models of small groups (Guetzkow). Some approaches, moreover, are stated so persuasively and provocatively as to invite their further systematic application. Thus the essays by Hartz, McCloskey, Hagan, and Morgenthau suggest possibilities yet to be explored. Furthermore, it is impossible not to learn from Scott Greer's analysis of the way the facts of urban life challenge democratic political theory or from Lindsay Roger's spirited reflections on the present-day political theory curriculum. And finally, some contributions—notably Norman Jacobson's plea for the integrity of political theory and Foster H. Sherwood's discussion of the relation between political science and law—are so evidently marked by sound sense that they merit a second look.

To single these essays out for capsule comment is not to disparage others. Collectively, they succeed in giving substance to the image of American political science as an undisciplined discipline, as essentially accessible, competitive, flexible, and dynamic. For this, two cheers are not too many.

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Soviet Marxism: A Critical Analysis. BY HERBERT MARCUSE. (New York: Columbia University Press. 1958. Pp. 271. $4.50.)

According to the author, the chief difference between Soviet Marxism and the system originally developed by Marx concerns the problem of the transition from capitalism to socialism. In the original Marxian system, he says, this can be brought about only by the revolutionary action of the working class itself. Should capitalism be overthrown, say, by a peasant revolution, the result could not be the advent of socialism. The original system also rules out the emergence of a socialist order from a revolution initiated and brought to fruition by a party, a vanguard distinct from the proletarian masses and acting independently of them, even if such a party should claim to act on behalf of the proletariat. It is clear, then, that the Bolshevik revolution was not one from which the advent of socialism could be expected on Marxian grounds: the active element in it was represented by a tightly knit revolutionary *élite* and a largely peasant mass rather than by the working class as such. Of course, no socialist revolution true to the Marxian precepts could take place in Tsarist Russia where industrial capitalism was only weakly developed. Lenin and his associates did not observe the Marxian timetable; no wonder that their revolution and its aftermath developed along un-Marxian lines.

This line of argument is, of course, a familiar one, but Professor Marcuse elaborates it in unusual fashion. He does not content himself with saying that the Bolsheviks were trying to put Marxian socialism into practice where the preliminary conditions for this, as specified by Marx, did not exist. He also offers an explanation and an excuse. In the western countries that were "ripe" for socialism by the Marxian criteria, he points out, the working class simply refused to play a revolutionary role. In view of this, the advent of socialism as conceived by Marx became a highly dubious matter. What, then, was a true Marxist to do? If he adhered to the Marxian prescriptions about revolution,

the only consequence could be that there would be no revolution at all. Orthodoxy as to detail entailed betrayal of the principle, the revolutionary final objective of Marxism. It was, however, possible to rescue the substance of Marxism while deviating from it in detail. There could still be a revolution, in spite of the defection of the western proletariat, if one succeeded in raising revolutionary forces outside the industrial orbit and the western world. This is what Lenin and his associates did—they mobilized, for revolutionary purposes, the Russian peasantry, a strategy that enabled them to substitute "socialism in one country" for "world revolution." After Lenin's time, the colonial masses also were enlisted in the struggle against western capitalism. In this way, the Marxian "final crisis" of capitalism, originally conceived of in terms of domestic cleavages within the western countries, assumed the form of political tension between two powerful blocs, the East and the West. Neither being strong enough to challenge and defeat the other, they must "co-exist."

Professor Marcuse proposes to explain the basic features of the Soviet regime in terms of the realities of this "co-existence." To begin with, it was vital for Soviet Russia to develop a heavy industrial base. This in turn imposed totalitarian methods of regimentation. The Marxian concept of socialism calls for direct control of the means of production by the "immediate producers" themselves, but the Soviet regime introduced only control by the state. There was "nationalization," but no "socialization." Actual conditions did not correspond to the Marxian image of socialism. The Soviet regime, however, did not acknowledge this discrepancy. It pretended that its principles and policies were genuinely socialist and Marxian. Hence, the regime's language became permeated with "ideological" falsehood. What it asserted day in and day out was controverted by the most palpable, direct evidence.

This, too, has been observed before, but here again Prof. Marcuse draws unexpected conclusions. "Taken by themselves," the Soviet regime's assertions about its genuinely socialist character are "obviously false." This falsity, however, does not "invalidate" them in their proper context, because the validity of this kind of statement does not depend on truthfulness in the ordinary sense. The Soviet falsehoods are "magic" formulae which, if repeated day in and day out, help to bring about the facts that they falsely assert to be already in existence. In this sense, the untrue, magical formulae are related to historical truth (the truth about the final advent of socialism). They are "turned into an instrument for rescuing the truth" (p. 88).

This pattern of reasoning runs through the whole book. The liberal and Marxist critique of the Soviet regime is reproduced only to be dismissed as irrelevant. Soviet Marxism, Professor Marcuse feels, cannot be properly judged on the basis of its past record or of the truthfulness of its utterances. The only thing that counts is what one may expect from it in the future. Will the Soviet Union perpetuate a repressive, tyrannical regime? Or was its totalitarian dictatorship merely a necessary stage that had to be traversed in order to prepare the advent of a truly socialist, classless society? A final judgment about Soviet Marxism will be possible only when enough data are available to answer these questions.

The facts known to date, Professor Marcuse says, permit no "workable hypothesis" as to the final *dénouement*, but his "critical analysis" is clearly oriented toward the second alternative. At least, it cannot be ruled out on the basis of our present knowledge: "negatively, it seems that nothing in the structure of Soviet society would exclude such a long-range development" (p. 188). And positively, the observable trend runs in the direction of the relaxation of domestic terror and the easing of international tension. Soviet economic policies are aimed at creating those conditions of plenty under which true, democratic socialism or communism becomes practicable. The main obstacle in the way of this is the heavy military expenditure that is imposed by the international situation. This tends to strengthen and perpetuate the repressive features of the Soviet regime; in the West, it tends to stabilize the capitalist economy and to stifle the revolutionary propensities of the proletariat. Totalitarian repression in the East and rigid stability in the West mutually condition each other. "The history of Soviet society seems to be fatefully linked to that of its antagonist. Over and above the construction of socialism or communism in one country and in one orbit, the essentially international element of socialism seems to prevail" (pp. 189 f.). In other words, socialism cannot triumph as long as the East-West cleavage persists.

Can this deadlock be overcome? The first thing needed would be the self-liberation of the Russian masses, but this is impossible as long as the antagonism between East and West continues to exist. What is more, self-liberation remains questionable even in case international tension subsides. In the concluding part of his book, dealing with the ethics of Soviet Marxism, Professor Marcuse discusses the possibility that long conditioning under totalitarian pressure may have weakened the moral fiber of the Russian people to such an extent that they no longer are capable of any movement of self-assertion against the state. This trend also is world-wide; "security" has supplanted "freedom" as an ideal in the West too.

The discussion becomes exceedingly confused at this point; the author first denies (p. 260) and then asserts (pp. 266 f.) that a sound ethical value system must be anchored in the moral autonomy of the individual. It remains obscure whether the loss of moral autonomy is or is not compatible with the emergence of the good society which for Professor Marcuse is the "socialist or communist democracy." The final conclusion, however, seems to be that, aided by the trend toward relaxation and a welfare economy, the libertarian components of Marxism may still come to the fore in the Russian society.

Professor Marcuse's analysis treats Soviet Marxism as a stage in mankind's struggle toward freedom and socialism. It pertains more to social mythology than to political critique. It is, of course, necessary to look at the Soviet system as a changing entity and to explain Soviet policies in terms of the international environment. In this undertaking, however, unreal concepts such as the revolutionary mission of the proletariat or the control of the economy by the "immediate producers" do not seem to me to be helpful.

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