occur, rather than as they lend themselves to the necessary manipulation if one is to prove an evolution toward socialism.

Perhaps the most remarkable thing about the essays is the general agreement that there should be a "true and proper general theory of Law and the State founded on an established system of values." The Marxists of Russia and Hungary insist that no true sociology of law is possible without the Marxist theory of Law and the State being immanent, and even the Americans insist that a modern concept of natural law is an essential precondition for the sociology of law to function properly. The net effect is that while the method of the "sociology of law" is modern, behavioral, and sociological, its objective is the establishment of theories of law based on natural law concepts. This blending of the modern and the traditional is perhaps indicative of the real status of the sociology of law as it is viewed by sociologists whose objective is to understand and change the law, and lawyers whose object is to preserve it.

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Both of these books are important and thought-provoking, illustrating from different perspectives the malaise in regard to our society experienced by certain intellectuals and student radicals. No one will deny their timeliness, although many may question their conclusions.

In The Poverty of Liberalism Professor Wolff offers four trenchant ess-
says on the meaning of Liberty, Loyalty, Power, and Tolerance, principles which he identifies as the shibboleths of contemporary liberalism. He demonstrates their inability to provide a basis for problem solving in our industrial and technological world and in his concluding essay argues the proposition that only by the acceptance of the concept of Community can the way be opened to the rational resolving of our present discontents.

The essay on Liberty is a refreshing critique of John Stuart Mill and of his influence on the evolution of liberal thought. Wolff contends that the arguments in Mill's Essay on Liberty, accepted as gospel by Liberals, actually support conservative values, while those in his Political Economy, esteemed by Conservatives as extolling laissez faire, in reality lead to the justification of the welfare state. He holds further that Mill's logic, if followed rigorously, does not support freedom of speech or religion, but rather results in their suppression, and this on good utilitarian grounds. Ultimate confusion is introduced into liberalism by its attempt to engraft Mill's political individualism upon a sociology of collectivism derived from Weber, Durkheim, and Marx.

A similar disarray exists in the liberal camp over the issue of Loyalty. After a preliminary conceptual analysis of Loyalty and Disloyalty, Wolff takes up the perennial problem of political philosophy, "Does a man ever have a moral obligation to be loyal to the State?". Here liberalism has muddied the waters by denouncing Loyalty Oaths, "guilt by association" and "compelled conformity," while at the same time requiring an unreserved acceptance of Mill's doctrines.

On the problem of Power, or in political terms "Who governs?" the Liberals, true to their heritage, champion a pluralistic society against the Radicals' thesis of government by a "Power Elite." Although on this issue, at least
in America, the author believes the Liberals are right, they have manipulated their doctrine into a defense of stability, moderation and the negation of ideology. In so doing they perpetuate the status quo in which the common problems of society remained unsolved because they are not made the object of anyone’s decision.

As a consequence of the Liberals’ understanding of Mill, Tolerance is looked upon by them as the guiding genius of their pluralistic democracy. But political pluralism and its accompanying Tolerance, “is fatally blind to the evils which affect the body politic... obstructing consideration of precisely the sort of thoroughgoing social revisions which may be needed to remedy those evils.”

It follows that liberal democracy, whatever its merits in the past, has outlived its usefulness and is now a fetter upon human progress and an intensifier of man’s alienation. What is now required is the acceptance of the idea of Community, based on a rationally arrived at agreement as to common interests and values, which will override the private, competitive interests of individuals. The establishment of a new society centered on Community should be striven for through rational discourse and by convincing men of its desirability; it is not foreordained by historic necessity. In this sense Wolff identifies with the tradition of the Enlightenment rather than that of Marx.

Herbert Marcuse’s Essay on Liberation is also a critical attack upon contemporary society. Marcuse, however, for all his Hegelianism, is basically a romantic. His philosophical apparatus is a murky mixture of Hegel, Freud, and Marx, augmented in this book with borrowings from Kant and the aesthetics of modern art. Building upon ideas developed in his earlier works Eros and Civilization and One Dimensional Man he reacts to the situation presented by the phenomenon of the New Left. Marcuse’s basic proposition is a simple one: the existing industrial society in the West is one which degrades man by frustrating and inhibiting his inherent “biological” drive for self-expression and freedom. It does this in a particularly “obscene” way by manipulating the social environment so that men accept their debasement and lose their revolutionary drive. In his earlier work Marcuse had concluded that the possibility of revolution under these conditions was unlikely. In his present book a note of guarded optimism is introduced. The pre-conditions for revolution are being created by the young intellectuals, members of the “New Left,” who although the beneficiaries of the affluent society, have comprehended it for what it is, and by their criticism have called into question its moral right to exist. But the New Left, although it may unmask the corruption of capitalist society, cannot produce its overthrow without the backing of the masses. It must, therefore, return to the proletariat and by educating it as to its true interests and condition, forge the weapon which will revolutionize the world. That this is at least a possibility lies at the basis of Marcuse’s new-found optimism.

The impact of the book will be chiefly felt by that section of the New Left which has accepted Marcuse as their guru, and by those amongst the rebellious youth who will see in it the intellectual legitimization of their own emotional alienation. Not all will fall under the spell, as is ironically evidenced by Daniel Cohn-Bendit’s recent denunciation of Marcuse for “selling out to the establishment.” Amongst his academic colleagues, Marcuse will have his following, but many will be repelled by his essential negativism, and his apparent willingness to justify suppressive means to achieve vague and elusive ends.

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