reliance upon "the moral sphere" for achieving administrative responsiveness. But no other possibility seems any more promising. The vagaries of social work procedure in the two anonymous counties testify to the futility of legal, regulatory, and enforcement controls. The "will of the people" and "scientific truth" are also rejected. In omitting a really satisfactory solution to the problem, Keith-Lucas may simply be reflecting the facts of administrative life.

Political scientists will be interested in the author's use of the distinction between "responsiveness" and "responsibility" (p. 42), and between public "sentiment" and "opinion" (p. 79). Who among us would quarrel with Keith-Lucas' conclusion that administrators tend to be responsive to their own apprehensions of how a public sentiment might be translated into public opinion? Decisions about People in Need, then, is especially broad in its conceptual background, challenging in its thesis and its omissions, well written despite some distracting errors, and worthy of the attention of students of public administration.

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Of contemporary political philosophers, the late Franz Neumann was one of the more eminent. He conceived of political philosophy in the grand classical tradition; hence, current pragmatism, positivism, and relativism were objects of his strictures. Even when dealing with concrete and immediate problems, Neumann wrestled with issues of perennial significance. In him, the practical and the theoretical, the particular and the universal, and the immediate and the ultimate coalesced. Consider his probing and enduring work, Behemoth.

The Democratic and the Authoritarian State is a collection of the late Professor Neumann's essays, most of which have been previously published. However, it is worthwhile to have these articles and addresses brought together in a single volume for the sake
both of convenience and of permanence. Posthumously published, Professor Herbert Marcuse edited and wrote a Preface to the book. This book, displaying the range of Neumann's interests and knowledge, covers a variety of important themes: political power, law in modern society, types of natural law, Montesquieu, the limits of justifiable disobedience, political and intellectual freedom, the theory of the federal state, the theory of dictatorship, economics and politics, and anxiety and politics.

At first, it seems that the book lacks unity. However, there is a connecting thread that runs throughout the volume. For the unifying theme of the book is Neumann's conception of the problem of political philosophy: the reconciliation of freedom and coercion, liberty and power, right and might. Perceptive of the tensions, anxieties, frustrations, and contradictions which emerge from the pursuit of these twin essentials, he seeks to transcend them. He succeeds in clarifying the problem. One of his merits is that he recognizes the limits of his success. "This dilemma between conscience and social order no theory can solve" (p. 159).

Freedom, according to Neumann, is the absence of restraints, but this conception, he continues, is insufficient. Freedom also means self-determination, the presence of those conditions which enable the individual (who is a rational creature) to fulfill his potentialities. Freedom is constitutive of three elements: juridical, cognitive, and volitional. Even scientific inquiry is justified in terms of its capacity to make men free, for, Neumann insists, self-determination entails knowledge of external nature, of human nature, and of the historical process.

It is apparent to this reviewer that freedom is Neumann's sum-mum bonum. Indeed, it is for him the norm by virtue of which truth is determined. "The truth of a doctrine will depend upon the extent to which it embodies concrete liberty and human dignity, upon its ability to provide for the fullest development of all human potentialities" (p. 72). Here, then is a man who, like Dewey, is a philosopher of freedom.

Neumann's central defect is that he provides no adequate philosophy of value and of man in terms of which the concept of freedom can be validated. It is insufficient to begin with the proposition that man is a rational being, for many crucial questions are begged. Es-
sential, too, is a framework of meaning and value, a conceptual scheme of first principles.

Moreover, the idealistic element in Neumann's thought, the ideal of self-realization, is inadequately formulated and defended. Man's potentialities are many and varied. While some are creative, others are destructive. Accordingly, there is a radical shortcoming in the proposition concerning "the fullest development of all human potentialities." Surely, evil and destructive abilities and potentialities ought not to be accorded "fullest development." The problem is, therefore, that of providing norms to determine which potentialities should be realized and which suppressed. Certainly Neumann does not mean that a Hitler or Stalin ought to be permitted fulfillment of his destructive potentialities. Also, there is the problem of the precise meaning of "self-realization" as well as its status as a valid norm of human striving. What kind of self ought to be realized and why?

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This is Professor Osgood's contribution to the burgeoning shelf of polemic literature on American security policy. His major theme is the obsolescence of "massive retaliation" and the necessity of a newly self-conscious program aimed at limiting war between the United States and the USSR. In this effort, he joins a fairly numerous company of scholars, army and navy officers, journalists, and politicians who have been urging the same doctrine for several years. Except for a more ambitious attempt to ground his argument on basic theoretical principles of war and politics and a somewhat clearer understanding of the role of military power as a means rather than end, his treatment adds but little to what others have said, most notably Henry A. Kissinger in his *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy.*