political indictment of the thinker is out of the question.) (2) The
political implications must not be left in the position of isolated
facts which we just do not like; they must be contradicted in prin-
ciple by implications from a philosophic starting point which rec-
ommends itself to us not simply because it rationalizes our status
quo. It also must have its historic and cosmic setting. In a word,
we must show that the political facts we are discussing do have a
philosophic reason behind them, whether a cause or not; and, sec-
ond, we must have better philosophic reasons for the opposed facts
so that we do not consider philosophic and political truth just a
matter of sentiment.

Philosophic ideas, like all others, can be understood only through
seeing what can be done with them, and what can be got out of
them. Though political facts do not usually follow from philo-
sophic theory, since statesmen are not theoreticians, their justifica-
tion can be found only in a system of ideas which is broader than
their historic-political context and which, when extended to a
maximum, becomes a philosophy. Philosophic ideas have broader
implications than political concepts, and there is a definite sense in
which this is now, and can become more and more, a spiritual con-

cflict. For serious philosophic consideration, the evaluation of a
political system must be more than political or cultural or ethical,
however pressing and obvious these may be. It is this broader type
of problem which demands the best talents of English-speaking
philosophers.

So looked at, philosophy as the pursuit of things as they are is
not unimportant in the crisis. In fact, it is so important to get at
the deepest truths that I regret to see philosophers already ceasing
to be philosophical (and even logical) in the excitement of national
peril. This is no time for hysteria, in philosophy least of all.

LEWIS WHITE BECK.

THE UNIVERSITY OF DELAWARE.

BOOK REVIEW

1941. xii + 431 pp. $3.75.

The book analyzes Hegel’s thought, with special emphasis on the
social and political implications, and reviews the philosophical
schools which developed in reaction to Hegel. Hegel’s Jenenser
philosophy, The Phenomenology of Mind, The Science of Logic, the
Philosophy of Right, and of History are expounded in the first
part, while the second reviews the Marxian philosophy, which
adopted and developed Hegelianism, discusses positivism, which rejected it, and concludes with an account of the rise of National Socialism and the "End of Hegelianism."

Central in Marcuse's interpretation is the insistence that "reason," which was for Hegel the whole subject-matter of philosophy, can only be understood in its social, political, and historical context. The French Revolution was the turning point of history because for the first time men deliberately set about to erect an order of reason. "Robespierre's deification of reason as the Être suprême is the counterpart to the glorification of reason in Hegel's system," he asserts, and the picture of Robespierre he has in mind is not the customary tyrant, but the incorruptible statesman, rationalist, spokesman for the people, and for democracy, as set forth, let us say, by Mathiez. The young Hegel used the language of the French Jacobins. Reason and its corollary, freedom, are for him not only philosophical but also social terms. At present men are not free, but deprived of property and dependent upon the propertied. Since the world is not rational, the world must be changed. Or must not the individual consciousness be changed? Even in his early writings, it is perhaps not clear whether Hegel put the main emphasis on objective freedom to be realized through history or on subjective freedom. Yet the instances in which Hegel anticipated Marx are impressive testimony to the objective trend of his thought at this time. Thus he recognizes the importance of the class struggle, the worker's want of freedom in capitalist society consequent to his alienation from property, the ruinous effects of the restriction of private property to the few who attempt to convert even the power of the state into private property, the relation of "abstract and quantitative" labor to the increasing inequality of wealth and men, the distortion of love in bourgeois society by its identification with property relations, etc.

The author is quick to point out agreements of Hegel's early thought with that of Marx, but also to cite the drastic divergences in later writings. For example, Dr. Marcuse states that in The Phenomenology of Mind

The change in Hegel's point of view becomes manifest in the unshakable certainty with which he determines the end of the process. The mind despite all its deviations and defeats, despite misery and deterioration, will attain its goal, or, rather, has attained it, in the prevailing system. [P. 93.]

Likewise, the early sympathy for the French Revolution has turned to sour appraisal, and bitter attacks, especially upon Rousseau's "law of the heart." Freedom is now to be attained, not in reality, through "destruction," but in the realm of the mind typified by
BOOK REVIEW

German idealist culture. Freedom has become Stoic freedom, consistent with fetters or the throne and hence inoffensive to any tyranny. And although this emphasis may be due in part to the preoccupation of the Phenomenology with immanent dialectic, with consciousness or mind, it also portends the anxious withdrawal, hastened by the events of the French Revolution, from the claim to objective freedom. On the other hand, even this work demonstrates the affinity of Hegel with Marx, as Marx himself recognized, for Hegel saw that man is "the result of his labor."

Marx makes reference to Hegel's definitive insight, which disclosed to him that lordship and bondage result from necessity of certain relationships of labor. . . . The relationship of lord to servant is thus neither an eternal nor natural one, but is rooted in a definite mode of labor and in man's relation to the products of his labor. [P. 115.]

It is in his solution of the endless contradictions of modern society in the Philosophy of Right that Hegel shows the greatest contrast to Marx. Instead of the eventual withering away of the state as the ultimate reconciliation of the individual with the universal, the state becomes an end in itself over and above the conflicts of civil society. The state is now described as the realization of freedom, as embodied morality, as the march of God in the world, as a self-sufficient power in which individuals appear only as inconsequential moments. On this outcome of Hegelian philosophy L. T. Hobhouse centered his attack in his war-time book, The Metaphysical Theory of the State. Dr. Marcuse does not deny the justice of Hobhouse's contention, but he rightly points out its one-sidedness, and notes the frequent partiality of English Hegelians for the most reactionary Hegel. Hobhouse's claims for the individual as against the state are in harmony with the abstract liberal principles, he remarks, but not with the liberal state as it existed, and he cites Hegel's comment that the liberal is one who "sticks to the abstract" and is always "defeated by the concrete."

While deploring Hegel's particularly reactionary stand around the year 1819, his general advocacy of suppression of civil rights, Dr. Marcuse contends that Hegel's adversaries, the Burschenschaften, with their anti-semitism, racism, and anti-rationalism, were even more reactionary, and much closer to modern National Socialism than Hegel. The interesting thesis is put forward that Hegel's frequent renunciation of the freedom in which his whole philosophy was supposed to culminate, resulted from his fear (doubtless based upon his contempt for the masses of people) that constitutional reforms, such as the Great English Reform Bill, however desirable in themselves, would in fact endanger order, ration-
ality, universality of law. In any case, the most important thing disclosed by Hegel's pilgrimage from the ideals of the French Revolution to those of the Restoration, from sympathy with the Enlightenment to the glorification of the Prussian monarchy, was not so much servility, as a betrayal of his own philosophy. Nothing in the dialectic justifies its termination in the Prussian monarchy, for the conflicts so often described by Hegel, on which the dialectic thrives, were still unresolved. To bear out his point Dr. Marcuse might have cited the distortion which the dialectic undergoes. When the nominal will contradicts the "real" will, it simply cancels out. Since it contradicts itself it can not be real. Dissenting voices by this sleight of hand are ruled non-existent. Likewise, in spite of Hegel's insistence upon constitutional rights, the monarch comes more and more to dominate the picture as his political philosophy unfolds. The people, Marcuse quotes from the Philosophy of Right, "is that part of the state which does not know what it wants," and whose "movement and action would be elemental, void of reason, violent and terrible" if not regulated. The monarch standing above conflicting interests, reconciles them by constitutional guarantees, by the rule of law, which he dispenses and can withdraw. As Marx remarked, the only person who counts in this state, supposed to be the realization of freedom, is the monarch.

But even in Hegel's reaction, Marcuse sometimes sees a certain justice and prophecy. Since Hegel's concept of freedom was bound up with free ownership of property and he perceived no new principle, it was natural that in the Philosophy of Right, he should see a stabilization of forces in society and the end of progress, therefore of history. "There is a stark truth," the author says, "in Hegel's strangely certain announcement that history has reached its end. But it announces the funeral of a class, not of history." Hegel is thus put forward as the spokesman for the new entrepreneur society, whose limited possibility of development he already (unlike Bentham) clearly foresees.

Hegel's nineteenth-century disillusionment, however, does not compare with the Nazi frenzy in the twentieth century. The principal thesis of the book is that National Socialism owes nothing to Hegel or to German idealism in general, but has been nourished rather by the anti-Hegelian positivists. Paradoxical in view of the frequent allegation that Hegel is one of the fathers of National Socialism, the contention has its plausibility. For one thing, reaction at one period has a different meaning than it has at another. If, as Mussolini once said, fascism is "reaction," it is essentially reaction of the twentieth century. One of the merits of Dr. Marcuse's book is that he so often indicates the political currents and
developments against which Hegel hammered out his supposedly aloof philosophy, and without which its passionate cadence and stresses are bound to be misunderstood. This is not to say that there are not broad similarities across the centuries between certain of Hegel’s ideas and Nazi ideology; but only that ideas do not have the same origin or repercussions or instruments for enforcement in one epoch as they have in another. Some trends in Hegel which approach the Nazi programme have already been cited, but contrasting views are perhaps, as Marcuse holds, even more significant. Thus the Hegelian insistence on rationalism, constitutional guarantees, and the universality of law is, in spite of absolutistic backslidings, utterly different from the lawless Gauleiter system, with its capricious and sadistic cruelty, its sporadic murder of innocent hostages as local measures of decree enforcement, its racialism and intuitive leadership. Hegel deified the Prussian state of the early nineteenth century, seeing around him the uncertain and dangerous possibilities of reform, but would he have had anything but contempt for the Nazi state, given the alternatives that exist today?

One can not but sympathize with the attempt to rescue Hegel or Goethe or any other of the great men of Germany from complicity in the career of National Socialism. Dr. Marcuse has performed good service. On the other hand there runs through the book an unfortunate suggestion, conveyed principally perhaps by implication and omission, that ideas are the prime movers of history, that a philosophy, such as the positivism of Comte or that of F. J. Stahl, for example, could so transform states of mind and habits of thought that fascism would be practically inevitable. In contrast to this theory, which may not have been in the author’s mind, it appears that ideas only take effect when they fall on fertile soil. If one looks for precursors of Nazi ideology one might be led back with some plausibility to Thrasy machus or Machiavelli. But it would soon be apparent that ideas of the past which produced effects were appropriate to the instrumentalities of past periods and can not be supposed to have initiated or even to have envisaged the essentially contemporary, highly industrialized phenomenon of Nazi Germany—a system built upon over-production and under-consumption, seeking its immediate economic salvation in fabulously costly wars, evolving in short as a solution to problems never conceived in previous periods of history.

It appears most promising to regard National Socialism, not primarily as a philosophy, but as a programme of action, or a conspiracy against the people, i.e., the most reactionary solution of the post-war problems of Germany: unemployment, overproduction,
shrinking markets, domestic and foreign. Philosophy, psychology, and anthropology necessary to put through the programme of repression and "unification," were borrowed opportunistically where they could be found, or produced to order. The Nazis could make use of aspects of Hegel's philosophy, although he was often regarded as too close to the French Revolution and to the hateful ideas of the Enlightenment. Likewise, Nazi writers looked askance at the Hegelian theory that in the dialectical process the truth of the lower stages is taken up in the synthesis, for it was essential to their program to induce a sharp break with Weimar and with whatever was humanitarian in the past. Thus the Kierkegaardian dialectic with its drastic, either-or choice between alternatives, involving a complete rejection of the former stadium, was more suitable to Nazi purposes and Kierkegaardian philosophy has continued to boom in Nazi Germany as have few others. Clearer instances of the opportunistc nature of Nazi philosophical maneuvers are provided by the shifts from the familiar ideals of (1) Kinder, Küche und Kirche, (2) Blut und Boden, and (3) the ideal of the peasantry as the backbone of the nation. The first ideal was dropped when the war economy demanded millions of cheap laborers (women) in factories; the second was abandoned in effect by the invasion and settlement of realms of other races, while the third was found inconsistent with the industrialized preparation for war, not to speak of Junker sensibilities. Yet who would deny that these ideals served a purpose for a time? Many examples of such political suborning of philosophy are available, and it would seem important to distinguish such pandering demagogy from genuine philosophy. Yet it is curious that although the sycophant character of Nazi psychology and anthropology is not questioned, certain brands of philosophy on the contrary are often depicted as inseminaters or engineers of National Socialism.

Dr. Marcuse is most successful in denying such a rôle to Hegel's philosophy. His meaning might rather be expressed as follows: Whatever is great in Hegel was rejected by National Socialism, but had long since been adopted and developed by Marx. In the last sentences of the book Dr. Marcuse finds the truth in an unsuspected source. He agrees with Carl Schmidt, leading Nazi political theorist, that "the school that became authoritative in Prussia after 1840 preferred to have the 'conservative' philosophy of F. J. Stahl, while Hegel wandered from Karl Marx to Lenin and to Moscow. . . . On the day of Hitler's ascent to power 'Hegel, so to speak, died'" (p. 419).

How much truth there is in Dr. Marcuse's further interesting thesis, apparently shared by J. H. Muirhead, that "the ideolog-
ical roots of authoritarianism have their soil in the ‘violent reactions’ against Hegel that styled itself the ‘positive philosophy,’” is difficult to determine. The argument appears to be that while Hegel, and idealism in general, subjects what is, the present, the facts, to merciless criticism, according to standards of reason and right, positivism, whether that sponsored by Comte or the very different “positivism” of F. J. Stahl, accepts the factual present without criticism, and tends to uphold, like the sociology of Lorenz von Stein, the ideal of wertfreie science. The result is that facts become normative, the “what is” is accepted as “what should be,” and criticism and reform are discouraged. The worship of facts results in a worship either of the status quo, of success, or of the strongest immediate force for change as such. While an attitude of this kind, especially on the part of scientists, teachers, and professionals, doubtless facilitated the success of the Nazis, it should be remembered that Hegel himself sometimes came very close to identifying “what is” with “what should be,” and that, on the other hand, Nazism is not chiefly distinguished by a worship, but rather by a despair, of fact. Thus of Marcuse’s two sentences below, the first is certainly true, while the second is almost certainly false: “An integral part of totalitarian control is the attack on critical and independent thought. The appeal to facts is substituted for the appeal to reason” (p. 405). The widespread perversion of science in Nazi Germany, the flight from facts taking the form of psychological pressures, as described in Erich Fromm’s new book, Escape from Freedom, and the more basic evasion of rational acceptance and solution on the economic plane, as analyzed by Robert Brady, for example, in The Spirit and Structure of German Fascism, all speak against the second sentence. What the Nazi worships in a genuine sense, not demagogically, is his programme of conquest and domination, for that is his solution of the straits of post-war Germany. Freedom of the individual is not curbed out of respect for fact. The Nazi worships only facts and fictions which promote or break down resistance to his programme. It should be remembered that positivism has been attacked by the Nazis far more frequently and vehemently than has Hegel, who, in spite of Dr. Marcuse’s examples to the contrary, is seldom condemned in Nazi Germany.

Yet if the thesis is that positivism is only the handmaid, but not the creator of fascism, it appears to be partly true. Positivism, skepticism, and relativism hostile to Hegelianism doubtless played a certain part in preparing the psychological ground for the surrender to fascism. The comforting dogmatism and prophylactic action provided by the fascist lore of Volksgemeinschaft and Führer,
and by the cult of the pure planless act in Italy, were perhaps attractive where ideals had been relativized or replaced by official and unyielding "facts." Certainly, as the author's excellent discussion reminds us, there can be no doubt that positivism, not only Stahl’s but Comte’s, turned into the most reactionary realistic apologetics imaginable. Dr. Marcuse’s conjecture as to the bearing of positivism on National Socialism, if only partly true, overturns standard generalizations and gives occasion to serious reconsideration.

V. J. McGill.

HUNTER COLLEGE.

BOOK NOTES


*Hegel über Sittlichkeit und Geschichte.* Gustav E. Müller. Münschen: Ernst Reinhardt. 1940. 100 pp. 2.50 M.

While the usual approach to Hegel’s philosophy has been through Kant, Schelling, and Fichte, certainly a very illuminating view of it is obtained from the vantage point of Greek philosophy. The value of this approach is clearly indicated by Hegel’s intense preoccupation with Greek philosophers, to whom he devotes almost a half of his *History of Philosophy,* his discovery of the beginning of his dialectic in Heraclitus and its culmination in *Parmenides* and *The Sophists,* his vast admiration of Aristotle, and of Greek religion and political ideals. Dr. Gray’s volume, which brings together the various lines of evidence showing the immense influence of Hellenic ideals upon Hegel’s developing philosophy, provides a convenient reference work, but also a lucid, pleasantly written, non-technical introduction to this philosophy itself.

The young Hegel’s enthusiasm for Greek religion, and for exuberant, vital, national or *Volk* religions in general, is well described, as is also his early adverse attitude toward the other-worldly, ascetic, super-national Christianity which "depopulated Valhalla and destroyed the sacred groves," robbing nations of their national myths and heroes. Hegel’s decided preference for tribal gods and cults close to the *Volksgemeinschaft* is noted, without commentary, for the author confines himself mostly to exposition. He often chooses the most colorful illustrations. Thus he reminds us of the contrast, in Hegel’s interpretation, between the fate of Macbeth and that of Antigone. The tragedy of Macbeth was not a Greek tragedy. Macbeth gave allegiance to powers alien to nature, i.e., to the folkways of his people, which impelled him to the blackest murders, while Antigone, Hegel’s favorite heroine, remains true to