by Clyde Kluckhohn and the two present authors. The new volume is superior in that full documentation is offered and a more acceptable manner of presentation is employed. (The earlier one tried to grasp Soviet reality from unusual—and often artificial—points of view.)

The results of the analysis are presented in Chapters IV through XV, while the first three chapters are devoted to a methodological introduction, the main purpose of which is to explain the use, in 1959, of data referring to 1940, despite all the tremendous events and changes which have occurred over the past twenty years. The final chapter, “The Future of Soviet Society,” is an attempt to predict the future on the basis of the assumption that contemporary Russia is a field where two forces operate—one inherent in totalitarian society, the other characteristic of modern industrial society. As might be expected, the prediction remains rather indeterminate. Most of the chapters forming the core of the book begin with surveys of particular aspects of the development of Soviet society prior to 1940, and end with brief surveys of most recent developments. The latter are based on contemporary literature as well as on impressions formed by the authors during brief trips to the USSR in 1956 and 1957, and from conversations with a large number of other recent visitors.

The authors’ findings cannot be summarized in detail here, but they investigated such areas as occupational stratification and mobility, the ways of making a living, getting an education, keeping up with the news, selecting mates and friends, rearing children, the attitudes of various socioeconomic and other groups toward the Welfare State and economic and political institutions, the sources of hostility and disaffection, the sources of cleavage (class, party-nonparty, and nationality). The question of nationality has been handled wisely by dealing with the differential attitudes of the Russians and the Ukrainians, for the number of informants of other nationalities was not sufficient to support reliable conclusions.

Since the authors are well aware that their sample is not representative, they have concentrated their attention on the differential attitudes of various groups and categories. Thus, for instance, they do not say anything about the absolute degree of hostility to the regime, but establish that hostility consistently increases as one goes down the social ladder.

The authors have found that there are certain aspects of the Soviet regime which are generally accepted: the educational system, socialized medicine, and the wide scope of coverage provided by the social security system. There are also widely detested aspects, primarily what the authors call “the Stalin system of social control.” There is, they say, little class antagonism, but a deep cleavage between party and nonparty men. They conclude that access to education does not vary significantly between Russians and Ukrainians, that the attitudes of the Russians and Ukrainians toward the Welfare State do not differ, that only a small proportion of Russians and Ukrainians objects to marriage across the ethnic line. This does not mean, however, that there is no Ukrainian national sentiment or no separatism. Unfortunately, the investigation of this problem did not yield very conclusive results since it used as a frame of reference the antagonism between the Ukrainian Autocephalous Church and the Synodal Church (that is, the Ukrainian branch of the Moscow Patriarchate). In general, the problem of religion has been rather neglected.

In the reviewer’s opinion, this volume is one of the best and most enlightening studies of Soviet society. Of course, it deals with it as it was in 1940. But a solid static account of Stalin’s Russia is an indispensable requisite to the understanding of today’s trends, just as solid knowledge about prerevolutionary Russia (which, alas, more often than not has been conspicuous by its absence) was and is essential for the study and understanding of the development of Russia during the first quarter century of Communist rule.

N. S. Timasheff

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This book examines Soviet Marxism as a coherent system of thought that attempts to comprehend both Marxism and a world situation that Marx never foresaw. The author argues that the principles of Marxism are built into the very foundations of the Soviet regime and that ideological pronouncements therefore have a meaning and a function beyond that of cynical manipulation, for which purpose the trappings of Marxism might well be an encumbrance and an embarrassment. The outlook of Soviet Marxism has been, however, inevitably molded by the circumstances in which the Soviet regime has found itself. Of these, the fact that the socialist revolution occurred in backward Russia has been less important than the unforeseen “adjustment” and stabilization of capitalism in the industrialized West and the abdication of the proletariat from its revolutionary role. It is awareness of this “adjustment,” never explicitly acknowledged, in ten-
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sion with fundamental Marxian concepts, that spans all the many shifts in the party line from Lenin to Khrushchev with a remarkable overall consistency. What Marx called the “real” interests of the working class (as opposed to its “immediate” interests) have been hypostatized by Soviet Marxism in the Soviet state. The Soviet state has replaced the international proletariat as the protagonist of the socialist revolution, and this has resulted not, as Lenin put it, in the transfer of the class struggle to an international plane, but in a “struggle between states for populations and spaces,” in Marcuse’s words.

At the moment, the struggle is at an impasse. Every aggressive move on the part of the Soviet Union seems to consolidate the Western powers more effectively and prevent the dissolution of capitalism. Soviet successes in the underdeveloped regions of the world do not immediately or decisively alter the situation. It is the industrialized nations that count, and against them, the risks of military aggression are too formidable. The “socialist future” depends on a reactivation of the class struggle in the West. On the assumption that it is not immediately forthcoming, a long-range policy of “coexistence” is based. The object of “coexistence” is, in the realm of foreign policy, to knock the prop of military production and a consolidated international economy from under the capitalist West, while completing “the transition from socialism to communism” in the Soviet Union. In Marxist terms this transition takes place when productivity is sufficiently developed so that distribution may take place according to the needs of the individuals, and the administration of things replace the government of men; or, in Stalin’s terms (which completely transform the Marxist meaning) when the working day can be reduced to five or six hours and real wages doubled. The dissolution of capitalism will begin when the Soviet Union has demonstrably outstripped the West in productivity.

The rapid increase of productivity in the Soviet Union has been achieved by the Soviet state through an unprecedentedly systematic application of repression against the “needs of the individuals,” either in the form of naked terror, or through propaganda and exhortation whereby the individual is induced to become his own Minister of the Interior. In the present phase of coexistence, terror has given way to persuasion. Since the increasing tempo of international competition, as well as the expectations aroused by relaxation, make a return to terror impractical, the success of the regime depends on its ability to make “the individuals” internalize the norms of a productivity-ethics, which is fundamentally an ethics of repression.

Whether this internalization will be accomplished is, of course, problematic. Marcuse does not feel, as Isaac Deutscher does, that Soviet successes in the realm of productivity will in themselves (in the given Marxist context) shatter the repressive aspects of the regime. He is not that literal a Marxist. He does, however, associate Marxism with that humanistic tradition of the West that seeks the fullest possible self-realization of the individual for his own sake, and though he ruthlessly demonstrates how Marxism has been transformed into a doctrine that aims at a kind of built-in repression, he is not without hope that the liberating features of Marxism may again assert themselves. The dimness of this hope derives from the world situation of antagonism between two enormous power blocs.

In contrast to the sanguine utopianism of his previous book, Eros and Civilization, in which Marcuse saw modern industrial production as having created the conditions for liberation of the deepest self without detriment to civilization, and in which he dazzlingly celebrated the marriage of Marx and Freud, the conclusions he points to in Soviet Marxism are rather bleak. The longer the Soviet Union and the West remain at odds, the more their development is determined by their antagonistic relationship; and the more they come to resemble each other. Marcuse brings the best insights of his masters (Hegel, Marx, Freud) to bear on his analysis of Soviet Marxism, and the result is a dense, eloquent, and convincing book, demonstrating that what these masters revealed of human possibilities is not about to be accomplished in the modern world.

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SIDNEY MONAS


In English, the title means Principles of Sociology. The author, professor on the law faculty in Belgrade and one of the leading members of the International Sociological Society, begins with the traditional attempt to define the place of sociology in regard to other social sciences and natural science. Most interesting for the reader, however, is his differentiation of sociology from Marxism. He maintains that historical materialism is nothing but another theory of society; furthermore, he points out that the theory is not sufficiently elaborated and tied to the manifoldness of social phenomena (p. 66). Quoting Lenin, he