class" which Marx and Lenin have allegedly destroyed. Besides this inconsistency which derives from Marcuse's elimination of the theological pattern in Hegel's concepts of reason, spirit and mind—which though unfolding "in time" are never affected by it in their essence—one may ask if the rise of Fascism and National Socialism does not demonstrate that Marx's theory of the middle-class was his greatest mistake, so great that orthodox Marxism perished on its account: Marx despised and hated the "petit-bourgeois," considering him totally irrelevant in the dialectical struggle between the capitalist-bourgeois class and the proletariat, as the outcome of which he prophesied the abolition of both classes in a communist society. In the real, unforeseen history the proletarians became more and more bourgeois-like while the old bourgeoisie became proletarized. The result was a new kind of middle-class which gave the most important support to the authoritarian movements in Italy as well as in Germany. Only a scholar whose approach to Hegel is already fixed by Hegel's historical effects on Marx can be persuaded by Marcuse's thesis that the "Reason" of Hegel was in itself revolutionary and has been realized by the "Revolution" of Marx.

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