Eros and Civilization after thirty years

A reconsideration in light of recent theories of narcissism

C. FRED ALFORD
Department of Government and Politics, University of Maryland

It has been over thirty years since the publication of Eros and Civilization, the book that Herbert Marcuse, as well as many of his critics, have regarded as his most significant work.\(^1\) Eros is based almost entirely upon a reinterpretation of Freudian psychology. Yet, even as Eros sharply attacks revisionists who would deviate from this psychology, it introduces a theme that Marcuse would develop more fully in subsequent articles, such as “The Obsolescence of the Freudian Concept of Man” (1963).\(^2\) Marcuse argues that key Freudian categories such as the Oedipus complex no longer seem to capture the experience of growing up in a one-dimensional society. In such a society the male child no longer develops his ego in a protracted and highly personalized conflict with father, who represents the reality principle. Rather, the child is “pre-socialized” by the administrative organs of the state, such as the schools. The father is either absent, seen as ineffectual in comparison with the power of the state, or both. The result is new generations far more compliant, and significantly weaker in ego strength, than previous generations, who grew up in the shelter of the patriarchal bourgeois family. It is as though today the child is socialized by the capitalist state before he has an opportunity to develop his own ego.

Actually, this issue had been a concern of the Frankfurt School for some time. As early as 1936, in “Authority and the Family,” Max Horkheimer suggested that the bourgeois family risked becoming as thoroughly rationalized as the factory.\(^3\) This was a theme developed by Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno in a number of essays written in the 1940s and 1950s, of which the most well known is probably Horkheimer’s reprise, “Authoritarianism and the Family Today” (1949).\(^4\) In recent years, Marcus and the Frankfurt School generally have been sharply criticized for their nostalgia for the patriarchal family of the “bourgeois golden age,” as Horkheimer calls it, prior to the First World War.\(^5\) At the same time a number of scholars, although not necessarily following Marcuse’s exact

© Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht – Printed in the Netherlands
line of analysis, have agreed that the character of psychopathology has indeed changed since Freud's era, as the result of social changes. Particularly noticeable has been the rise in the number of narcissistic personality disorders. In fact, the very idea of a "culture of narcissism," developed by Christopher Lasch and others, draws heavily upon Marcuse's analysis of the way in which one-dimensional society gives rise to a new personality type: outwardly adaptive and compliant, but inwardly filled with rage. Lasch has discussed at some length the relation between Marcuse's analysis and his own. Yet it would be misleading to see Marcuse merely as one of the first critics of the culture of narcissism. Eros contains a wide-ranging reevaluation of narcissism, showing it to be a potentially emancipatory force, not merely a regressive one. Stanley Aronowitz, particularly, has drawn attention to this aspect of Marcuse's work. In this respect Marcuse is in tune with such theorists of narcissism as Béla Grunberger and Janine Chassesgue-Smirgel, who emphasize the dual orientation of narcissism: that it, is the source of some of humanity's greatest achievements, as well as its most degrading follies.

Since the publication of Eros in 1955, the theory of narcissism has undergone rapid development. Although Marcuse anticipates aspects of this development, recent theories of narcissism can help clarify Marcuse's attempt to make narcissism the core of a new reality principle. Two aspects of Eros are especially problematic. First, Marcuse's reinterpretation of Freud on the process of sublimation seems to involve a fundamental misrepresentation of Freudian theory. An advantage of the theory of narcissism is that it allows us to see Marcuse's virtual misrepresentation of Freud in a new light. This will enable us to move beyond the debate over whether Eros is flawed because in it Marcuse sticks too closely to Freud, or because he does not stick closely enough. The second problem is that aspects of Marcuse's erotic utopia seem terribly regressive, even infantile, in character. The goal seems to be instinctual gratification for its own sake. "Higher values" are not only, but merely, a detour from genuine gratification.

In a recent article, "Beyond Drive Theory," Nancy Chodorow links this aspect of Marcuse's work to his embrace of narcissism. Narcissism, she notes, in effect denies that the external world, including other people, possesses an independent existence. The narcissist's "refusal to accept separation from the libidinous object (or subject)," his "union with a whole world of love and pleasure," denies the object or external world its own separateness and choice." Chodorow concludes that the "higher values" that Marcuse would transcend must include respect and concern for the needs and autonomy of others. In a word, the narcissist neither
knows nor cares that others have needs as real and legitimate as his own. A world composed solely of such individuals would seem to have more in common with Hobbes's state of nature than an erotic utopia. As Chodorow puts it, the "narcissistic mode of relating and of drive gratification based on the pleasure principle precludes those very intersubjective relationships that should form the core of any social and political vision."12

Chodorow's criticism is trenchant. Particularly compelling is her demonstration of how difficult it is to make drive theory, so concerned with individual satisfaction, the basis of social theory, which is properly concerned with mutuality and the recognition of the subjectivity of others. Yet, her interpretation of the role of narcissism could be misleading, were it taken to suggest that narcissism serves only archaic, regressive needs.13 It is the primary characteristic of the theory of narcissism developed by Grunberger and Chasseguet-Smirgel that it emphasizes the duality of narcissism: that its regressive potential may be transformed into the ground of mature autonomy, which recognizes the rights and needs of others. At the same time, narcissism remains a demanding principle. It may be rendered compatible with society. However, narcissism will never be thoroughly socialized. For narcissism, as for eros, too much satisfaction is never enough. A reinterpretation of Marcuse's erotic utopia in light of narcissism is thus not likely to eventuate in accommodationist or revisionist conclusions. Unlike Chodorow, the theory of narcissism is sympathetic to the radical individualism that she identifies as being at the root of Eros. The theory of narcissism concerns how this individualism can be tempered, not how it can be overcome.

In the next section, I consider Marcuse's treatment of narcissism in Eros. Following this I compare Marcuse's understanding of narcissism with the theories of narcissism of Grunberger and Chasseguet-Smirgel. Finally, these recent theories are brought to bear on Marcuse's erotic ideal, revealing its progressive and regressive aspects. Addressed again in this context is the question suggested by Chodorow. To what degree is narcissism truly capable of transcending its roots in selfishness? I conclude that the primary contribution of recent theories of narcissism is showing why instinctual gratification is so desirable: not merely because it meets a physical need, but because it reveals to the individual that he is capable of meeting his own needs; he need not totally depend on others as he did as an infant. It is this insight that opens the door to the possibility that labor and cultural activity generally might — if properly organized — be gratifying in their own right. This is contrary to a regressive theme in Marcuse's
analysis in *Eros*, in which virtually any activity undertaken under constraint (including that imposed by nature) is seen as a detour from genuine gratification.

**Marcuse and Narcissus**

Marcuse argues that Freud's discovery of primary narcissism meant more than the addition of just another (the earliest) stage in the development of the libido. Narcissism reflects another orientation toward reality, one that engulfs its environment, rather than standing in opposition to it. It is in this vein that Marcuse quotes from *Civilization and its Discontents*.

> Originally the ego includes everything; later it detaches itself from the external world. The ego-feeling we are aware of now is only a shrunken vestige of a far more extensive feeling — a feeling which embraced the universe and expressed an inseparable connection of the ego with the external world.  

Freud, as is well known, goes on to say that he has never had such an oceanic feeling, and found it very difficult "to work with these almost intangible quantities." Marcuse is, of course, less circumspect, arguing that the fundamental relatedness to reality expressed in narcissism might, under the proper social conditions "generate a comprehensive existential order. In other words, *narcissism may contain the germ of a different reality principle*: the libidinal cathexis of the ego (one's own body) may become the source and reservoir for a new libidinal cathexis of the object world."\(^{15}\)

This view, says Marcuse, holds out the possibility of an entirely different mode of sublimation: one that results from an extension rather than from a "constraining deflection of the libido."\(^{16}\) Much of the rest of *Eros and Civilization* is speculation about how erotic self-sublimation, based upon an extension rather than a deflection of the libido, might become the basis of an entirely new order based upon the pleasure principle. It should not be overlooked that in framing the issue in this way Marcuse to some extent must misrepresent Freud. For Freud, sublimation can, in a certain sense, heighten pleasure by finding more reliable, realistic, and ego-syntonic (where erotic cathexes are in accordance with ego-tendencies) means to its realization.\(^{17}\) Such a perspective is apparently alien to Marcuse. For Marcuse, repression and Freudian sublimation hang together, because both deflect eros from its ultimate aim. This is the only issue for Marcuse.

In formulating the possibility of non-repressive sublimation, Marcuse turns to "The Ego and the Id," where Freud asks "whether all sublimation
does not take place through the agency of the ego, which begins by chang-
ing sexual object-libido into narcissistic libido, and then, perhaps, goes on to give it another aim.” 18 If this is the case, says Marcuse, then perhaps “all sublimation would begin with the reactivation of narcissistic libido, which somehow overflows and extends to objects. The hypothesis all but revolutionizes the idea of sublimation: it hints at a non-repressive mode of sublimation.” 19

However, as so many critics have pointed out, there is virtually no evi-
dence in Freud for such a concept of non-repressive sublimation. Indeed, even in the passage that Marcuse quotes in support of his claim that “sub-
limation would begin with the reactivation of narcissistic libido, which somehow overflows and extends to objects,” Freud suggests that the ego is the agency (mediator) involved. The “somehow” process invoked by Marcuse, if it is to refer to Freud at all, can refer only to Freud’s subsequent discussion in the passage cited by Marcuse of how the ego is the agency that helps the male child abandon his attachment to mother, by encourag-
ing his confrontation with the reality principle as represented by father.20 If this is so, then Marcuse can hardly employ Freud in support of his claim that a reactivation of primary narcissism could provide a means of non-
repressive sublimation, as Sidney Lipshires argues so clearly.21 Further-
more, Freud’s reference to narcissism in the passage quoted by Marcuse refers only to the way in which the ego abandons its libidinal attachment to objects, such as mother. It has nothing to do with the way in which libido is redirected or generalized, what Marcuse refers to as the “transformation of sexuality into eros”; i.e., sublimation, repressive or otherwise.22

Non-repressive sublimation is such a central concept for Marcuse because it is the basis for his argument that a society without repression is possible. Unfortunately, the “hint” that Marcuse finds in Freud for this possibility turns out to be no hint at all. However, by turning to the theory of narcissism developed by Grunberger and Chasseguet-Smirgel the issue can be reconceptualized. This reconceptualization does not suggest that most repression can be rendered surplus. It does suggest that narcissism could indeed be the ground of a new orientation toward reality, one that stands between the pleasure principle and the reality principle. Indeed, narcissism bridges these principles, by emphasizing the depth of gratification that can be achieved by mastering aspects of reality. At the same time, narcissism can be as demanding as eros. Though capable of being exploited just as eros is (recall Marcuse’s concept of “repressive desublimation”23), narcissism does not readily accept false substitutes for genuine satisfaction. In particular, narcissism will not readily confuse mastery with alienated labor and comfortable adaptation to reality.
Narcissism as worldview

For most practicing psychoanalysts in the United States today the field of narcissism is circumscribed by the work of Heinz Kohut and Otto Kernberg. Indeed, an issue of the *Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association* concerned solely with narcissism was totally devoted to the work of Kohut and Kernberg. Other theorists barely figured.24 Like Kohut, Grunberger and Chassequet-Smirgel are concerned with the vicissitudes of the self. However, unlike Kohut’s “self-psychology,” Grunberger and Chassequet-Smirgel stress the fundamental importance of the drives. In this respect their work comes closer to Kernberg’s, which combines a commitment to drive theory with a recognition of the importance of the self. That is, Kernberg understands pathological narcissism as exaggerated libidinal investment in a pathological self structure.25 Several comments by Grunberger support this claim of an affinity between his work and Kernberg’s.26 In general, however, it seems fair to conclude that both Grunberger and Chassequet-Smirgel hold to a fairly orthodox view of psychoanalysis, according to which narcissism is not a unique phenomenon requiring a special vocabulary, but is rather part of a larger psychodynamic uncovered by Freud.27 What makes the work of Grunberger and Chassequet-Smirgel unique is their – especially Chassequet-Smirgel’s – emphasis on the ego ideal, a concept Freud introduced to psychoanalysis, but did not systematically develop.28 It is the concept of the ego ideal that lends itself so well to an understanding narcissism as a worldview, not merely a clinical phenomenon.

Following Freud, both Grunberger and Chassequet-Smirgel treat the ego ideal as the avatar of primary narcissism. For each, the ego ideal contains the image of a time when the individual was his own standard of perfection. He was the cosmos, and all was bliss. This time was, of course, that of primary narcissism.29 All of life, they suggest, is oriented toward the reunification of the individual and his ego ideal, the carrier of the image of narcissistic perfection. The only question is whether the pursuit of reunification proceeds in a progressive or regressive fashion. Chassequet-Smirgel quotes Freud, who states that

As always where libido is concerned, here again man has shown himself incapable of giving up a gratification he has once enjoyed. He is not willing to forgo the narcissistic perfection of his childhood… [H]e seeks to recover the early perfection, thus wrested from him, in the form of an ego ideal. What he projects before him as his ideal is the substitute for the lost narcissism of his childhood — the time when he was his own ideal.30
Grunberger elaborates upon the phenomenology of narcissism, characterizing it in terms of an unconscious memory of a privileged state of elation, understood in terms of the experience of the infant shortly before and after birth. Associated with this privileged state is a sense of wholeness and omnipotence, even pride, as well as an experience of uniqueness. In this regard, Grunberger sees Lou Andreas-Salomé's "The Dual Orientation of Narcissism," as central. In this essay Andreas-Salomé articulates what might be regarded as the central irony of pathological narcissism: it seeks individuality at all costs, yet cannot live outside a state of fusion with another. Grunberger explains this state in terms of an unconscious memory of the first months of life, in which there was no distinction between self and other (i.e., mother). In such a state the other's power is experienced as an extension of one's own to such a degree that one's dependence upon it is not recognized: a contradictory state of total freedom and total dependence. All human experience, says Grunberger, can be seen in terms of an attempt to recapture this state of narcissistic wholeness, power, and control. "One could regard all the manifestations of civilization as a kaleidoscope of different attempts by man to restore narcissistic omnipotence."

As Freud states in a footnote to "Instincts and their Vicissitudes," the disturbance of the primary narcissistic state is linked to the subject's incapacity to help himself. Or, as Grunberger puts it, the infant is an outcast in two worlds: he is unable to meet his instinctual urges in a satisfactory manner (the recognition of this inability is, of course, what shatters the narcissistic illusion of omnipotence), nor is he able to achieve narcissistic satisfaction. The result is a humiliating sense of powerlessness. What will ultimately make up for this humiliation — called narcissistic injury — to some degree is a sense of "object mastery": an ability to control one's environment, and oneself. Chasseguet-Smirgel expresses this concept of object mastery in terms of the ego ideal. In the course of normal development, the ideal is projected before the individual as a hope, guide, and promise. The content of this promise is that in growing up the individual will be able to recapture something of the lost perfection of the world as experienced in the state of primary fusion. This would involve, according to Chasseguet-Smirgel, the acquisition of real capacities to influence the world, the integration of libidinal needs with the demands of the superego, and above all a sense that in so doing the ego is moving closer to becoming its own ideal. This might seem to be pale satisfaction in comparison to the omnipotence promised by primary narcissism, and Chasseguet-Smirgel agrees.
It is not doubt inaccurate to say that the ego ideal becomes less demanding. The goal pursued is still equally grandiose (that is to say incest) [understood as refusion with mother], but the subject is no longer bound by the law of all or nothing, by the necessity of immediate and total gratification.\textsuperscript{36} We shall consider more fully later whether object mastery, even for a subject “no longer bound by the law of all or nothing,” could ever adequately compensate him for the lost narcissism of the earliest stage of life. For now the key theoretical issue is the relation of the ego ideal to the superego. About this issue Freud is of little help. As Chasseguet-Smirgel points out, the term “ego ideal” first appears in Freud’s 1914 article on narcissism, and by 1923 was almost completely absorbed by the concept of the superego.\textsuperscript{37} If there is a consensus today, it would probably be that the ego ideal comprises the most archaic levels of the superego, including elements of grandiosity and rage.\textsuperscript{38} The issue is important because it bears heavily upon the question of how civilized the ego ideal is capable of becoming. If it is not civilized at all, if it is only a carrier of archaic images of omnipotence, grandiosity, and rage at those who fail to support such fantasies, reducing the distance between ego and ego ideal can hardly become the goal of mature object mastery. On the other hand, if it is too civilized the ego ideal can hardly serve as a source of genuine individuality and non-identity with an imperfect world. Chasseguet-Smirgel attempts to strike a balance, writing in terms of the pre-genital ego ideal being “aufgehoben” in the superego.\textsuperscript{39} However, she notes that

\begin{quote}
even a well-established superego is not sufficient to provide man with the food he requires for his narcissism ... Man needs both bread and roses. The ego ideal can live in friendship with the superego when it [the ego ideal] has itself acquired that maturative quality that I have spoken about and effected a certain number of instincual integrations.\textsuperscript{40}
\end{quote}

Though capable of being tamed, it appears that the ego ideal will not be readily co-opted by society, as it continually seeks the perfection of the self; i.e., the restoration of a state prior to narcissistic injury. In this respect, the ego ideal fulfills a key function that Marcuse assigns to eros: it serves as a source of negativity, non-identity, and resistance to society. Like eros, the ego ideal is not easily satisfied. Could the ego ideal also serve as a locus of pleasure and gratification as well? If it could, then reconciliation with one’s ego ideal could become an instance of the pleasure principle. This possibility will be considered later.

Narcissism, for both Grunberger and Chasseguet-Smirgel, acts to give a sense of dignity to the pursuit of libidinal satisfaction. The achievement
of libidinal satisfaction acts to confirm the autonomy and value of the individual: that he is capable of meeting his own needs, and worthy of their satisfaction. Conversely, Grunberger interprets depression as an attack by the narcissistic agency on the ego, punishing the ego for its inability to seek pleasure effectively or accept it. Marion Oliner succinctly captures the role of narcissism in the dynamics of mental development. "The role of the narcissistic factor within psychosexual development rests in its bestowing a sense of worth on strivings that have a foundation in biology."

Marcuse apparently assumes that the only alternative to a society based upon repression (i.e., all previous societies) is a society organized to provide effortless gratification to all. Why he makes this assumption will be considered shortly. However, a result of this assumption is already apparent. Taking effortless gratification as his ideal seems to lead Marcuse to stress the passive, regressive aspects of the "narcissism principle." He pays less attention to the way in which the quest for mastery and control can also contribute to narcissistic gratification, by fostering a sense of worth. This theme is developed in the next two sections.

Narcissism and civilization

Having considered the theory of narcissism in some detail, I now want to return here to *Eros and Civilization*, in order to analyze further the relations among narcissism, eros, gratification, and mastery. Marcuse claims that the "images of Orpheus and Narcissus reconcile Eros and Thanatos." Consider how Marcuse characterizes this reconciliation, in terms of the "halt of time, the absorption of death; silence, sleep, night, paradise – the Nirvana principle not as death but as life." Surely the reconciliation Marcuse writes of here is tantamount to a return to the womb, the paradigm of the most regressive moment of narcissistic gratification. It involves no misrepresentation to conclude that Marcuse comes close to equating eros and narcissism. Indeed, Marcuse provides the missing term in this equation. In a society governed by the pleasure principle, says Marcuse, eros and thanatos would cease their constant struggle, and together be transformed into the nirvana principle, which seeks eternal freedom from pain, stimulation, and anxiety. It is the nirvana principle, in which eros and thanatos are "aufgehoben," that is tantamount to narcissism. Like nirvana, narcissism seeks a state of primitive gratification so complete that the distinction between self and other, and hence the distinction between life and death, is blurred. Indeed, it is for this reason that
several theorists of narcissism have characterized narcissism in terms of its indifference to death. Conversely, pathological narcissism (in which later psychological development remains under the thrall of primary narcissism) is often characterized by insomnia, interpreted by some theorists as the result of an unconscious failure to distinguish sleep and death. As Marcuse puts it in discussing the autoeroticism of Narcissus: "If his erotic attitude is akin to death and brings death, then rest and sleep and death are not painfully separated and distinguished: the Nirvana principle rules throughout all these stages." It is, of course, precisely this aspect of narcissism that accounts for its regressive potential, particularly its inability to distinguish freedom from fusion with the power of another, life from death.

If it is not too misleading to interpret what Marcuse calls eros in terms of narcissism, then it is not illegitimate to employ the theory of narcissism to criticize—and praise—Eros and Civilization. From the perspective of the theory of narcissism considered here, the most problematic aspect of Marcuse's work is its utter separation of object mastery and gratification. That is, Marcuse overlooks the way in which mastery can also serve to recover something of the lost omnipotence of primary narcissism, by fostering reconciliation between ego and ego ideal. In this way mastery may serve gratificaton, if gratification is not simply reduced to instinctual relief, as it frequently is by Marcuse. To be sure, much of what passes for mastery should be called by its right name: alienated labor. In this respect Marcuse is quite correct in rejecting Ives Hendrick's "Work and the Pleasure Principle," which posits a separate mastery instinct that is fulfilled in labor, but makes no adequate distinction between alienated and non-alienated labor. Instead, Marcuse embraces Barbara Lantos's "Work and the Instincts," which argues that play is dominated by polymorphous sexuality, whereas labor serves merely the purpose of self-preservation. Yet, Marcuse misinterprets Lantos on a key point. For Lantos, the child's play represents more than just autoerotic gratification; it may also provide gratification by promoting a sense of mastery and control. It is thus quite misleading for Marcuse to suggest that Lantos provides support for his claim that eros and mastery belong to two entirely different realms of experience: the pleasure principle and the reality principle. Instead, it is precisely Lantos's point to suggest how thoroughly eros and mastery are blended in play. "We may say that the pregenital organization of the sexual instincts has its parallel in the play organization of the ego-activities."

To be sure, Marcuse writes of erotic labor, which might seem to suggest that he believes that eros and mastery could be blended. However, erotic
labor turns out to have little in common with labor as it is ordinarily understood. In particular, any activity performed under the constraint of necessity, however remote, cannot qualify as erotic labor. To be sure, Marcuse calls eros a "prop" for "work relations." However, by work relations Marcuse means primarily the social relations of building culture, and secondarily the social relations among workers, such as feelings of friendship and solidarity among work groups. In neither case does Marcuse refer to the actual act of laboring itself. Marcuse does state that it is the purpose and not the content of an activity that marks it as work or play. This seems to suggest that under erotic social relations even such activities as ditch digging could be pleasurable. Yet, ditch digging could be pleasurable only if it were a hobby done entirely for its own sake. The purpose at issue for Marcuse is only whether the work is necessary. It is the necessity of work that marks it as a constraint on human freedom, and thus shows it to be labor.

There are several reasons why Marcuse separates labor and pleasure (including the pleasure gained through mastery) so sharply. One of the most important has to do with the internal theoretical structure of Marcuse's argument. For Marcuse, eros loses its ability to be self-sublimating unless it is entirely free from social control, including that control exercised by society's efforts to combat scarcity. This is because erotic self-sublimation is based upon an overflow of erotic energy to the entire body, a process that is incompatible with any repression whatsoever. Because I have addressed this aspect of Marcuse's scheme in a recent hook, I will not recapitulate it here. The key point is that Marcuse's erotic utopia comes to depend heavily — perhaps more heavily than any theorist since Francis Bacon — upon scientific and technological progress. Only such progress, transformed into total automation, can create the conditions of non-repressive sublimation: the elimination of labor, under whose necessity eros is localized in the genitals (the result of the "successful" resolution of the oedipus conflict), rather than remaining free to overflow to other elements of the psyche in such a "diluted" state that eros would no longer be the enemy of civilization. Marcuse does not shrink from this conclusion. "The more complete the alienation of labor, the greater the potential of freedom: total automation would be the optimum."

Science and technology thus become terribly important in Marcuse's project. Transformed by industry, they become the vehicles by which Marcuse's erotic utopia is to be realized. About this use of science and technology Chasseguet-Smirgel makes an interesting remark. She argues that although scientific and technological progress requires secondary process
thinking, demanding as it does vastly sophisticated versions of reality testing, such progress is nonetheless experienced at a deep psychological level as magic itself; i.e., as primary process, in which wish and fulfillment are as one. It seems to her

legitimate to take into account the external activating factors (which nonetheless have their roots in the individual psyche of every human being) of this ancient wish for reunification of ego and ideal, by the shortest possible route, namely Illusion. The development of the pathology I have attempted to outline is to be set to the account of those factors which take progress made by science as confirmation of the possibility of an immediate reunification of ego and ideal.\textsuperscript{56}

Nowhere is this illusion more clearly expressed by Marcuse than in his vision of science and technology, guided by eros, as leading to a world that “could (in a literal sense!) embody, incorporate, the human faculties and desires to such an extent that they appear as part of the objective determinism of nature.”\textsuperscript{57}

Such a vision is profoundly narcissistic, reflecting as it does the themes of grandiosity, omnipotence, and oceanic fusion with an entire universe. Andreas-Salomé interprets the myth of Narcissus in such a way as to capture this aspect particularly well. “Bear in mind that the Narcissus of legend gazed, not in a man-made mirror, but at the mirror of Nature. Perhaps it was not just himself that he beheld in the mirror, but himself as if he were still All.”\textsuperscript{58}

\textit{The progressive aspect of a regressive ideal}

One might respond in Marcuse’s defense that to suggest that his ideal is in fact terribly regressive is actually a compliment, at least in comparison with the prevailing reality principle, which sees maturity in terms of repression, sacrifice, renunciation, and control. There would be some truth to such a response. Some progressive consequences of Marcuse’s regressive ideal are suggested by Martin Jay, in “Anamnestic Totalization: Reflections on Marcuse’s Theory of Remembrance.” According to Marcuse, it is because we have known, at the very beginning of life, such a surfeit of gratification — “oceanic contentment” — that we continue to demand (even if this demand is generally repressed and confined to the unconscious) happiness. It is this memory, often ineffable, that is a primary source of revolutionary activity, if it can be tapped.\textsuperscript{59} The memory of primitive gratification thus serves not merely as the Siren call toward passivity and withdrawal; it also has the potential to spur the self to action.
Jay also notes an additional aspect of Marcuse's account that raises an issue not usually addressed by psychoanalysis. Marcuse considers the possibility that the "memory" of primitive gratification could, at least in some measure, be not the memory of an actual experience, but of an ideal, and "imaginary temps perdu in the real life of mankind," as Marcuse calls it. This is a distinction not considered by Grunberger or Chasseguet-Smirgel in their account of narcissism. However, even if the ego ideal contains not the memory of an actual experience, but the longing for something that never was, "oceanic contentment," this would not fundamentally alter the argument of this essay. This argument is based upon the demanding character of the ego ideal, not its sources. In any case, Marcuse’s observation reminds us once again of the subtlety of his analysis.

This subtlety is confirmed by the way Marcuse so frequently approaches the ideal of primitive gratification: as an aesthetic experience. It is Orpheus and Narcissus as culture symbols — i.e., Orpheus and Narcissus as they are mediated by the aesthetic experience of their stories — that Marcuse values so highly. Marcuse values this experience because he believes, following Kant, that the aesthetic experience is the realm in which the senses and intellect meet. This suggests that Marcuse does not always intend that his erotic utopia be seen as a place. Rather, it is a realm — an aesthetic dimension — of truths as valid and timeless as the truths of reason and intellect. It is the purpose of Eros to champion this realm, which is, of course, not the same thing as championing regressive gratification per se. The details of an actual world in which the rational and sensuous (the original meaning of aesthetics, according to Marcuse) would meet as equals remains unclear in Marcuse’s work. The guiding principle of such a world is, however, most definite. The performance principle and the domination of nature would give way to play and joy as principles of civilization.

It might seem that the emphasis on object mastery and control associated with the theory of narcissism is incompatible with Marcuse’s insight into the truths of the aesthetic dimension. Were this so the theory of narcissism would be incompatible with Marcuse’s project; it could hardly serve as the source of an immanent critique. In fact, the theory of narcissism also sharply challenges the unbounded quest for mastery so closely associated with the prevailing reality principle, particularly as this quest is expressed in the project that the Frankfurt School called the domination of nature. Narcissism originates in the infant’s symbiotic fusion with mother, a state in which dependence and independence are not yet differentiated. The theory of narcissism sees in the unmitigated scientific and technological quest
to control nature not merely a denial of infantile dependence, but any dependence at all, including that of humanity upon nature itself. One sees this in Chasseguet-Smirgel’s analysis of the way in which scientific progress can promote regressive narcissistic fantasies of total control over the natural world. The denial of genuine and realistic dependence and relatedness is, in fact, as characteristic of narcissism as in the quest for fusion. Indeed, it is the paradoxical coexistence of these two orientations that constitutes the defining characteristic of narcissism according to Grunberger and Andreas-Salomé.

*Eros and Civilization* is such a striking expression of narcissism precisely because both orientations are expressed so dramatically in virtually the same breath. In Marcuse’s utopian vision, science, technology, and total automation are to achieve humanity’s utter independence from the constraints of the natural world, so that humanity can achieve an erotic fusion with this world so extensive that human desires “appear as part of the objective determinism of nature.” Narcissism, according to Grunberger, represents a time when the infant lived in a “cosmos filled solely with his own being, which is both megalomaniacal and intangible, merging with his own bliss.” It is this state Marcuse’s utopia seems designed to recapture. If the theory of narcissism considered here is correct, this is precisely what utopia should — indeed must — recapture. The only question is whether Marcuse’s utopia does not sometimes confuse progressive and regressive means to its realization, in part because Marcuse sees mastery and gratification as implacable opponents, no matter how society might be organized. Marcuse sees mastery and gratification as incompatible in large measure because he sees the pleasure principle as the only alternative to the reality principle. Though he introduces the narcissism principle in order to theorize a self-sublimating, hence self-regulating, pleasure principle, he never truly captures the complexity of narcissism. Narcissism remains a somewhat less socially disruptive — in large measure because its aims are pre-genital — version of the pleasure principle. Marcuse thus fails to capture the complexity of narcissism: that it is capable of pursuing the most regressive aims by means of the most progressive, autonomous strategies. In so doing narcissism bridges the reality and pleasure principles, whereas Marcuse reduces narcissism to a particularly regressive version of the pleasure principle. This makes it far more difficult for Marcuse to develop the progressive, potentially revolutionary, demands that are also implied by his regressive ideal.
Mastery and gratification

Marcuse's erotic utopia grasps the social implications of what is ordinarily a private, indeed unconscious, quest: the pursuit of narcissistic perfection. In so doing Marcuse reveals the incompleteness of Grunberger's claim that "one could regard all the manifestations of civilization as a kaleidoscope of different attempts by man to restore narcissistic omnipotence." Eros suggests that this claim should better read, "one could regard all the manifestations of civilization as a kaleidoscope of different attempts by some men to restore their narcissistic omnipotence by perpetuating the narcissistic humiliation of others, in the form of differential opportunities to exercise mastery and control." That such an epigram could have been written by Marcuse reminds us that he is also a great realist. Indeed, this is why Freud's Civilization and Its Discontents is so attractive to Marcuse. It states uncompromisingly that society requires far more instinctual renunciation than it ever compensates for via opportunities for secure gratification. Not socialist revolution, but only an erotic utopia, could ever eliminate this discomfort. Or, as Marcuse puts it in responding to Erich Fromm and other too easily satisfied revisionists, "socialism cannot liberate Eros from Thanatos." Yet, this remains the goal. However, our considerations suggest that Marcuse's embrace of Freud regarding the burden of civilization could be misleading, at least insofar as it neglects why instinctual renunciation is so painful. It is not merely a matter of lost opportunities for satisfaction, but rather as Grunberger puts it: "The instinctual sacrifices that man must make to become civilized are painful in large part because they have the nature of narcissistic injury, which is compensated for in only small measure by the cathexis of civilization as a value in itself." Such a perspective is fruitful because it suggests that the issue is not so much absence of gratification per se, but that such lost gratification is coupled with narcissistic humiliation, rather than compensated for by mastery.

The advantage of such a perspective is that it suggests that mundane -- albeit thoroughly revolutionary -- social changes could help heal the narcissistic wound, by promoting reconciliation between ego and ego ideal, the avatar of narcissism. Indeed, such a perspective suggests that mature forms of mastery might not merely compensate for lost gratification, but would in fact become a form of gratification. Why this is so is suggested by Chasseguet-Smirlig. The ego ideal follows, she notes, directly from Freud's observations that nothing is harder to give up than a pleasure once experienced. Indeed, we never give a pleasure up, we only exchange one pleasure for another. From this perspective it appears that the ego ideal
is the substitute for the greatest pleasure of all: narcissistic perfection. Reconciliation between ego and ideal, fostered by mastery, thus brings genuine pleasure, not merely satisfaction in a job well done. Gratification and mastery are inseparable. Or rather, mastery is the highest form of gratification, for it meets the narcissistic needs of the self for wholeness and perfection. Mastery is not merely bread, but roses.

From the perspective of the theory of narcissism lost opportunities for gratification are painful not merely because of the absence of pleasure. Lost opportunities are painful because they highlight the ego's vulnerability and inadequacy: its inability to achieve satisfaction. What would a society look like that reduced narcissistic humiliation to an absolute minimum, while fostering "object mastery" for all citizens? This topic cannot be pursued here, and fortunately it is not necessary. The list of reforms, from self-determination in the work place, to the political empowerment of local groups, is familiar, and has been addressed by a wide variety of authors: Karl Marx, John Stuart Mill (On Liberty), Carole Pateman (Participation and Democratic Theory), Rudolf Bahro (The Alternative), Benjamin Barber (Strong Democracy), and Philip Green (Retrieving Democracy), to mention just a few. The list is long, and hardly new. Indeed, in his last published work Marcuse enthusiastically embraces Bahro's book. The key point is, of course, that neither bureaucratic socialism nor the welfare state will suffice. Whatever the exact outlines of a society that fostered genuine mastery, it would have to be highly participatory and genuinely democratic in every aspect of collective life.

Narcissistic injury stems from the discrepancy between the ego's abilities and the ego ideal. A society that fostered genuine mastery for every citizen, by creating real (i.e., not merely formal) opportunities for self-determination in politics and the work place, would foster reconciliation between ego and ego ideal by reducing the discrepancy between them. Self-determination, such a familiar cliche, would take on a new meaning: it would refer to opportunities for each citizen to exert greater mastery over his or her environment (the mature object world), by undertaking increasingly more sophisticated responsibilities at work and in the community. A society so organized would encourage all individuals to project their ego ideals forward, into the possibility of their own development, rather than backwards, into more regressive modes of satisfaction. These are, it will be recalled, the only choices. The path of mature narcissism should not, however, be confused with the path of mere repression and denial. Mastery may be a long and arduous path, but it is nonetheless the path of pleasure, because it connects the most primitive narcissistic desires (par-
particularly for the perfection of the self) with the greatest achievements of individuals and groups: those that make the world a more humane place in which to live. This last statement assumes, of course, that decent and humane values are practiced as well as praised in society, so that these values may have a real opportunity of being internalized within the ego ideal in the first place. Generally this is a counterfactual assumption. However, our considerations suggest that the attempt to promote as well as realize such values can itself be a form of mastery, and hence gratification. The theory of narcissism thus does more than characterize utopia; it connects utopia with efforts to realize it. That Marcuse is utterly unable to make this connection has been frequently noted.\textsuperscript{70}

*Can narcissism transcend its roots in selfishness?*

In *The Heresy of Self-Love*, Paul Zweig examines narcissistic themes in literature. Zweig's understanding of narcissism is not psychoanalytically informed. Often he seems to equate narcissism with withdrawal, and a morbid concern with the self. Nevertheless, Zweig's main point is incisive, and complements the approach of this essay. Self-love is heretical because it is a source of subversive individualism that challenges society and authority. In particular, self-love challenges all those forces that alienate the individual from him or her self, that threaten authentic wholeness and individuality. Paramount among these forces today are industrialism, bureaucracy, and commerce (or rather, the transformation of all relationships into commercial ones).\textsuperscript{71} Zweig's heroes, such as Kierkegaard, Baudelaire, and Walt Whitman, all retreat into the self in order to resist these fragmenting forces. However, Zweig is quick to distinguish among heroes, neurotics, and the mad. His heroes are those who, after withdrawing into the sanctuary of the inner self, are able to communicate to others the potential for authenticity and wholeness that they find there. His heroes risk the madness of isolation, and are saved by their ability to reach out to others and touch them with what they have found.

The role of narcissism in Marcuse's work should be seen in a similar fashion. The roots of narcissism do indeed tap a level of experience that cares only for the wholeness and fulfillment of the self. This, though, is not a purely negative phenomenon, as Zweig points out. Rather, it is precisely because of its roots that narcissism serves as such a powerful source of opposition to all that would fragment this wholeness. Indeed, Jay makes a similar point in his analysis, discussed earlier, of how Marcuse sees in the memory of primitive gratification a source of revolutionary activity.
What is necessary is that these profoundly selfish demands be socialized without being co-opted. Needed are the men and women whom Zweig calls heroes: those who can communicate this experience to others, and use its demands to help build a better society. It is a purpose of this essay to show how this process is aided by the duality of narcissism itself: that narcissism has the potential to find the most primitive narcissistic gratification in the pursuit of the most mature values, including those values that recognize the autonomy and needs of others.

To be sure, narcissism is not a source of mutuality per se. Narcissism is, however, compatible with mutuality and the recognition of the subjectivity of others. To ask more of narcissism would be to compromise the source of its power, what Zweig calls the subversive individualism of self-love. Conversely, there is no reason to assume that narcissism is the only source of mature autonomy. Jessica Benjamin, for example, has studied the roots of autonomy in the child’s earliest relations with others — that is, she has studied how autonomy develops from relationships, not merely the demands of the drives. Nonetheless, though it is not the only source, narcissism remains a particularly deep and powerful font of genuine autonomy. It is for this reason that the theory of narcissism is so compatible with an immanent critique of Marcuse’s project. Unlike the perspectives of Chodorow and Benjamin, the theory of narcissism supports Marcuse’s subversive individualism. On the other hand, the theory of narcissism reveals that even subversive individualism can be socialized without being co-opted, a distinction Marcuse is unable to appreciate fully. It is Aristotle’s comment on friendship that perhaps best captures the balance between mutuality and selfishness that is expressed in the theory of narcissism.

One will wish the greatest good for his friend as a human being. But perhaps not all the greatest goods, for each man wishes for his own good most of all. (N. Ethics, 1159a 10 – 13.)

Conclusion

It is now apparent that whether Marcuse misrepresents Freud on the process of sublimation is not a key issue. To be sure, Marcuse does misrepresent Freud. However, the key issue is whether doing so leads Marcuse in a fruitful direction. The proper answer would seem to be yes, but... Yes, because as theorists of narcissism have shown, the narcissism principle is as fundamental as the pleasure and reality principles. Indeed, the narcissism principle acts to bridge the gap between them, by emphasizing the depth
of pleasure possible from mastering aspects of reality. However, Marcuse does not take this insight as far as he might. Narcissism is introduced by Marcuse primarily in order to address a theoretical problem: how to tame eros, by making it self-sublimating. Understood thusly, narcissism remains under the thrall of the (genital) ideal of erotic gratification. In fact, narcissism reflects the operation of a more primitive (pregenital) quest for fusion with the All. Aspects of Marcuse's erotic utopia, particularly the way in which it would eventuate in a reunion with nature, certainly reflect this quest for fusion. However, precisely because this quest is not integrated with the narcissism principle, its progressive and regressive aspects are not always well differentiated by Marcuse. In other words, Marcuse does not take the narcissism principle seriously enough. It is not merely the helpmate of eros, as Marcuse would have it, but also the vehicle by which nature autonomy becomes a source of libidinal satisfaction. Nevertheless, it would be churlish harshly to criticize Marcuse for not fully capturing the dialectic of narcissism. Marcuse took the hint in Freud that narcissism might contain the seed of an alternative reality principle, and developed it. Our deliberations only confirm Marcuse's insight: that in spite of the reified power of the reality principle, humanity aims at a utopia in which its most fundamental needs would be fulfilled. Our considerations reveal only the subtle complexity of these needs; their existence is corroborated.

Acknowledgment

Two readers for Theory and Society made a number of helpful comments.

Notes


7. Lasch, *The Minimal Self* (N.Y.: W. W. Norton and Co.), 227-234, and passim. Several reviewers have argued that Lasch does not give the Frankfurt School, and especially Marcuse, sufficient credit as a source of his own views. See, for example, Mark Crispin Miller’s review of *The Minimal Self* in *The Atlantic* (November, 1984):148.


12. Ibid.

13. To read Chodorow in this way would be to misinterpret her, however. Though she does not develop the point, she clearly recognizes that narcissism can serve mutuality (306).


16. Ibid., 154.


23. *Eros*, xi-x.


27. Ibid., xi-xiv.


32. Grunberger takes pains to stress that he does not see primary narcissism in terms of the infant’s fusion with mother, “The primal narcissistic state, to my way of thinking, is not the narcissistic child-mother fusion, which in a way tends to be maintained for a while
after birth, but the fusion of the child with his world, which for him is the world" (Narcissism, 267). Chasseguet-Smirgel differs, seeing the narcissistic state very much in terms of fusion with mother ("The Ego Ideal, 8, 184). However, Grunberger's distinction may be more subtle than is warranted by the diffuse ego of the infant. Why should we not assume that for the infant the mother is the world? In this case, the distinction between the infant's fusion with mother and fusion with his world is superfluous.

33. Grunberger, Narcissism, 78.
35. Chasseguet-Smirgel explicitly notes how very close her concept of the ego ideal stands to the concept of object mastery, The Ego Ideal, 44.
36. The Ego Ideal, 181–182.
38. Jay Greenberg and Stephen Mitchell, Object Relations in Psychoanalytic Theory (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1983), 316. Lasch, in The Minimal Self, notes how little consensus there really is over the status of the ego ideal, 178–182, 284–286. Marcus occasionally refers to the ego ideal, especially in the psychoanalytic essays collected in Five Lectures. However, the references are quite untheoretical, reflecting none of the duality of the concept considered here (54, 60).
39. The Ego Ideal, 37.
40. Ibid., 187–188.
41. Narcissism, 245.
42. Forward, xii in Narcissism.
43. Eros, 149. The classic source for the myth of Narcissus is Ovid's account in Metamorphoses, book III. That Marcus does not present the full (and less than completely joyful) story of his anti-heroes is well known. See Bullfinch's Mythology (New York: Avenel Books, 1979), 101–105; 185–189.
46. Eros, 1952.
47. Ibid., 199–202.
48. Ibid., 195–197. Lipshires is helpful on this point, 45–47.
50. Eros, 195.
51. Ibid., 196.
53. Science and the Revenge of Nature: Marcuse and Habermas (Gainesville, University Presses of Florida, 1985), chap. 3. The much debated relation between freedom and necessity in Marcuse's work is also addressed in this chapter, thus it shall not be recapitulated here.
54. Diluted is my term. Marcus refers to the "binding" of eros, presumably alluding to Freud's distinction between bound nervous processes, which do not press for discharge, and mobile processes, which do (Eros, 76), Freud, Beyond the Pleasure Principle, trans. James Strachey (New York: Liveright, 1950), 43.
55. Eros, 142.
57. *An Essay on Liberation* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1969), 31. Marcuse is referring here to *eros* under the influence of the aesthetic sensibility, but that does not affect the issue at hand.
62. Ibid., 177–178.
64. *Narcissism*, 21.
72. See note 5.